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ABSTRACT 
 
When the Government of National Unity took office in 1994, it inherited a country with 
severe inequalities in resource distribution and land ownership. In particular, it 
inherited a housing crisis which was, to a large extent, caused by apartheid 
legislation and policies. This research focuses on the housing crisis post-1994 by 
considering the impact and effect of the constitutional right to have access to 
adequate housing, especially for those living in intolerable conditions. It does so by 
utilising a social-scientific approach to the law. This approach acknowledges that the 
housing right must exist alongside other social phenomena and as a part of every-
day life in South Africa. Accordingly, the implementation of the housing right by three 
local municipalities in the Eastern Cape is examined.  
 
Following an initial overview of the history of housing and local government in South 
Africa, the study focuses on the current legislative framework for housing and the 
interpretation of the housing right (and other socio-economic rights) in certain court 
decisions. These decisions are discussed, not only because of the impact they have 
had on communities living in intolerable situations, but, as importantly, because they 
have developed standards against which policy and planning should be measured. 
These standards are used in the study to evaluate housing provision in three 
municipalities.  The evaluation (by means of interviews and assessment of planning 
documentation) demonstrates that the recognition of the housing right in the 
Constitution and by the courts does not necessarily translate into effective 
recognition and implementation by the state. The research shows that the failure to 
plan proactively, lack of co-operative governance and inadequate controls over 
financial and human resources thwart the realisation of the housing right by local 
government.  It is recommended that, in order to make the housing right a reality, 
research into the housing right (and indeed other socio-economic rights) should 
scrutinise the management of financial and human resources of the state in the 
context of the policy, planning and implementation environment. Where research is 
able to show evidence of unspent budgets, insufficient planning and mismanagement 
of resources, courts would be able to focus on the implementation aspect of the 
housing right, and ensure that it may yet have a meaningful impact on the lives of 
millions of some of the most vulnerable people in society. 
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To me a Constitution is like a house, 
carefully designed, built and handed over for use. 
Whether it becomes a happy family home 
 or a house of ill fame 
depends on its inhabitants 
 
-- Professor RH Christie ‘Editorial’ (1968) RLJ 3 
 
 
 
 
These restless broken streets where definitions fail – the houses the outhouses of 
white suburbs,  two-windows-one-door, multiplied in institutional rows; the hovels with 
tin lean-tos sheltering huge old American cars blowsy with gadgets; the fancy 
suburban burglar bars on mean windows of tiny cabins; the roaming children, 
wolverine dogs, hobbled donkeys, fat naked babies, vagabond chickens and drunks 
weaving, old men staring, authoritative women shouting, boys in rags, tarts in finery, 
the smell of offal cooking, the neat patches of mealies between shebeen yards 
stinking of beer and urine,  the litter of twice-discarded possessions, first thrown out 
by the white man and then picked over by the black – is this conglomerate urban or 
rural?  No electricity in the houses, a telephone an almost impossible luxury: is this a 
suburb or a strange kind of junk yard?  The enormous backyard of the whole white 
city where categories and functions lose their ordination and logic … a ‘place’; a 
position whose contradictions those who impose them don’t see, and from which will 
come a resolution they haven’t provided for. 
 
-- Nadine Gordimer Burger’s Daughter (1979) 
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 1 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction  
 
1.1 The general purpose of this study 
 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to identify the meaning and content of 
the constitutional right to have access to adequate housing, as implemented 
by local government in the Eastern Cape.  In particular, the dissertation 
focuses on the provision of housing for those people who have no roof over 
their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations. 
The reasons for this study will become apparent from the narrative below, 
which provides a context for the research. 
 
On 18 April 2002, a court ordered the eviction of Kholisile Kam Kam and 37 
others and also authorised the demolition of their shacks.  His story is simple: 
 
‘I started living in the Hooggenoeg Squatter Camp … during October of 
last year.  I had previously resided on a farm at “Assegaai Bos” 
situated alongside the Port Elizabeth road.  I moved to the 
Hooggenoeg Squatter Camp as I am 101 years of age and it is difficult 
for me to access my old age welfare grant from Assegaai Bos.  In 
addition, I had begun to require medical care more frequently and it 
was difficult for me to get to the Provincial Hospital from Assegaai Bos. 
I also feared that living at Assegaai Bos, I could become too ill to take 
myself to hospital and there were no other people living in the nearby 
vicinity who would then be able to assist me in my plight.  I currently 
live in a shack made out of mud wood and zinc.’1 
 
Kholisile is one of about 9.1 million people who lack access to adequate 
housing and secure tenure in South Africa.2 He is among South Africa’s 
                                                 
1
 Supporting Affidavit of Kholisile Kam Kam in the unreported proceedings of Davies and 
others v Makana Municipality (case no 391/02 ECD) paras 3 and 4.  
2
 ‘9.1 million awaiting houses – Minister’ The Herald 26 May 2004.  
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poorest who live in urban shack settlements, in backyards,3 under stairs,4 
dangerously close to railway lines,5 and under highway bridges.6 Tenure in 
these situations is precarious and conditions are often intolerable.  Kholisile 
chose to live in these appalling conditions because of his need to access his 
welfare grant and obtain regular medical attention.  Owing to high levels of 
unemployment and relatively low wage levels, those younger than he often 
choose to live in these places because they are located close to formal job 
opportunities or points of entry into the informal economy.7 
 
Kholisile’s right to have access to adequate housing is protected in terms of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
Section 26 of the Constitution states: 
 
‘(1)    Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
 (2)   The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of this right.  
                                                 
3
 For example, in Diepsloot (near Johannesburg) alone, about 16 000 families, or 150 000 
people, live in backyard shacks, many of them assembled from scrap metal, wood, plastic or 
cardboard.  Dlamini, quoted in Atkinson (2006) 2. 
4
 See, for example, the Respondent’s heads of argument in City of Cape Town v Rudolph and 
others (2003) 11 BCLR 1236 (C): ‘The 21st respondent and his wife and two children … were 
literally thrown out of a property they had rented because of their inability to pay rent.  They 
were then sneaking into the Parkville school and sleeping under the stairs, until they were told 
by the teachers to leave.  Before they moved to the property [from which the applicant sought 
to evict them], they were “strolling”.  They would sleep in the school premises, at the back of 
the clinic, and near the dumping area.  As a result, the children were continuously sick.’ 
Rudolph heads of argument at para 12.10. My italics. 
5
 See SARCC v Unlawful occupants of the Western Cape commuter Area between Nolungile 
and Nonkqubela Stations, Khayelitsha  (unreported case no 2452/03 CPD) where the South 
African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC) sought to evict persons living within the rail 
reserve in Khayelitsha.  The SARCC alleged inter alia: that an informal dwelling had been 
erected entirely enclosing a substation and access could be obtained only through the 
informal dwelling itself.  In addition, it alleged that children played on and in the proximity of 
the railway track resulting in 5 deaths and 73 injuries along the railway line.  See the SARCC 
founding affidavit at para 4.3 and 4.6 respectively.  See also City of Cape Town v The various 
occupiers of the road reserve of the applicant parallel to Sheffield Road, Phillipi (unreported 
case no A5/03 CPD) in respect of occupation of a road reserve.  These cases are discussed 
in chapter 4 below. 
6
 See Transitional Metropolitan Substructure of Cape Town v The occupants of erven 182, 
183, 194 and 195 Cape Town (unreported case no 1791/1996 CPD) where the local authority 
sought to evict people living under a bridge at the foreshore of Cape Town.  
7
 In the municipality where Kholisile lived (viz. Makana Local Municipality), the 1996 and 2001 
censuses record that unemployment continues to increase with unemployment figures almost 
doubling from 8912 to 14489 people respectively,  with a group of 21 054 people classed as 
‘not economically active’. (IDP Review Process: Makana Local Municipality June (2004) 10). 
 3 
 (3)   No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances.  No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.’ 
 
What does this right actually mean to Kholisile?  In other words, what would 
Kholisile’s options have been when faced with eviction? 
 
1.1.1 Housing Subsidy 
 
One of the options available to Kholisile would be to apply for a state housing 
subsidy to meet his housing needs.  These subsidies are available to people 
who earn less then R3 500 a month.8  For someone who earns less than 
R800 per month and is aged or disabled like Kholisile, the full subsidy would 
be payable.9  If Kholisile qualified in terms of the criteria set by the National 
Housing Department, he would be entitled to such a subsidy and the local 
government where Kholisile lived (viz. Makana Local Municipality) would add 
him to their housing waiting list.  Kholisile would then have to wait his turn. 
 
However, the problem with Kholisile waiting his turn is that, given the huge 
housing backlogs across the country, he would have to wait a long time – too 
long for a 101-year-old man – before he received a state-subsidised house. 
Despite the construction of over 1.5 million houses across South Africa 
between 1994 and 2003,10 huge housing backlogs across the country remain. 
In Makana Local Municipality, Kholisile would be placed 12 001 on an 
                                                 
8
 In 2002 (the year of Kholisile’s intended eviction), Kholisile would have been entitled to a 
housing subsidy of R20 300.  McLean 55-6 notes that the housing subsidy was originally set 
at a maximum of R16 000 for the poorest households, which was then increased in 2002 to 
R20 300.  It currently stands at R36 528 per household.  See chapter 3 and Annexure B 
below. 
9
 Apart from the income requirements, beneficiaries for housing subsidies must not have 
benefited from the housing benefit scheme (nor their spouses or partners).  In addition, 
beneficiaries must also be: 
• married, cohabiting, or have at least one proven financial dependent; 
• a lawful resident of South Africa; 
• twenty-one years or older; and 
• a first time property owner. 
(see Housing Code para 2.2.1). 
10
 Gardner, quoted in COHRE Report 7. 
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outdated housing waiting list.11 In addition, he would have no hope of getting a 
house until well after 2007/2008, given that in 2005 the Eastern Cape 
Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs (the 
Provincial Department) communicated with all municipalities in the Eastern 
Cape that no new housing projects would be approved until 2007/2008.12  
 
Notwithstanding the long waiting list, the housing backlog and the provincial 
moratoriam on new housing projects, Kholisile would face further problems 
once he finally receives his house.  While he would enjoy security of tenure 
and a house of bricks and mortar, the subsidised house would, in all 
likelihood, be situated on the urban periphery, far from the main transport 
routes and access to the Provincial hospital.13 
 
1.1.2 Informal settlement accommodation 
 
Another option would be for Kholisile to erect a shack in another of Makana’s 
informal settlements.  However, Kholisile is likely to face the same risks and 
disadvantages as he faced in Hooggenoeg Squatter Camp.14  Before he 
finishes building his shack in an informal settlement in Grahamstown, it is 
                                                 
11
 Telephone interview with Housing Manager, Makana Local Municipality (4 December 
2006).  According to this communication, the municipality assessed its housing backlog at 12 
000 families in 2003 and has not made another assessment since then. This outdated figure 
is repeated in an Eastern Cape Growth and Development Summit District Profile Report 
(2007) at 15 with its source recorded as: ‘Information as provided by LMs [Local 
Municipalities], 2006’.  In the circumstances, it is highly likely that the municipality does not 
have accurate information about its housing backlog. See chapter 6 for a discussion of these 
statistics. 
12
 Provincial Circular 1 of 2005 set out that the provincial government would not be 
considering applications for funding of any housing projects until 2007/2008.  The reasons for 
this circular will become apparent in chapter 6. 
13
 McLean 55-16 notes that most new housing developments are located far from the main 
economic centres.  See generally L Royston ‘On the Outskirts: Access to Well-Located Land 
and Integration in Post-apartheid Human Settlement Development’ in F Khan and P Thring 
(eds) Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2003) 234. 
14
 The Fifth SAHRC Report set out (at 14) that many of those living in informal settlements are 
in ‘a crisis situation’ and ‘living in intolerable situations’.  In City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W), the Court 
suggested that many informal settlements were flood and fire hazards where people were in 
danger of losing their lives (para 64).  See chapter 4 below. 
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probable that a contractor would be called by the municipality to dismantle the 
structure.15  
 
Kholisile, like so many others, is locked into very difficult circumstances.  He 
needs to live near the urban centre to access hospital facilities and welfare 
grant payouts, yet he cannot afford secure tenure or adequate housing.    
Private sector housing providers are too expensive and there is no NGO-run 
housing within the municipality.  In other words, there is no immediate 
prospect of relief from the state despite his undisputed right to have access to 
adequate housing. 
 
1.2 Dissertation questions 
 
The situation in which Kholisile found himself raises a number of crucial, 
interlinked questions which form the subject of this dissertation, such as: why 
is there a housing crisis in South Africa?; what measures has the state taken 
to address this housing crisis – specifically for those in desperate need?; how 
reasonable are these measures?; and how have these measures been 
implemented by local government? 
 
1.3 Structure and methodology 
 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation seeks to answer the first question set out above 
by reviewing the history of housing provision in South Africa which led to the 
inclusion into the Constitution of a right to have access to adequate housing.  
The history of housing is preceded by a review of the housing right’s 
international context and followed by a discussion of the justiciability of socio-
                                                 
15
 Some local government institutions seek to manage the growth of informal settlements by 
dismantling structures that people have started to build in the area.  The idea is that a half-
built structure cannot theoretically be called a ‘building or structure’ in terms of the definition in 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) 
and, as a result, the provisions of PIE would not apply, and the municipality would not have to 
follow court processes to secure the person’s removal.  In Grahamstown (the municipal seat 
of Makana Local Municipality), the dismantling of structures is carried out by independent 
contractors named Mayibuye.  In Johannesburg, this job is carried out by the municipality’s 
so-called ‘rapid response teams’.  See Makana interview 12 and COHRE Report 8.  
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economic rights insofar as it is necessary for a proper understanding of the 
housing right.  This review adopts a qualitative approach by drawing on 
various literary sources, including books, journal articles and discussion 
papers, white papers and legislation, reported and unreported cases. 
 
Since the aim of this dissertation is not purely historical, chapter 2 will not 
comprise an exhaustive rendition of the history of housing in South Africa. 
Instead, the chapter will focus on four areas, namely, international context in 
respect of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1996 (the ICESCR), housing after unification (viz. 1910) and under apartheid, 
housing under the first year of the Government of National Unity and 
justiciability of socio-economic rights in general. 
 
Chapter 3 seeks to answer the second question set out above by explaining 
the legislation and policy framework for housing provision.  Chapter 4 seeks to 
answer the third question in its consideration of court decisions in socio-
economic and eviction proceedings.  This part of the research seeks to clarify 
the content of the housing right with reference to case law and legislation and 
policies enacted to give effect to the right.  Literary sources are again used to 
answer this question.  In addition, this research draws on the work being done 
at the Legal Resource Centre (LRC)16 in Cape Town in defending parties 
affected by evictions – with particular regard to the pleadings drawn up by the 
LRC and organs of state in both reported and unreported eviction 
proceedings. 
 
Chapter 5 and 6 move away from strict desktop research and a case study 
method is adopted in order to answer the final question set out above.  The 
courts have continually focused on the need for policies to be reasonable not 
only in their conception, but also in their implementation.17 Thus, case studies 
are considered a useful mechanism in focusing on the implementation of 
                                                 
16
 The LRC is an independent, client-based, non-profit public interest law clinic. www.lrc.co.za 
(accessed 4 June 2005).  For an interesting history of the LRC, especially in Grahamstown, 
see M Delaney Rights to Reality – The Right to Social Security with particular emphasis on 
the Legal Resources Centre’s Welfare Project in the Eastern Cape (2003) unpublished 
Master’s dissertation, Rhodes University. 
17
 Grootboom para 41.  See chapter 4 for a discussion of this requirement. 
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housing for those in desperate need.  To do so, three local municipalities in 
the Eastern Cape are considered, namely: 
• Makana Local Municipality; 
• Sakhisizwe Local Municipality; and 
• Ngqushwa Local Municipality.18  
 
The particular history and socio-economic context of each case study area is 
canvassed in chapter 5, while provision for housing and its efficacy is 
considered in chapter 6. While these case studies cannot provide a 
generalisation of the state of local government within South Africa,19 they 
provide unique insight into common issues facing local government at the 
level of implementation – especially within the Eastern Cape.20  The research 
spans the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 period, but with the emphasis being on 
plans and interviews as at October 2006.  
 
The dissertation will then end with a chapter which seeks to bring together the 
conclusions made throughout the research.   
 
1.3.1 Rationale for case study approach 
 
The rationale for the case study approach within this dissertation originates 
from a growing concern amongst researchers21 that the trend in socio-
economic research is to pay more attention to theoretical questions relating to 
                                                 
18
 The Urban Sector Network produced an insightful source paper in October 2003 for the 
Department of Housing’s Policy and Research Agenda headed: ‘Expanding Socio-Economic 
Rights and Access to Housing’.  This report made use of interviews as a means of 
ascertaining the views of local government and the rights agenda of South African civil 
society.  Unfortunately (for our purposes), the paper focused on the role of national 
government programmes and policies, and interviews were conducted only on a national 
level.  
19
 Yin (at 10) points out that a common concern raised among social researchers about case 
studies is that they provide little basis for scientific generalisation.  Whilst this may be true in 
particular instances, Yin stresses that case studies, like experiments ‘are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes.’  In the context of this research 
then, these case studies are set out to assess whether obligations arising from the housing 
right (viz. the theoretical proposition as elucidated by the courts) have indeed been 
progressively realised by local government as required by the Constitution. 
20
 Cohen, Manion and Morrison comment (at 181) that case studies provide ‘a unique 
example of real people in real situations, enabling readers to understand ideas more clearly 
than presenting them with abstract theories or principles.’ 
21
 These legal commentators include Newman, Fernando, Kennedy and Cotterrell.  
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the fulfilment of socio-economic rights, rather than researching practical 
questions relating to their implementation. Researching practical questions is 
necessary, according to Newman, because ‘if social and economic rights are 
to mean anything to human lives, they cannot exist only at an abstract level.’22  
 
The case study approach recognises that an understanding of the right to 
have access to adequate housing requires not only systematic analysis of 
housing legislation and case law, but also an understanding of the social 
environment within which this legislation and case law must operate.23  The 
question posed here is: supposing the court does interpret the right to have 
access to adequate housing, what effect will the judgment have on the 
conduct of life outside the courtroom?  Cotterrell comments: 
 
‘Very often, surprisingly little may be known by judges and lawyers 
about the law’s potential or actual social effects.  Perhaps even more 
surprisingly, rarely is any systematic attempt made by them to find 
out.’24 
 
This case study seeks to ‘find out’ about the actual effects of measures 
adopted to realise the housing right.  In these circumstances then, the case 
study model provides a framework within which the right to have access to 
                                                 
22
 Newman 191.  Newman’s concerns echo those of the late Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Prime 
Minister of Canada, at the opening of the 1976 United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements in Vancouver: ‘Human Settlements are linked so closely to existence itself, 
represent such a concrete and widespread reality, are so complex and demanding, so laden 
with questions of rights and desires, with needs and aspirations, so racked with injustices and 
deficiencies, that the subject cannot be approached with the leisurely detachment of the 
solitary theoretician.’  My italics.  See http://www.housing.gov.za/ (accessed 11 December 
2006). 
23
 McLean 55-1 notes that, until recently, most writing on housing law and policy, and s26, 
has been undertaken either by legal academics or by housing practitioners.  The result, she 
states, is that legal academics tend to focus on the jurisprudence of socio-economic rights 
and the Constitutional Court’s seminal decision in Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and others v Grootboom and others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), while 
the housing practitioners tend to be preoccupied with the practical implementation of the state 
housing policy, unaware of its nuanced legal interpretations.  Recognising the problems that 
can result from such a one-dimensional approach, this dissertation attempts to combine both 
discourses. 
24
 Cotterrell 1. 
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adequate housing is seen ‘in actual, live conditions’.25  The case study model 
also provides insight into whether the interpretation of the housing right by the 
courts has precipitated concrete changes in housing provision at local 
government level.26  
 
The case studies in this dissertation rely on both primary data in the form of 
semi-structured interviews27 and secondary data.28  The interview method is 
used as it is considered to be one of the most important sources of case study 
information.29  
 
Key officials and project consultants operating within each municipality were 
interviewed within each case study area with the purpose of gaining 
information on the process of implementing housing policies at local 
government level.  Interviews with local government officials and project 
consultants took the form of semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
                                                 
25
 See Chaskalson 202-205 for a discussion on the link between constitutional values and 
positive action to realise socio-economic rights.  See also Moseneke 318 where he advocates 
that ‘transformative jurisprudence needs to contextualise violations in actual, live conditions.’ 
26
  See Liebenberg 233 where she queries whether rights can precipitate concrete changes in 
social policies and laws especially ‘so that they are responsive to the needs of the poor.’  Yin 
comments (at 13) that the case study approach is very effective where the researcher wants 
to cover contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to one’s 
phenomenon of study.  Similarly, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (at 181) comment that one of 
the strengths of the case study approach is that case studies can observe effects in real 
contexts, recognising that context is a powerful determinant of both causes and effects.  The 
fact that the local municipalities chosen for this study were previously part of three different 
government systems can thus be taken into account.  
27
 Questionnaires are also seen by social scientists as an acceptable method of research 
within a case study.  In addition to interviewing people at a national level, the Urban Sector 
Network (see footnote 18) attempted to use a questionnaire format at local level, largely 
unsuccessfully:  out of 40 municipalities representing all provinces and most major cities, six 
municipalities responded despite a covering letter from the Department of Housing 
accompanying such questionnaire.  Given the likelihood of a similar low return rate of 
questionnaires, the interview method was seen as a far better option. 
28
 This secondary data consists of:  
• Statistics provided by the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council 
(ECSECC); 
• Integrated Development Plans of three Eastern Cape Local Municipalities; 
• Selected annual reports of the Eastern Cape Department of Housing, Local Government 
and Traditional Affairs; 
• Selected audit reports by the Auditor-General; 
• Selected reports by the South African Human Rights Commission; 
• Selected reports by the Public Service Accountability Monitor; and 
• Media reports and political speeches. 
29
 Yin 89. Yin concludes at 92: ‘Overall, interviews are essential sources of case study 
evidence because most case studies are about human affairs.’ 
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questions.  This particular type of interview (viz. semi-structured) was chosen 
because of the perceived advantages of such a method, namely, openness in 
character and flexibility.30  This method allowed for follow up questions and, in 
some instances, led to other persons being identified and interviewed.31 
 
In preparing for the interviews, interview guides were compiled and sent to 
various interviewees at least one week before the interview took place (see 
Annexure A).  The guides displayed general themes on housing provision 
using the reasonableness test developed by the Constitutional Court and 
clarified in this dissertation.  Owing to the character of each interview situation 
(i.e. form of interview applied, role of informant in relation to local government, 
co-operation between the interviewer and the interviewee), the interview guide 
served as a structuring tool for the dialogue, as well as a device to ensure that 
the same themes were targeted in each interview. 
 
During the initial stages of the research, it became clear that the provincial 
government plays a vital part in the ability of local government to implement 
the housing right.32  Therefore, the study also considers the role of the 
Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs in the 
Eastern Cape (the Provincial Department) insofar as it assists local 
government in implementing the housing right.  This section of the research 
relies mainly on official statistics and quantitative data33 such as the annual 
reports of the Provincial Department, the Auditor-General’s reports and 
                                                 
30
 Kvale quoted in Lind 33.  Clarke 72 endorses this view in the context of interviews in 
evaluation research.  He comments that semi-structured interviews include both standardised 
questions and open-ended questions which are designed to elicit more quantitative 
information than a formal interview.  This allows the interviewer to depart from his or her 
predetermined sequence of questions, should this prove necessary within the context of the 
individual or the interview.  Clarke also comments that the semi-structured interview method 
also allows the interviewer to probe for more information by encouraging the person being 
interviewed to digress and expand upon their answers.  
31
 Yin 90 points out that the semi-structured interview allows the person interviewed to provide 
the case study investigator with sources of corroboratory or contrary evidence – and also 
initiate access to such sources.  
32
 This is confirmed by De Visser 21 who comments that the Constitution and the Housing Act 
107 of 1997 both emphasise the need for co-operation between the levels of government, 
especially between provincial and local government.  
33
 Since the Constitutional Court directed the state (including local government) to enact 
policies that are reasonable, the information provided in these documents and statistics would 
go some way to gauging compliance with this standard. 
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reports on the performance of the Provincial Department by the Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM), a civil society organisation situated in 
Grahamstown.34  It also relies on one interview with the acting senior manager 
for policy planning and research for the Provincial Department, as well as the 
testimonies of several senior officials given during a recent Commission of 
Inquiry into the Finances of the Eastern Cape (the Pillay Commission).35 
 
1.4 Scope of study 
 
1.4.1 Eastern Cape Province 
 
Apart from the obvious geographical location of Rhodes University, the 
research focus on the Eastern Cape Province is due to a unique combination 
of factors.   
 
Firstly, the Eastern Cape’s history and composition highlight the significance 
of apartheid legislation on social and economic rights and local government.36  
The province, being one of South Africa’s new provinces since 1994, is an 
amalgamated territory of two former Bantustans, the Transkei and Ciskei, and 
the eastern part of the former Cape Province, which formed part of ‘white’ 
South Africa prior to 1994.  Therefore, three different state systems previously 
operated within the province. 
 
                                                 
34
 The PSAM is an independent monitoring and research organisation based at Rhodes 
University, Grahamstown.  Its stated vision is to ‘to build African institutions and social 
relationships of accountability which ensure government responsiveness to socio-economic 
rights and the effective use of public resources’ www.psam.org.za (accessed on 3 April 2006). 
35
 This Commission was established by the Premier of the Province of the Eastern Cape, 
acting in terms of s127(2)(e) of the Constitution.  See Provincial Gazette, Proclamation No 
1440, GN 4, 7 October 2005 which established the Commission and Provincial Gazette, 
Provincial Notice 39, 7 October 2005 which set out its terms of reference. 
36
 Kriegler J makes this point in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) at para 
121 where he notes ‘[T]he impact of the apartheid system is particularly evident in the area of 
local government.’  He goes on to state: ‘Nowhere is the contrast in existential reality more 
stark than in the residential areas of the cities, towns and villages of South Africa.  In this case 
we are concerned with the vast conurbation that developed in the economic heartland of the 
country.  More specifically we are concerned with the consequences, primarily socio-
economic but ultimately political, of the vastly inferior living conditions imposed on the majority 
of residents, merely by reason of their skin colour.’ 
 
 12 
The three municipalities chosen for the case studies (viz. Makana, 
Sakhisizwe, and Ngqushwa) are geographically located in the areas where 
the Transkei, Ciskei and the Cape Provincial Administration previously 
operated.  Choosing municipalities as case studies from different parts of the 
province (and thus originating from three differing state systems) introduces 
another dimension to the dissertation, viz. do local and regional factors of the 
chosen three municipalities influence the implementation of the housing right, 
despite being situated within the same province?  
 
The second reason for the research focus is that the Eastern Cape was the 
only province to attribute its under-spending in housing to insufficient capacity 
at municipal level in both the Fourth and Fifth Annual Economic and Social 
Rights Report commissioned by the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC).37  At provincial level, the Eastern Cape Province was reported to 
have under-spent its budget vote by almost one-third, despite an estimated 
976 160 families still without housing in the Eastern Cape.38   
 
Thirdly, current research on topics of the housing right and local government 
has tended to focus on the metropolitan areas.39  These areas are mainly 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban40 with the marginal and poorer urban 
areas such as smaller municipalities within the Eastern Cape receiving less 
attention.41 
 
                                                 
37
 Fourth SAHRC Economic and Social Rights Report (no page numbers) and Fifth SAHRC 
Economic and Social Rights Report 25.  In terms of s184(1) of the Constitution, the SAHRC is 
responsible for promoting respect for human rights and a culture of human rights, promoting 
the protection, development and attainment of human rights and monitoring and assessing 
the observance of human rights in South Africa.  Section 184(2) of the Constitution gives the 
SAHRC the power ‘to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; to take 
steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; to carry out 
research; and to educate.’  In particular, the SAHRC ‘must require relevant organs of state to 
provide the Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the 
realisation of rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health, care, food, water, social 
security, education and the environment.’  The SAHRC Annual Economic and Social Rights 
Reports therefore serve as a good point of departure in considering the measures taken by 
the government with specific reference to those living in desperate need. 
38
 Ibid.  
39
 This is not surprising given that in 2003 the National Spatial Development Perspective 
stated that the biggest demand for housing in South Africa was in the metropolitan areas.  
40
 See generally COHRE Report and Beall.   
41
 For an interesting political-geographical angle on housing, see Lind. 
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1.4.2 Local Government 
 
This dissertation narrows its focus on housing by considering the participation 
of local government in housing provision.  The enhanced status of local 
government post-1996, manifested in the Constitution, together with official 
policies and legislation regarding the provision of housing,42 provides an 
interesting basis for this research.   Under the apartheid legal order and even 
in terms of the interim Constitution of South Africa,43 local government was 
the lowest tier of government in a strict hierarchical structure.  It had no 
constitutional standing on its own but derived its powers from two superior 
tiers of government, national and provincial.44  This subordinate position was 
done away with by chapter 3 (Co-operative Government) of the Constitution 
which articulated the new position of government:  
 
‘In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and 
local spheres of government, which are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated.’45  
 
From its previous subordinate position, local government has been catapulted 
into a new model of developmental local government where local government 
is given responsibilities emanating from the Constitution itself instead of 
acquiring such functions from national and provincial government.  This new 
role was affirmed by the Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council.46  Local 
government’s role has thus changed from mere functionary to an autonomous 
constitutional institution.  In other words, local government is no longer simply 
an administrative arm of central and provincial government but is a 
component of the government proper.47  Given this change of role, this  
 
                                                 
42
 See Steytler and Mastenbroek 292.   
43
 Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution). 
44
 See De Visser and Bekink for a general discussion on local government’s new status. 
45
 My italics. Section 40(1) of the Constitution. 
46
 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC).  
47
 Mastenbroek and Steytler (1997) 245. 
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research considers how local government has managed to implement the 
housing right for those in desperate need. 48  
 
1.4.3 Case study areas 
 
In order to remain within the parameters of a Master’s dissertation, only three 
local municipalities were chosen as case studies, namely, Makana Local 
Municipality, Ngqushwa Local Municipality and Sakhisizwe Local Municipality. 
As explained above, these local municipalities were chosen specifically 
because each municipality was subject to a different administration at one 
stage, namely, the Cape Provincial Administration and the administrations of 
the self-governing homelands of the Ciskei and Transkei respectively.  The 
interviews in each case study area were conducted from over the period of 
July – September 2006.49 
 
1.4.4 Provision of housing for those people who have no roof over their 
heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis 
situations 
 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and 
others,50 the Constitutional Court found that the housing programme was a 
salutary attempt to meet the housing needs of South Africans.51  However, the 
Court found that the housing programme was unreasonable in that it failed to 
cater for persons in society ‘who have no roof over their heads, and who are 
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations’.52  While much research is 
undertaken in the housing field, the provision of housing assistance in so-
called emergency situations does not receive the attention it deserves.53  This 
problematic aspect of housing is highlighted whenever people are evicted – 
from a variety of situations including backyards,54 road or rail reserves,55 
                                                 
48
 See chapter 3 of this dissertation which discusses the effect this has had on legislation. 
49
 The housing information in each case study is therefore accurate as at these dates.  
50
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 883 (CC). 
51
 Grootboom para 53. 
52
 Grootboom para 52. 
53
 Van Wyk 35. 
54
 See Makana interview 13 (discussed in chapter 6 below). 
 15 
under bridges,56 public property57 or private property.58  This research then, 
focuses on the provision of housing in emergency situations.59 
 
                                                                                                                                            
55
 SARCC v Unlawful Occupants of the Western Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile 
and Nonkqubela Stations, Khayelitsha  (unreported case no 2452/03 CPD);  
56
 Transitional Metropolitan Substructure of Cape Town v The occupants of erven 182, 183, 
194 and 196 (unreported case no 1791/96 CPD). 
57
 Grootboom.  
58
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC), 2005 (1) SA 217 
(CC) and President of the Republic of South Africa & another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
(Agri SA & others, amici curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC). 
59
 As Van Wyk clarifies at 35, ‘emergency’ is a term variously and widely defined and 
interpreted.  In its widest sense, it is related to the term ‘disaster’ in terms of the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002.  In the confines of this research, provision for those falling under 
the Disaster Management Act is not considered.  The focus of this research is rather placed 
on foreseeable emergencies; that is, evictions from, for example, land earmarked for 
development, privately-owned land and from unsafe buildings. 
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Chapter 2: 
International and historical context of housing in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A discussion of the housing right would not be complete without setting out 
why such right was included in the South African Bill of Rights in the first 
place.  This chapter therefore seeks to place the housing right in the context 
of South Africa’s turbulent history.  
 
Generally, it is acknowledged that most bills of rights arise out of times of 
struggle, with the object of preventing those conditions which led to the 
struggle never to be allowed to occur again.1  These bills of rights are 
therefore designed to ensure against conditions brought about by myopic or 
mistaken decisions in ordinary politics.2 
 
What is the decision which led to the adoption of a bill of rights and the 
inclusion of the housing right in particular?  In short, the Constitutional Court 
has stated that apartheid is that myopic or mistaken decision.3  In more 
general terms, Budlender and Latsky comment on the myopic decision known 
as apartheid in the following language: 
                                                 
1
 Brand and Heyns 1.  These bills of rights have been termed ‘transformative’ in the sense 
that they set out certain aspirations that are emphatically understood as a challenge to long-
standing practices.  See Sustein 4.  This theme runs throughout the decisions of both the 
Constitutional Court and other courts.  In Soobramoney v Minster of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 8, the Court stated that a 
‘commitment … to transform our society … lies at the heart of a new constitutional order.’  In 
The Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC); 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) para 21, the Court stated: ‘The 
Constitution is located in a history which involves a transition from a society based on 
division, injustice and exclusion from the democratic process to one which respects the 
dignity of all citizens, and includes all in the process of governance.’  See also the 
Constitutional Court decisions of Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); 1996 (6) BCLR 
752 (CC) paras 39 and 40 and City of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) 
BCLR 257 (CC) para 73.  Courts other than the Constitutional Court have also referred to the 
Constitution’s transformative role, most notably Holomisa v Khumalo 2002 (3) SA 38 (T) para 
55, Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 (12) BCLR 1328 (C) para 100 and City v 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) paras 51-52.  
2
 Sustein 4. 
3
 See Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others 2001 
(1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (Grootboom) para 6: ‘The cause of the acute 
housing shortage lies in apartheid.’  
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‘It is the kind of labyrinthine complexity which cannot and did not arise 
from a single flash of misguided brilliance.  Rather, it is the result of 
generations of legal tinkering, of piecemeal and painstaking technical 
embellishments of structures created, on the one hand, in the service 
of the grand apartheid plan and on the other hand, in response to 
ideological, development and economic realities from time to time and 
from area to area.’4 
 
Following Budlender and Latsky’s framework, the purpose of this chapter is to 
review the historical context of housing – especially as created in the service 
of the grand apartheid plan.  This review of housing is important to this 
research for three reasons: 
 
1. It provides the historical context in which the housing right was conceived 
and included in the South African Constitution.5   
2. It foreshadows the emphasis that the courts have placed on the need to 
interpret legislation within its historical context in the new democratic era.6 
3. It complements the local government historical context provided in chapter 
5 especially as it relates to the three specific case study areas chosen for 
this research.    
 
However, before the historical context of housing is discussed, it is important 
to consider the direction given by international law as to the content and 
                                                 
4
 Budlender and Latsky 155. 
5
 While this context is all important, this chapter is not intended to paint a ‘master-narrative’ of 
history, but rather to highlight important aspects of the development (or lack of development) 
of housing.  On the dangers of using history as a master-narrative, see de Vos ‘A Bridge Too 
Far?  History as Context in the Interpretation of the South African Constitution’ (2001) 17 
SAJHR 1.  
6
 In many court decisions of the pre-democratic era, judges avoided any reference to 
historical or international context in decisions on the pretext that the common-law principles 
that they applied were neutral, apolitical or acontextual.  See Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA (A) 
20A.  In the context of evictions, Van der Walt 14 comments that this kind of attitude allowed 
the apartheid government to use the eviction principles to justify the evictions and forced 
removals that entrenched fundamentally unequal land holdings along race lines. 
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meaning of the housing right.  This exercise is both helpful and imperative in 
the task of interpreting any of the rights protected by the Constitution.7 
 
2.2 International law context 
 
In South Africa, the right to have access to adequate housing is protected in 
terms of s26 of the Constitution.8  Section 39 of the Constitution obliges a 
court to consider international law as a tool for the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights.  In addition, s233 of the Constitution states that when interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.   
 
Socio-economic rights, and specifically the right to adequate housing, are 
included in numerous treaties and declarations as fundamental human rights.9  
Amongst these instruments, it is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (the Declaration)10 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
                                                 
7
 Yacoob J quotes Chaskalson P (as he then was) in Grootboom para 26 as stating: ‘[P]ublic 
international law would include non-binding as well as binding law.  They may both be used 
under the section as tools of interpretation.  International agreements and customary 
international law accordingly provide the framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be 
evaluated and understood.’  Yacoob J adds a qualifier to this statement in the same para: 
‘The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be attached 
to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary.  However, where the relevant 
principle of international law binds South Africa,  it may be directly applicable.’  
8
 The other reference to accommodation (ie. not ‘housing’ per se) is to be found in s28(1) 
where it is stated: ‘Every child has the right … (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services.’  My italics.  This is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution also makes reference to ‘adequate accommodation’.  It 
provides every detained person with the right to ‘conditions of detention that are consistent 
with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment’.  My italics. 
9
 These instruments were conveniently summarised by the Centre for Human Rights, 
University of Pretoria in November 2000 in their ‘Economic and Social Rights Series’ under ‘A 
Compilation of Essential Documents on the Rights to Accommodation, Housing and Shelter’. 
In addition to some of those instruments mentioned in that compilation, the European Social 
Charter should be added to counter the perception that the right to housing is only a ‘third 
world’ right.  The European Social Charter affirms the right of the family to social, legal and 
economic protection by means of providing family housing (Article 16). 
10
 For an interesting discussion of the status of a ‘right to housing’ in international law prior to 
the Declaration, see Craven in S Leckie (ed) National Perspectives in Housing Rights (2003) 
Kluwer Law International: London 45ff.  Craven calls this discussion a ‘pre-history’ of the right 
to housing given his belief (at 45) that ‘the most notable feature of international activity prior to 
1945 is the almost total absence of serious contemplation of anything in the nature of a “right 
to housing”’. 
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and Cultural Rights of 1996 (the ICESCR) which have had the most pervasive 
effect on the conception of the housing right in South Africa.11  Article 25(1) of 
the Declaration states:  
 
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and his family,  including food,  clothing, 
housing and medical care, necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.’12  
 
The ICESCR13 was drafted to give effect to the socio-economic rights in the 
Declaration and the right to housing is explicitly protected in terms of Article 
11(1) which elaborates on the above-quoted clause: 
 
‘The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.  The State Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of this right recognising to 
this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.’14  
 
                                                 
11
 The South African National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
(NAP) lists South Africa’s international obligations with regard to housing and shelter as being 
guided by Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 11 of the 
ICESCR.  It also refers to ‘the objectives, principles and recommendations contained in the 
[UN-Habitat’s] Global Urban Observatory Programme and Habitat Agenda.’  See Urban 
Sector Network Report 10 and McLean 55-31.  According to the Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) the ICESCR is ‘the most legally significant universal codification 
provision recognising this right and has been subject to the greatest analysis, application and 
interpretation of all international sources of housing rights.’  NAP was drawn up in terms of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna.  See Urban Sector Network Report 11.  For information on the Habitat 
Agenda, see http://www.unescap.org/huset/habitat.html (accessed 7 December 2006). 
12
 My italics. 
13
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force 3 January 1976, in 
accordance with Article 27. 
14
 My italics. 
 20 
Noteworthy in these provisions is the extent to which housing rights are 
bundled with livelihood rights, recognising the interconnectedness of socio-
economic needs.15 
 
While the African Charter on Human Rights does not expressly recognise the 
right to housing, the African Commission has read this right into the Charter in 
the matter of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria.16 
 
The right to housing is also recognised in Article 20 of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 21 of the Convention relating the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,17 Article 5(e)(iii) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,18  Article 
14 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,19 
Article 27 of the Rights of the Child,20 Article 17.1 of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 43 of the International 
Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families.21  Although a Draft International Convention of Housing 
Rights22 has been prepared by the United Nations Special Rapporteur23 on 
                                                 
15
 See COHRE Report generally.  The recognition in international law that livelihood rights are 
interconnected with housing is not without controversy in South Africa, especially in light of an 
impending appeal to the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 SCA 25 
(City of Johannesburg II).  One of the grounds of the appeal is that the SCA ought to have 
found that ‘the applicants were entitled to have their current access to jobs, livelihoods and 
social services taken into account in any plan to relocate them’.  See para 20.9 of the 
applicants’ founding affidavit and para 14 of the applicants’ replying affidavit. This appeal 
(CCT24/07) will be heard by the Constitutional Court on 28 August 2007.  See chapter 4, 
footnote 189 for a fuller discussion of the court a quo and SCA decision. 
16
 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No 155/96; (2001) 
AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). The Commission derived the right to adequate housing, including 
a right not to be unjustifiably evicted, from a combined reading of articles 14, 16 and 18(1) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
17
 Ratified by South Africa in 1996. 
18
 Ratified by South Africa in 1999.  
19
 Ratified by South Africa in 1996. 
20
 Ratified by South Africa in 1995. 
21
 This treaty has not yet entered force and South Africa has not yet signed it. 
22
 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/20.  The preamble to the Draft Convention of Housing states as follows:  
‘The non-fulfilment of housing rights is a widespread and growing phenomenon and no single 
country can claim to have satisfied in full their existing legal obligations arising our of the right 
to adequate housing.’   
23
 Special Rapporteurs are persons appointed by the United Nations bodies with a mandate to 
examine and report on specific countries or themes.  For more information on the status and 
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Housing Rights in August 1994, such Convention has yet to be adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly.24 
In 1985, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
Committee) was established to carry out the monitoring functions assigned to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Part IV of the ICESCR.25  
The mandate of the Committee, which consists of 18 independent experts, is 
to assist the Economic and Social Council in carrying out its responsibilities 
relating to the implementation of the ICESCR.  The Committee seeks to 
achieve three principal objectives: 
‘(1) developing the normative content of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant; (2) acting as a catalyst for state action in developing 
national ‘benchmarks’ and devising appropriate mechanisms for 
establishing accountability, and providing means of vindication to 
aggrieved individuals and groups at the national level; and (3) holding 
states accountable at the international level through the examination of 
reports.’26 
All state parties (ie. those countries which have ratified the Covenant) are 
obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights are being 
implemented.  State parties must report initially within two years of ratifying 
the Covenant and thereafter, every five years.  The Committee examines 
                                                                                                                                            
position of Special Rapporteurs, see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/xtraconv.htm 
(accessed 30 October 2006). The current UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing 
(appointed in 2000) is Mr Miloon Kothari. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/tm.htm 
(accessed 30 October 2006) regarding his appointment to the position. 
24
 In addition to these conventions, charters and covenants are what are known as United 
Nations declarations.  These declarations are accorded less legal weight but they are 
important political documents that represent the commitment of States towards a particular 
goal.  The Habitat II Agenda (1996) and Agenda 21 (1992) are two significant United Nations 
declarations in respect of the housing right.  The Habitat Agenda II was adopted by the 
second UN Conference on Human Settlements at Istanbul in 1996 and Agenda 21 was 
adopted by the UN World Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992.   
25
 Established under ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 1985. 
26
 Steiner and Aston 305-306.  
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each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the state 
party in the form of ‘concluding observations’.27 
Another part of the Committee’s work is to issue General Comments which 
have authoritative status under international law.28  These General Comments 
are official interpretations or elaborations on a specific right enumerated in an 
international instrument.29  It is in these comments that the idea that socio-
economic rights each contain a ‘minimum core’ obligation has been 
developed.  Such an obligation requires every state party to fulfil certain 
minimum essential levels of the rights and failure to do so constitutes a prima 
facie failure to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.30 
 
General Comments 3,31 432 and 733 published by the Committee are relevant 
to housing rights.  General Comment 3, adopted in 1990, first introduced the 
notion of the concept of ‘minimum core obligation’ as characterising the nature 
of state duties under the Covenant.  The idea in this General Comment is that 
implicit in each right is a minimum set of specific benefits and protections that 
the state party to the Covenant must provide to all rights-bearers.34 
 
                                                 
27
 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/ (accessed 2 November 2005).  See Steiner 
and Alston 306-312 for an interesting case study of the Committee’s examination of a report 
by Nigeria.  Their case study focuses on the right to adequate housing with the purpose of 
considering (1) the types of reports that the Committee has sought to elicit through its 
guidelines; and (2) the use it has made of general comments to develop the content of the 
right.  For example, in response to reports of forced evictions in Nigeria, Steiner and Alston 
quote the then Chairperson of the Committee, asking the government delegation from 
Nigeria: ‘What measures was the Government taking to remedy the situation of those 
persons?’ and: ‘Had the Government taken into account the provisions of General Comments 
4 and 7 of the Committee,  which required prior consultation, compensation and resettlement 
of the victims of evictions, and would it take them into account in the event of future 
evictions?’ My italics.  See UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/SR. 8, 4 May 1998, quoted in Steiner and 
Alston 309.  In chapter 4, the need for consultation with victims of evictions is discussed as a 
central theme in the decisions of the Constitutional Court (Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC)) and the Witwatersrand 
Local Division (City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2006 (6) BCLR 
728 (W)). 
28
 See paras 20-21 of the Grootboom amici heads of argument. 
29
 See the Limburg Principles of 1986, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 1997 and the Bangladore Declaration and Plan of Action 1995 
which have also been a source of guidelines in the interpretation of socio-economic rights. 
30
 See para 24ff of the Grootboom amici heads of argument. 
31
 ‘The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations’ UN Doc. E/19991/23. 
32
 ‘The Right to Adequate Housing’ UN Doc. E/1992/23. 
33
 ‘The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions’ UN Doc. E/1998/22. 
34
 COHRE Report 24. 
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The standard of review set by this General Comment is high.  For example, in 
paragraph 10 of the Comment 3, the Committee states: 
 
‘In order for a state party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at 
least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources,  it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all the 
resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, 
those minimum obligations.’ 
 
Paragraph 12 of the Comment 3 requires that even if the state parties can 
demonstrate a lack of resources, ‘vulnerable members of society can and 
indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted 
programmes.’ 
 
General Comment 4, adopted in 1991, attempts to give content to the 
terminology of the housing right, focusing on what ‘adequate housing’ really 
means.  In respect of ‘housing’ (used interchangeably with ‘shelter’ in the 
comment), the Committee rejected a narrow or restrictive definition, preferring 
to link housing with the inherent dignity of the human person.35  The 
Committee, quoting with approval the Commission on Human Settlements 
and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, stated: 
 
‘Adequate shelter means ... adequate privacy, adequate space, 
adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic 
infrastructure and adequate location with regard to work and basic 
facilities – all at a reasonable cost.’36  
 
In respect of ‘adequacy’ (in the sense of ‘adequate housing’) the Committee,  
while recognising that this definition is determined in part by social, economic, 
cultural, climatic, ecological and other factors, nevertheless set out seven 
aspects of ‘adequacy’ that must be taken into account in any particular 
context.  These are:  
                                                 
35
 Para 7, General Comment 4, 1991. 
36
 Ibid. 
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1. Legal security of tenure.  An emphasis is placed on conferring legal 
security of tenure upon those persons and households currently lacking 
such protection (e.g. informal settlements). 
2. Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure.  This 
includes sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe 
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and 
washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage 
and emergency services. 
3. Affordability.  Housing must be sufficiently spacious, safe and healthy. 
4. Habitability.  Housing must protect persons from cold, damp, heat, rain, 
wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors. 
5. Accessibility.  Adequate housing must be accessible to those entitled to 
it. 
6. Location.  Adequate housing must be in a location which allows access 
to employment options, health-care services, schools, child-care 
centres and other social facilities.  
7. Cultural adequacy.  Housing must be constructed so as to enable the 
expression of cultural identity.37 
 
The words ‘adequate housing’ are also found in s26 of the Constitution.  Since 
this aspect of ‘adequacy’ strikes at the heart of most of the cases heard in 
South Africa regarding the housing right and eviction proceedings, the details 
of such aspect included in the General Comment are repeated here in full: 
 
‘Disadvantaged groups must be accorded full and sustainable access 
to adequate housing resources.  Thus, such disadvantaged groups as 
the elderly, children, the physically disabled, the terminally ill, HIV-
positive individuals, persons with persistent medical problems, the 
mentally ill, victims of natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone 
areas and other groups should be ensured some degree of priority 
consideration in the housing sphere.  Both housing law and policy 
                                                 
37
 Para 8, General Comment 4, 1991. 
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should take fully into account the special housing needs of these 
groups.  Within many states parties increasing access to land by 
landless or impoverished segments of the society should constitute a 
central policy goal.  Discernible governmental obligations need to be 
developed aiming to substantiate the right of all to a secure place to 
live in peace and dignity, including access to land as an entitlement.’38 
 
General Comment 7, adopted in 1997, deals with what the Committee regards 
as the biggest obstacle to giving effect to the right to adequate housing, 
namely, failure to provide secure tenure resulting in forced evictions.39   
Forced evictions are defined in Article 3 of General Comment 7 as:  
 
‘[t]he permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals,  
families and/or communities from their homes and/or land which they 
occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of 
legal or other protection.’ 
 
Paragraph 15 of General Comment 7 thus sets out eight requirements for an 
eviction to be procedurally just.  These are: 
 
‘(a)  an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected;  
(b)  adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to 
the scheduled date of eviction;  
(c)  information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on 
the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be 
used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those 
affected;  
(d)  especially where groups of people are involved, government 
officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction;  
(e)  all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified;  
                                                 
38
 Para 8(e) of General Comment 4, 1991. 
39
 This is integral to the first aspect of the Committee’s definition of ‘adequacy’, namely, legal 
security of tenure.   
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(f)  evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night 
unless the affected persons consent otherwise;  
(g)  provision of legal remedies; and  
(h)  provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in 
need of it to seek redress from the courts.’ 
 
Since South Africa has signed but not ratified the Covenant,40 it is not obliged 
to comply with the ICESCR reporting requirements but must (as a signatory) 
‘refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty’.41 
This effectively means that there is no duty for South Africa to submit reports.  
Despite various organisations calling on the government to ratify the 
agreement, the government has not done so to date.42  
 
2.3 Historical context of housing in South Africa 
 
It is impossible to understand the housing right in the Constitution or post-
Constitution court proceedings without reference to the effects of previous 
apartheid legislation on housing and the issues the housing right seeks to 
address.43  This part therefore describes the legislation directly affecting 
                                                 
40
 The ICESCR was signed by Nelson Mandela on 2 October 1994.  
41
 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 states as: ‘A state is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it 
has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to  
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a 
party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the 
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.’  In 
addition, Article 26 of the Convention sets out a general duty to act in ‘good faith’. 
42
 For example, it was reported in 2000 that the Socio-Economic Rights Project at the Centre 
for Human Rights was involved in lobbying government for the urgent ratification of the 
ICESCR.  See Mashava 2 and Pillay 3.  In 2003, the Urban Sector Network commented that 
the failure of South Africa to sign the Covenant was an ‘inexplicable gap’.  One of the 
recommendations of the report was that there should be a renewed attempt to have the 
ICESCR ratified by South Africa as ‘this ratification would make the legal duties of the State 
with regards to the right to adequate housing clearer.’  See Urban Sector Network Report 51 
and 59.  
43
 In his influential analysis of the interim Bill of Rights, Mureinik (at 31) emphasised the need 
to understand the past as a mechanism to deal with the future: ‘What is the point of our Bill of 
Rights? The Bill is Chapter 3 of the interim constitution, which declares itself to be aspiring to 
be “a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, 
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human 
rights, democracy and peaceful existence and development opportunities for all South 
Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.”  ‘If this bridge is successfully to 
span the open sewer of violent and contentious transition, those who are entrusted with its 
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housing and its impact.  However, it should be noted at this stage that South 
Africa’s history of housing cannot be described in any meaningful sense 
without recourse to both the peculiar racial and economic ideologies 
underpinning previous housing legislation, especially as it related to labour 
and influx control.44 
 
2.3.1 Housing, local government and apartheid 
 
Armed with bulldozers 
they came 
to do a job 
nothing more 
just hired killers 
We gave way 
there was nothing we could do 
although the bitterness stung in us 
and in the earth around us45 
 
By the time the Government of National Unity took office in 1994 it inherited a 
country with severe inequalities in land, resource distribution and ownership. 
These issues were as a direct result of apartheid policies that sanctioned 
forced and brutal removal from land and required that black South Africans 
live only in officially-mandated settlements that were run down, cramped and 
                                                                                                                                            
upkeep will need to understand very clearly what it is a bridge from and what a bridge to.’ My 
italics. 
44
 This is in keeping with Budlender and Latsky’s emphasis on ideological, development and 
economic realities mentioned in the main text above.  In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1458 (CC), Kriegler J commented on the economic issues relating to labour control at 
para 123 as follows: ‘The genius lay in the system of apartheid zoning: major commercial and 
industrial areas were located in the white areas and fell within the jurisdiction of white local 
authorities.  Not only did this impose a cost burden on those who had to commute the 
distance to and from these centres of economic activity, but the bulk of the tax base was 
located in the white city.  Black people came and went, and worked and spent, leaving behind 
their labour and money.  Despite the racial segregation “(t)his . . . exploitative logic . . . held 
the apartheid city together as a single interdependent urban system”.’  Original footnotes 
omitted. 
45
 ‘The day they came for our house’ Azanian Love Song quoted in Du Plessis 126. 
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without utilities.46  The housing crisis that the government faced was not only 
about homelessness per se, but rather about the varying degrees of squalor 
and overcrowding that millions of South Africans were forced to endure in 
informal settlements.47  Arguably, nowhere is South Africa’s past more starkly 
illustrated than in the housing sector’s institutional and funding confusion: 
 
‘By the early 1990s there were seven Ministries and Departments of 
Housing, an additional five national departments directly involved in 
housing and thirteen statutory funds through which housing-related 
funds were channelled.  Also, four provincial authorities, six ‘self-
governing’ homeland authorities and over sixty national and regional 
state corporate institutions were involved in housing delivery and 
facilitation delivery. … With decision-making authority vested in so 
many locations, fundamentally different housing policies and delivery 
strategies were being implemented, depending on race and/or 
geographic location of the intended beneficiaries.’48 
 
While it is acknowledged that some of the causes of the housing crisis in 
South Africa are common to many third-world countries (eg. poverty and the 
application of inappropriate standards), it is without doubt that the legislation 
and policies that the South African government enacted in pursuance of 
apartheid throughout the 1900s, have been a fundamental cause of most 
present and past housing problems. 
 
Apartheid, however, was not the sole cause of land inequality and 
homelessness in South Africa.  Discrimination was evident even before the 
founding of the Union of South Africa in 191049 and some of the most 
damaging pieces of legislation were passed in first half of the 1900s, 
                                                 
46
 For a more comprehensive analysis of apartheid policies affecting land and resource 
distribution and ownership, see Scoping Study 49-59.  See also: O’Regan (1990) 127, 
O’Regan (1991) 119 and Wickeri.  
47
 Robinson 509. 
48
 Gardner 87-88.  
49
 In terms of the South Africa Act 1909.  For example, Rutsch 139 points out that the policy of 
segregation along racial lines can be traced to the early days of white occupation, particularly 
in British-ruled Natal. 
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institutionalising segregation and the unequal division of property and 
resources.  It was during this time that the Native Land Act50 and the Native 
Trust and Land Act51 were passed. In terms of these Acts, the acquisition of 
property or property rights by blacks in urban areas was prohibited.  In 
addition, the Acts created ‘reserves’ for black South Africans, formalising the 
separation of black and white.52  The fundamental demand behind the Land 
Acts was expressed by a then Member of Parliament who stated simply that 
the black African had to be told ‘that it was a white man’s country, that he was 
not going to be allowed to buy land there, and that if he wanted to be there he 
must be in service.’53 
 
In the context of this research, it is important to note that certain areas in two 
of the three case studies were declared native reserves in terms of these 
Acts.  These areas were sections of the Peddie and Zwelitsha districts 
(forming part of what is now known as Ngqushwa Local Municipality) and the 
Xhalanga district (forming part of what is now known as Sakhisizwe Local 
Municipality).  In these particular areas then, the measures set out below 
regarding both housing and local government did not apply.  Instead, a 
system of headmen operating in the reserves until the commencement of 
tribal authorities, described more fully in chapter 5 below.  
 
While the Land Acts dealt with land distribution, no central state policy dealing 
with housing was in place until 1920.54  However, a serious influenza 
epidemic throughout South Africa changed this policy standpoint and drew 
attention to the deplorable conditions in the slums and locations of urban 
                                                 
50
 Act 27 of 1913. The Act scheduled 34 750 miles of land for the exclusive use of Black 
South Africans.  Jaichand 10ff comments that this constituted 7% of all land in South Africa.  
For more detail on the effect of this Act and Act 18 of 1936, see Jaichand 10ff.  
51
 Act 18 of 1936.  
52
 Robertson describes the Native Land Act in two separate publications as one of the 
‘linchpins of apartheid’ (even though it preceded the first Nationalist Government by thirty-five 
years) and ‘the foundational law of South Africa’s racial order.’  He also described Act 18 of 
1936 as the 1913 Act’s ‘sister’ from which grew the black homeland system with its modern 
successors.  See Robertson (1988) 285-217 and Robertson (1987) 120 respectively.   
53
 Quoted in Chanock 365. 
54
 Hendler, Mabin and Parnell 196 comment that housing for the poor during this time 
remained the voluntary responsibility of local authorities. 
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blacks.  As a result, the Public Health Act55 was passed.  From a housing 
point of view, the Act was more about public health control than a measure to 
deal with housing shortages.  Nevertheless, it was the first Act to contain a 
chapter dealing with factors associated with what is now the ‘housing right’ in 
South Africa.  The chapter, entitled ‘Sanitation and Housing’ fixed upon local 
authorities the duty of maintaining the areas under their jurisdiction in a clean 
and sanitary condition, and of preventing dangers to health from unsuitable 
dwellings.  At this early stage then, local government was responsible for 
aspects of housing. 
 
This Act was soon followed by the first Housing Act56 enacted in 1920.57  The 
Act marked the beginning of financial assistance by the state in the provision 
of housing.  While no subsidies were contemplated in the Act, grants were 
made available to local government to carry out approved housing schemes 
for specific race groups.58  The principle guiding the state’s policy at this early 
stage was that provision of housing was a function of local government, and 
the grants contemplated in the Act were merely there to assist local 
government in this function.59  Despite two commissions reporting on the 
deplorable conditions in mainly urban black locations,60 the powers given to 
                                                 
55
 Act 36 of 1919. 
56
 Act 35 of 1920. 
57
 The Act was passed after a commission, the Influenza Commission, (appointed soon after 
the epidemic) recommended that housing shortages be dealt with.  In response to its 
recommendations, a Housing Committee was appointed with the following terms of reference: 
‘Whether it is advisable for the government to give financial aid or other assistance in urban 
areas for persons of limited means including coloured persons and natives, and, if so, the 
best method of doing so.’  See Baldocchi 84. 
58
 Given the distinction between race groups in the Act, Hendler, Mabin and Parnell 197 
suggest that ‘working-people were residentially segregated by the state through its control of 
housing funds’ even before more specific racist legislation.    
59
 Baldocchi 85. 
60
 Both the Tuberculosis Commission 1914 and the Influenza Epidemic Commission 1918 
urged the government to pay attention to the locations.  The Tuberculosis Commission found 
inter alia, that the dwelling in the locations were ‘a disgrace, and the majority quite unfit for 
human habitation.’  In particular, it found that, ‘speaking generally, the dwellings are mere 
shanties, often nothing more than hovels, constructed out of bits of packaging case lining, 
flattened kerosene tins, sacking and other scraps and odds and ends.’  The Tuberculosis 
Commission noted that despite the deplorable conditions in these locations, some 
municipalities were actually making a profit out of the levies charged in the locations.  See 
Morris 16 and 22.  The Housing Committee (set up as a result of the recommendations of the 
Influenza Commission) reported that it found a large amount of indifference by local 
authorities towards the housing needs of blacks.  Its terms of reference are recorded by 
Baldocchi 84: ‘Whether it is advisable for the government to give financial aid or other 
 31 
local government in the Act in respect of black and coloured housing, were 
reported as ‘little used’.61  
 
In addition to precipitating the passing of both the Public Health Act and the 
Housing Act, the influenza epidemic also pressurised the government into 
finalising its policy on the role of local government and the position of urban 
blacks. Up until this point, the arrangements for local government62 excluded 
participation by the black population in totality.  This arrangement was 
premised on central government’s insistence that it was the only policy maker 
with regard to ‘blacks’ and that their presence in cities was to be regarded as 
temporary.63  As a result, the system of local government awarded no rights to 
blacks to participate in or benefit from its structures.  
 
In an attempt to finalise its policy, the government appointed the Transvaal 
Local Government Commission under Colonel Stallard.  This Commission 
established the principle of the impermanence of the black South African in 
white urban areas.64  This policy, which later became known as the Stallardist 
doctrine, had a major effect on the state’s policy of housing.  Given that blacks 
were not to be regarded as permanent inhabitants in urban areas, housing 
policy was directed towards ensuring the reproduction of labour-power and 
the restriction of movement of the black population, rather than concern for 
the black population’s social and economic welfare.65  These premises were 
evident in the deliberations of a Select Committee appointed to investigate the 
Draft Natives (Urban Areas) Bill and the Draft Native Registration and 
Protection Bill.  The debate of this Select Committee centred on two issues, 
namely; (1) whether to control movement of blacks in ‘white’ towns, and (2) 
whether or not blacks should be granted freehold tenure.66  The Select 
                                                                                                                                            
assistance in urban areas for persons of limited means including coloured persons and 
natives, and, if so, the best method of doing so.’ 
61
 Hellman 242.  See also Morris 22 and Lodge 55.  Lodge gives an example of the inaction of 
the local authority in East London which constructed no housing at all between 1926 and 
1940. 
62
 As set out in the South Africa Act 1909. 
63
 De Beer and Lourens 28.   
64
 Morris 18. 
65
 See Lea 198. 
66
 Morris 18. 
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Committee took the decision to restrict movement and not to grant freehold 
rights to black South Africans.  Although there are no records of the Select 
Committee’s discussions on the matter, its main reasons for these decisions 
seem to have been:  
• a fear that, were freehold rights to be granted, black South Africans 
would cease to recognise that they were in the urban areas primarily 
for employment; 
• if black South Africans were given the right to property they would also 
want the right to vote; and 
• it was convenient for locations to be near towns so that servants could 
go home early in the evening and be back at work early in the morning.  
With the extension of ‘European’ areas, it would be easier to move 
locations if no freehold rights existed.67 
 
Following the Select Committee’s decision, the Black (Urban Areas) Act68 was 
enacted and made provision for the granting of leasehold in respect of sites in 
black villages and locations only to ‘qualified persons’.69  In addition, the Act 
sought to restrict the entry and duration in the ‘white’ cities by black South 
Africans.  Landowners were prohibited from allowing black South Africans 
(other than their employees) to reside on their property within five kilometres 
of a proclaimed urban area.  Furthermore, the Act empowered local 
authorities to deport black South Africans from the area if they were ‘habitually 
unemployed’ or did not ‘possess the means of honest livelihood’ or led an 
‘idle, dissolute or disorderly life’.70 
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 These reasons are gleaned from the representations made to the Select Committee.  See 
Morris 20 and 143.  Chanock 403 records that a representative from the Eastern Cape 
Municipalities (ie. the area where case studies in this research take place) observed from his 
so-called experience: ‘It is difficult for the Municipality to retain control of these areas once 
you give the title deed.  The native is more amenable to discipline if he is merely a leasehold 
proprietor. … Once he has a title deed there is no shifting him without trouble.’ 
68
 Act 21 of 1923. 
69
 A qualified person (in terms of the later Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945) 
was a black who was a South African citizen, and any descendant of such black person. 
70
 Act 21 of 1923.  The Act was amended in 1930, 1937 and 1945 to tighten influx control 
measures further.  Some of these further restrictions dealt with the right of African women to 
enter an urban area (1930) and reducing the days allowed to black South Africans to seek 
employment.  The 1945 amendment (set out in s10 of the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act 25 of 1945) further restricted a black South Africa to claim permanent residence in an 
urban area.  The section provided that no black South African could be in a place outside his 
reserve for more than 72 hours unless he had resided there continuously since birth, had 
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On the housing front, local authorities continually failed to make use of the 
grants available in terms of the Housing Act, preferring to set aside plots 
where blacks could erect their own houses on a monthly tenancy.71  Given the 
immense housing shortages during this time,72 the government sought to 
encourage local authorities to access loan facilities by amending the Housing 
Act in 194473 and introducing the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act.74  The 
former Act provided for a National Housing and Planning Commission (NHPC) 
and introduced a new financial basis for housing loans to local authorities. 
The latter Act gave power to the newly-constituted NHPC to undertake a 
housing scheme where local authorities were unable or unwilling to do so.75  
As a result of these Acts, the volume of loan funds granted to local authorities 
increased by a small amount.  However, the NHPC failed to use the powers 
granted to it by the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act76 and by 1949 the 
housing problem was ‘far from solution’.77   
 
The failure of government (and local authorities in particular) to deal with the 
housing shortage during this time can be ascribed largely to the inherent 
contradiction in the legislation and the Stallardist doctrine upon which the 
legislation was drafted.  In effect, this contradiction made local authorities 
                                                                                                                                            
lawfully resided there for fifteen years, or had worked there for the same employer for ten 
years.  See Gelderblom and Kok 33 and Meyer 43. 
71
 Morris 26 opines that local authorities were ‘afraid to risk the experiment of establishing a 
permanent native community or relaxing the very strict regulations applicable to locations.’  In 
addition, Hellman 244 notes that due to World War II, there was a shortage of manpower and 
materials, hence a virtual stoppage of housing provision.  Pienaar 338 states that housing 
‘was completely halted’ during World War II which resulted in the proliferation of various 
squatter movements due to acute overcrowding where blacks were forced to crowd into any 
available accommodation. 
72
 In 1943, the Social and Economic Planning Council estimated that 185 000 houses needed 
to be built to deal with the housing shortage (60 000 for ‘Europeans’ and 125 000 for ‘Non-
Europeans’).  In 1947, the Department of Native Affairs undertook a survey which identified 
that 154 000 houses needed to be built and accommodation for 106 900 blacks provided.  
See Hellman 244. 
73
 Housing Amendment Act 49 of 1944. 
74
 Act 45 of 1945. 
75
 Section 2(1)(p) of the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act. 
76
 The then Minister of Housing was quoted as saying at the time: ‘Although the Housing 
Directorate had been given wide powers to alleviate the shortage, it was entirely a different 
matter to apply these powers. … We cannot ride roughshod over local authorities in furthering 
our building plans. … In a democratic state in times of peace, a Government must be 
circumspect.’  See The Star 10 July 1946, quoted in Hellman 17. 
77
 Hellman 17. 
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hesitant to accept responsibility for their black population in terms of housing. 
On the one hand, local authorities were expected to access funds and set up 
permanent housing schemes for blacks; yet on the other hand, the politics 
and ideology that informed legislation during this time saw blacks as a 
temporary presence with no right to own the land they lived on.78  The housing 
problem was also inextricably linked to the wage structure for black labourers 
which was too low to afford adequate housing and which, in turn, increased 
local authorities’ financial responsibilities for these apparent ‘temporary 
sojourners’: 
 
‘Housing is obviously enough the lynchpin of the urban Native problem.  
The local authorities are required to provide accommodation for the 
Natives resident in their area, and this housing is by implication 
supposed to conform to certain standards of decency.  But as the vast 
majority of Africans do not earn a wage sufficient to ensure reasonable 
standards of living, the great majority cannot pay an economic rent. 
Furthermore, as the economic and social structure in the Union pegs 
Africans to the unskilled occupations and maintains the present wide 
gulf between skilled and unskilled wage levels, there is no reason to 
expect the earning powers of the bulk of the African urban workers to 
reach a stage in the immediate future which will enable them to bear 
the costs of economic rentals without having to sacrifice expenditure on 
items such as food.  Hence their housing has to be subsidised, and 
recognition of this necessity is afforded by the facilities afforded by the 
central government for loans on which it is prepared to incur a heavier 
loss than the local authority.  But the use of such facilities pre-
supposes an ability on the part of the local authority to bear a loss.  In 
the case of some smaller municipalities there is apparently no ability to 
bear any loss.  The larger municipalities are now seriously concerned 
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 This very issue was canvassed as early as 1935 by the Young-Barrett Committee.  Its 
findings were not released as they were seen as hostile to the policy envisaged by the 
government at the time (see Morris 29-30).  From extracts published in Hansard, it is clear 
that the Committee doubted whether the concept of ‘the black as a temporary worker’ was 
practicable, ie. ‘the proposition that every municipal location ought to be regarded purely as a 
reservoir of Native labour, from which the worn-out labourer must be required to depart when 
he no longer ministers to the needs of the white man.’  See Morris 29. 
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as to the magnitude of the loss they will be called upon to bear if they 
are indeed to fulfil their housing obligations to Africans.’79 
 
While discriminatory laws affecting land and housing issues were passed 
before National Party rule, the system of unequal division of property and 
resources became official policy when the National Party came into power in 
1948 – a policy called ‘separate development’.80  The legislative programme 
which followed has been branded as ‘more thoroughgoing, more grotesque 
perhaps, than anything the country or the world had yet seen’.81  In a report 
commissioned in 1948 to deal with the ‘native question’,82 it was concluded 
that the migration of blacks to the city was a natural economic phenomenon 
and although it could not be reversed, it could be controlled and regulated.83 
This was sought primarily through the Group Areas Act,84 initially passed in 
1950 as Act 41 of 1950 and later consolidated by Act 36 of 1966.  Under this 
Act, a small percentage of land in South Africa was divided into ‘Bantustans’ 
for black South Africans to occupy.  These Bantustans were basically racial 
enclaves along assumed ethnic and linguistic lines.85  The Land Acts had the 
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 Hellman 248 is quoted here in full as she captures the circular nature of the problem.  
Based on this argument, she comes to the conclusion that housing subsidies were in fact 
camouflaged subsidies to employers of Native labour ‘…because if wages had reached an 
adequate level there would be no need to subsidise housing.’  See Hellman 249.  
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 Apartheid was the basis of Prime Minister Malan’s election manifesto in 1948 and entailed 
a system of separating the race groups to safeguard the racial privileges of the whites.  See 
Jaichand 6.  
81
 Roux quoted in Plasket 14 (at footnote 42).  Plasket further quotes Roux’s observation that 
‘[r]acial laws and segregation there had always been, but after 1948 racism became a political 
creed or ideology transcending all other creeds and providing the motive for a sustained 
program of legislation by the party in power.’  Similarly, Browett commented  (at 21) in 1982: 
‘What distinguishes the apartheid legislation is that the previous ad hoc segregationist 
measures were amended, supplemented and combined within a political ideology that has 
been pursued with a single-mindedness of purpose.’ 
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 The Native Law Commission Report 1948. 
83
 See Pienaar 338.  This Commission was followed by a commission in 1954 which looked at 
the socio-economic development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (the 
Tomlinson Report).  One of the startling methods recommended to curb urbanisation was ‘the 
promotion of planned parenthood’.  Whilst there appeared to be some doubt expressed in the 
report as to the success attainable by such a campaign, it recommended that ‘the efficacy on 
the means that can be used for family limitation’ be investigated.  See Tomlinson Report 30.  
84
 For a discussion of the Group Areas Act, see Rutch. 
85
 The National Party’s homelands policy aimed at separating South Africans along lines of 
exaggerated ethnic difference.  Four quasi-independent ‘homelands’ and seven ‘self-
governing territories’ scattered in a crescent stretched from South Africa’s northern borders 
and along its eastern and southern seaboards.  The Bantustans gave the apartheid state 
somewhere in which it could ‘repatriate’ Africans who were in surplus to the labour needs of 
‘white’ cities and farming areas and, as a result, fell foul of its tightened influx controls.  See 
 36 
effect of setting aside only thirteen percent of the land for black South Africans 
who were estimated to make up eighty-two percent of the population.86  
 
In response to the rising numbers of squatters,87 the government passed the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (PISA)88 in 1951 which focused on the 
criminalisation of squatting, the eviction of those persons and the 
establishment of emergency camps.89  In particular, PISA allowed landowners 
to demolish structures on their land and to evict people without a court 
order.90 While PISA was purportedly non-racial, its inevitable links with the 
historical effects of influx control and the Group Areas Act and Land Acts 
ensured that it targeted the black population.91  It is estimated that 
approximately 3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their homes over 
the period 1960 to mid-1983.92  Forced relocations often happened at 
gunpoint and the evictions of that time were characterised by bulldozing, the 
burning and demolition of shacks; the termination of the community’s water 
supply; and arrests of residents for trespass.93  
 
At approximately the same time that PISA was passed, the government 
passed the Black Building Workers Act94 and the Black Services Levy Act95 in 
                                                                                                                                            
chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the legislative structure of these Bantustans as 
they related to housing and local government. 
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 Rutsch 140. 
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 Pienaar 338 noted that by 1951, the numbers of black persons living in squatter areas rose 
to 20 000. 
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 Act 51 of 1952. 
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 See R v Phiri 1954 (4) SA 708 (T); Lolwana v Port Elizabeth Divisional Council 1956 (1) SA 
379 (E); R v Press 1956 (3) SA 89 (T) and R v Zulu 1959 (1) SA 263 (A) as examples of how 
PISA was enforced against unlawful occupiers. 
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 For commentary on this aspect of PISA, see Despatch Municipality v Sunridge Estate & 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1997 (4) SA 596 (SE). 
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 Robertson 1987 112-113. 
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 Platzky and Walker 9.  This figure, as quantified by the Surplus People Project, does not 
take into account those people moved within the Bantustans for the implementation of 
betterment planning.  Betterment planning was initiated by means of Proclamation 31 of 1939 
and involved a ‘piecemeal expansion in agricultural extension schemes and an emphasis 
upon the introduction of better crops, methods of production and livestock strains.’  Letsoalo 
and Rogerson 308 point out that this practice resulted in a number of forced removals of 
whole communities.  Unfortunately, betterment planning falls outside of the scope of this 
research.  
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 Robinson 509. See Grootboom and Western Cape Provincial Government and others: In re 
DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and another 2001 (1) SA 500 
(CC) for judicial commentary of the way in which evictions took place. 
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 Act 27 of 1951. 
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 Act 64 of 1952. 
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conjunction with the promotion of site-and-service96 and home-ownership 
schemes.  While these schemes attempted to introduce access to a housing 
market, one of the main aims of the government was to decrease its overall 
expenditure on ‘temporary urban blacks.’97  In any event, most municipal 
housing proved to be too expensive for the ordinary black South African.98  
 
After 1948, the idea began to gain ground that the homelands should not 
merely become depositaries for the surplus rural population but should also 
provide accommodation for black South Africans working in adjacent ‘white’ 
areas.99  However, it was only in the late 1950s that the government started 
taking active measures to implement this idea.100  The emphasis on this 
homeland ideology saw Parliament pass the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act101 in 1959, with the Transkei becoming the first of the 
homelands to be granted self-government.  In conjunction with this legislation, 
the South African government promoted the development of the homelands 
seriously by spending massive amounts of money on physical development 
and housing102 and resettling large numbers of black South Africans from 
‘white’ areas in homeland towns.  As a result, the promotion of leasehold 
rights and the provision of family housing in South Africa’s urban areas, 
introduced in the 1950s were effectively reversed, the powers to evict were 
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 In addressing the 28th Annual Conference of the Union’s Native Advisory Boards, Dr 
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country as a whole also rose fairly sharply.’  Riekert Commission (1979) para 4.387. 
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increased, influx regulations were tightened and opportunities to obtain 
permanent residence restricted.103  For example, a General Circular104 to local 
authorities required them to obtain approval from the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development before initiating any new black housing 
schemes.  The Department of Bantu Administration and Development in turn, 
only granted such approval if it deemed such developments (especially family 
housing) essential, and that accommodation could not be provided in the 
adjacent homeland.105  
 
In reflecting on this situation in 1979, the Riekert Commission (a one-man 
commission which reported to the government in mid-1979106) commented: 
 
‘The official [housing] policy from 1968 was, in regard to black workers 
in white areas, to provide family housing in the black states as far as 
possible rather than in the black residential areas surrounding the white 
cities and towns where they worked.’107 
 
In a bid to further increase control over black urban areas, the government 
transferred the administration of urban black areas from white local 
government and placed such control into the hands of twenty-two 
Administration Boards established in terms of the Administration of Bantu 
Affairs Act.108  These boards consisted of white South Africans who took over 
the important areas of black labour and housing as well as the administration 
of black urban areas.109  In so doing,  housing and other specified ‘black 
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 In terms of local government for coloureds and Indians, Ordinance 6 of 1963 made 
provision for separate local government bodies for both the coloured and Indian population.  
 39 
affairs’ was removed from the jurisdiction of white local government to a 
centralised body acting under the National Department of Bantu Affairs.110 
 
Whereas central government policy up to the late 1970s had been to 
discourage housing for blacks in urban areas, the Riekert Commission found 
that urbanisation was inevitable, and the best way of dealing with such 
urbanisation was to accept it and control it.111  One perceived method of 
controlling urbanisation (as well as placating heightening political unrest and 
boycotts) was the introduction of black local government.112  The reasons for 
the new system were spelt out by Dr Riekert himself in a later publication:113  
 
‘These local authorities will serve to defuse pent-up frustrations and 
grievances against the administration in Pretoria.  Local authorities will 
affect the daily existence of these black people more directly and 
intimately than the more removed activities of central government.  In the 
war in which South Africa is involved and the total onslaught against the 
country, defusion of this kind has become an urgent necessity which 
cannot be postponed any longer.’114 
 
As is clear from the quotation above, the establishment of black local 
authorities was portrayed by the government as a concession to black political 
aspirations and resistance.  The introduction of black local government was 
also seen as an attempt by government to compensate partially for the 
exclusion of the black population from the tri-cameral system introduced by 
                                                                                                                                            
Until 1993, the number of management committees in the Cape Province amounted to 211.  
See De Beer and Lourens 30.  
110
 Riekert 147. 
111
 See Riekert Commission 1979 para 4.204 (d) and (f). 
112
 It should be noted that Community Councils had existed since 1977 as a form of local 
government for black residents.  However, these Councils were purely advisory in nature and 
had hardly begun before local authorities contemplated in the Black Local Authorities Act 102 
of 1982 replaced them.  Manona reports that the imposition of an unrepresentative community 
council in Grahamstown (now part of Makana Local Municipality) in 1978 led to ‘other 
difficulties’ – one of these difficulties was their shared responsibility with the Eastern Cape 
Administration Board to enforce the demolition of backyard houses leading to making the 
severe shortage of housing worse.  See Manona 108. 
113
 At the time of writing these comments, Riekert was the Chief Director of the Western 
Transvaal Administration Board. 
114
 Riekert 156. 
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the Constitution Act115 in 1983.  However, the attempt by government to 
‘compensate’ and to ‘defuse’ the situation did not prove successful.  Despite 
greater powers being given to these authorities, local government had no 
power over housing and labour – two major sources of discontent.  In 
particular, housing for black South Africans remained in the hands of the 
Administration Boards.  Black authorities (set up in terms of the Black Local 
Authorities Act116) had no powers in terms of the Housing Act to raise loans 
for housing schemes.  Black local government thus still suffered from the 
same deficiencies as those institutions before them, namely, inequality, 
illegitimacy and lack of financial support.117  A clear distinction could be drawn 
between the well-serviced and financially-able local authorities in the white 
areas, and the underdeveloped, under-serviced and financially-deficient ‘non-
white’ areas.118 In addition, black activists saw the establishment of these 
authorities as a symbol of disenfranchisement, not least because of the 
limited franchise rights given to the coloured and Indian populations.119  The 
frustrations and grievances of the black population escalated into protests and 
violence in many areas, often in the form of physical attacks on black 
councillors.120  The combination of political illegitimacy and economic 
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 Act 110 of 1983.  This Act provided for limited power sharing with coloureds and Indians. 
The government sought to achieve this by classifying matters to be dealt with by Parliament 
and the state departments in two groups, namely: 
• General affairs (which included black municipal affairs) to be legislated upon in unison by 
the three houses of Parliament and administered by the state department and other 
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• Own affairs of coloureds, Indians and whites to be legislated upon by each of the relevant 
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 Act 102 of 1982. 
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 Given these deficiencies, it is difficult to believe Riekert’s conclusion at 165 that ‘[t]he 
Black Authorities Act is an honest attempt to extend constitutional development in the RSA to 
Blacks at the level of local government.’ 
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 See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). 
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 Friedman 6. 
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 Pieterse (2002) 16 comments that the Black Local Authorities were ‘beleaguered 
institutions from their inception’ due to the militant opposition from the black community and a 
well-established reputation for inefficiency, graft and collaboration with white interests.  As 
stated in the main text, the failure of past and present forms of local government was a lack of 
financial resources.  In terms of the Black Local Authorities, the problem was that no extra 
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increases in expenditure resulting from greater powers.  In an effort to finance township 
services, black local authorities were forced to increase rent and service charges (up to 
100%) of township residents.  Revenue of these bodies was also affected by a boycott of rent 
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desperation led to a sustained urban revolt, one of whose features was a 
boycott of municipal service charges.121  In response, the government 
attempted to intervene by setting up a system of ad hoc intergovernmental 
grants to channel resources to collapsing townships.122  In addition, the 
apartheid government, realising that the urbanisation of cities by black South 
Africans was inevitable (and fearing the growing informal settlements on the 
outskirts of cities), passed The Abolition of Influx Control Act123 in 1986 which 
effectively disbanded the forced removal policy and introduced the new 
concept of ‘orderly’ urbanisation.124  This new policy, which mandated 
settlements where black South Africans could live, was supposed to be more 
ordered, planned and directed than the government’s previous piecemeal 
attempts to deal with urbanisation and housing.125  As recorded in the White 
Paper on Local Government,126 these interventions were ‘too little too late’.127  
 
Despite mandating settlements, the government did very little in terms of 
developing housing for those black South Africans who had begun to return to 
the cities.128  PISA was used more frequently during this time to ensure that 
                                                                                                                                            
and service charges in protest against the increases.  See the case studies in chapter 5 for a 
closer look at the results of these boycotts. 
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 Ibid. 
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 In order to manage and channel these intergovernmental grants, Regional Services and 
Joint Services Boards were established in terms of the Regional Services Councils Act 109 of 
1985. They consisted of representatives of white local government, black local government, 
coloured committees and Indian committees.  See Pieterse (2002) 16-17 for a discussion of 
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 Act 68 of 1986. 
124
 O’Regan (1991) 119 (citing the White Paper on an Urban Strategy for the Republic of 
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See Pienaar 339. 
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 Published in March 1998. 
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 Section A. 
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 Wickeri 8. 
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‘orderly urbanisation’ took place129 by evicting all those living in backyards or 
any other land, regardless of whether or not they were paying rent.  
 
The result of this morass of legislation and policy was a housing crisis during 
the 1980s which threatened the very edifice of apartheid.  By the late 1980s, 
the government reacted against the increasing unrest over housing and land 
for blacks in urban areas by repealing the Native Land Act and Group Areas 
Act and introducing new legislation which ensured that blacks could own and 
occupy some land that was previously only reserved for whites.130  Whilst 
these measures lessened control over some aspects of the housing crisis, 
PISA, with its summary powers of demolition, remained largely untouched and 
evictions continued throughout this time.  However, a growing number of 
cases heard by sympathetic judges in the beginning of the 1990s proved 
successful in challenging evictions under this Act.131  
 
The year 1990 marked the beginnings of major political and social 
transformation.  In that year, political prisoners were released and former 
banned political organisations (including the African National Congress) were 
unbanned.  In addition, the National Party government committed itself to 
negotiate a new Constitution with all participating parties.132 A National 
Housing Forum was established in 1992 as a ‘think tank’ for all major 
stakeholders to develop a housing strategy and policy for South Africa. As an 
interim measure, the Housing Arrangements Act133 was passed in an effort to 
ensure that housing provision could proceed while a detailed future housing 
policy was being developed. This Act made provision for the establishment of 
a National Housing Board (with representation from housing suppliers, 
consumers and regulators) to advise government on issues of national policy.  
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 O’Regan (1991) 119 calls the Act during this time a ‘key control measure’ creating powers 
of removal and demolition and also establishing informal settlement areas.   
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 The new legislation included the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 
1991, the Less Formal Township Establishments Act 113 of 1991, and the Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. 
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 See, for example, George Municipality v Vena 1989 (2) SA 263 (A); Luwvalala v Port 
Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) and Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkhwaso and 
others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C).  
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 Cameron 81.  
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 Act 155 of 1993. 
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It established four Regional Housing Boards in the four provinces to 
adjudicate the allocation of fiscal resources to projects at the provincial level.  
The Act also provided for the amalgamation and joint operation of housing 
funds and certain housing institutions of old own affairs administrations by 
April 1994.134 Despite these interim measures, there was still a significant 
degree of overlap and duplication within the housing sector. It was abundantly 
clear that new legislation was needed to rationalize existing housing 
legislation. This then set the background to the first era of the Government of 
National Unity rule. 
 
2.3.2 Housing under the first era of Government of National Unity (the 
GNU)135 
 
Prior and during the 1994 elections, the African National Congress (‘the ANC’) 
ran an election campaign that promised to build one million homes, provide 
running water to over a million families and to electrify two and a half million 
rural and urban homes within five years of taking office.136  Housing was a 
major platform of their campaign.  When the ANC won a landslide victory in 
1994, the newly-appointed Housing Minister, Joe Slovo, announced: 
 
‘It is our task to give millions of South Africans an essential piece of 
dignity in their lives, the dignity that comes from having a solid roof 
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 This Act was amended many times during the period 1993-1996 so as to extend its 
application to the entire national territory and to all South Africans without distinction on the 
basis of race.  See Housing Amendment Act 101 1993, General Law Second Amendment Act 
108 1993,   Housing Matters Amendment Act 191 1993, Housing Second Amendment Act 33 
1994, Housing Amendment Act 6 1996. For an overview of this period, see Housing White 
Paper para 3.5 and Gutto 6.  
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interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution).  The interim Constitution 
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on its own.  The two chief parties who made use of the provision for a GNU were the National 
Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, both of which obtained cabinet portfolios for their 
leaders and other Members of Parliament. 
136
 ANC Election Manifesto 1994 at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/manifesto.html (accessed 
3 June 2005). 
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over your head, running water and other services in an established 
community.’137  
 
Given the institutional and funding confusion in the housing sector, this task 
was never going to be easy.138  Nonetheless, in 1994 a White Paper on 
Housing139 announced that ‘the time for delivery [of housing] has arrived’.140 
The GNU inherited a disaster.  In 1994, eighteen percent of South Africans 
were living in squatter settlements, backyard shacks or overcrowded 
conditions with no formal rights to their homes.  Approximately twenty-five 
percent of all urban households in the country had no access to potable 
water, sixteen percent of households had no kind of sanitation system, and 
almost forty-seven percent of all households had no electricity.141  
 
The specific history and approach to planning and township establishment led 
undoubtedly to a wasteful settlement structure that resulted in overlapping, 
duplication and confusion.142  Instead of an overall housing strategy dealing 
with housing, land and services, housing institutions were duplicated in terms 
of race (previous own affairs administrations) and in terms of geography (for 
example, between former national states and self-governing territories).  The 
structures set up by the apartheid policy also left an urban landscape of black 
townships and settlements on the peripheries of cities alongside so-called 
coloured and Indian areas which served as a ‘buffer’ for wealthier white 
areas.143  In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
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 Quoted by Cohen 134. 
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 The preamble to the Housing White Paper stated as follows: ‘Housing the Nation is one of 
the greatest challenges facing the Government of National Unity. The extent of the challenge 
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143
 Wickeri 10 comments that this apartheid structure also included a poor white ‘buffer’ which 
protected the wealthy white areas from the coloured and Indian settlements and further down 
the line, black areas.  
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Metropolitan Council,144 Kriegler J captures the tragic and absurd results of 
such structures: 
 
‘[S]prawling black townships with hardly a tree in sight, flanked by 
vanguards of informal settlements and guarded by towering floodlights, 
out of stonethrow reach.  Even if only a short distance away, nestled 
amid trees and water and birds and tarred roads and paved sidewalks 
and streetlit suburbs and parks, and running water, and convenient 
electrical amenities … we find white suburbia.’145 
 
The situation was made worse for the ANC by their very own tactic in the 
1980s – that of encouraging a ‘culture of non-payment’ of services by black 
South Africans during apartheid to cripple the state.146  This culture continued 
in the informal settlements.   
 
The new government thus sought to address these issues in a 1994 housing 
summit that brought together representatives of the government, the 
homeless, the financial sector and NGOs.147  The goals set out in the ANC’s 
election manifesto (inter alia the delivery of one million new housing units 
within five years) were to be met by the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme that aimed to build and deliver low-cost housing to the very 
poor.148 
 
The housing crisis was so acute that the right to have access to adequate 
housing was constitutionalised in the final Constitution of South Africa in 
1996149 and both the courts and a new body created by the Constitution, 
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 This housing summit resulted in the signing of the National Housing Accord (known as the 
‘Botshabelo Agreement’) by a range of stakeholders.  See McLean 55-3. 
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 Housing White Paper para 3.1.5. 
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interim Constitution. It was alleged that the local authority’s decision to evict the occupiers 
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namely, the SAHRC, were given roles in enforcing socio-economic rights in 
South Africa.150  However, the inclusion of the housing right, and indeed all 
socio-economic rights, was preceded by a debate about the wisdom and 
practicality of entrenching socio-economic rights in the final Constitution and 
on the possible forms such constitutionalisation could take.151 
 
2.4 Inclusion and justiciability of socio-economic rights 
 
Much of the debate on the inclusion and justiciability of socio-economic rights 
turned on institutional issues.152  Those arguing against their inclusion posited 
that there was a danger that the doctrine of separation of powers would be 
infringed.  This infringement would happen, so the argument went, because 
decisions on socio-economic rights required judicial involvement in functions 
which ordinarily resided in the legislature and the executive.  These kinds of 
functions were characterised by significant policy and budgetary impact.153 
This potential involvement with policy and budget decisions dramatically 
departed from ‘traditional’ conceptions of the judicial role.154  At this time, most 
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fundamental rights, particularly, s9 (right to life), s10 (right to dignity), s11 (right to freedom 
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countries had confined themselves to the constitutional entrenchment of civil 
and political rights.  Those countries which had included socio-economic 
rights included them as ‘guiding principles’.  These ‘guiding principles’ 
assisted courts in the interpretation of the properly enforceable civil and 
political rights, rather than making socio-economic rights directly 
enforceable.155  By making socio-economic rights directly enforceable, it was 
feared that courts ‘might become too much like government’.156 
 
This led to objectors then (and even now) raising the issue of the 
justiciability157 of socio-economic rights.  The focus, typically, was on their 
legitimacy (ie. whether their nature and content is suitable for inclusion in a 
constitution) and on whether the courts were institutionally competent to 
enforce them.158  Legitimacy-based arguments, similar to those regarding the 
separation of powers doctrine, claimed that socio-economic rights were 
‘choice-sensitive’ issues that were better left to political rather than legal 
deliberation.159  Competency-based arguments rested on the institutional 
competence of the judiciary and the limited processes of adjudication.  These 
arguments referred to the fact that judges are not economists or public policy 
experts and courts are regarded as ill-suited to evaluate and choose between 
various – equally valid and equally complex – policy options; a weakness 
exacerbated by their lack of political accountability.160  Another problem 
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identified was the fact that the judiciary was seen as unable to execute its 
findings itself.  In these circumstances, the judiciary would have to be 
dependent on executive co-operation for its judgments to have any credibility 
or impact on reality.161 
 
Responses to these issues have been wide and varied.  For the purposes of 
this research, these responses are confined to those raised by the 
Constitutional Court during the certification process of the Constitution and 
thereafter.  In the First Certification judgment, the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, the Free Market Foundation and the Gauteng Association of 
Commerce and Industry162 raised the separation of powers, legitimacy and 
competence arguments.   
 
In response, the Court pointed out that the enforcement of many civil and 
political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial 
also often had budgetary implications and the inclusion of such rights would 
not automatically result in a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.163  
The fact that socio-economic rights will ‘almost inevitably give rise to 
budgetary implications’ is not ‘a bar to their justiciability. At a minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from proper invasion.’164  
However, the court did observe that socio-economic rights ‘are, at least to 
some extent, justiciable.’165  This opaque observation by the court resulted in 
the issue being raised again by parties in Minister of Health and others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and others (TAC) despite Yacoob J’s statement 
in an earlier matter: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
also O’Regan (1999) 2 where she uses Fuller’s metaphor of a spider's web to describe the 
concept of polycentricity. 
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‘The issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at all in 
South Africa has been put beyond question by the text of our 
Constitution as construed in the Certification judgment.’ 166 
 
In TAC, the Court’s response to this issue was to describe the role of the 
courts by holding that although the courts are ‘ill-suited to adjudicate upon 
issues where court orders could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the community’, nevertheless, ‘the Constitution 
contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to 
require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to 
subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.’167  The Court 
further held that such determinations of reasonableness may have budgetary 
implications, but that they are not, in themselves, directed at rearranging 
budgets, and in this way ‘the judicial, legislative and executive functions 
achieve appropriate constitutional balance.’168 
 
It appears from the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in the First 
Certification and the TAC judgments that the budgetary implications of 
enforcing socio-economic rights are not, in themselves, a reason for judicial 
abstention,  but may influence the standard of review applied in particular 
cases.169  In Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; 
Mahlaule and another v Minister of Social Development and others (Khosa)170 
Mokgoro J set out the circumstances where such budgetary implications may 
affect the standard of review applied: 
 
‘When the rights to life, dignity and equality are implicated in cases 
dealing with socio-economic rights, they have to be taken into account 
along with the availability of human and financial resources in 
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determining whether the state has complied with the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness’171 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Where do these contextual discussions lead us?  First, any meaning and 
content to the housing right would need to take international law into account 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights.172  It can be concluded that the meaning 
given to a housing right by the ICESCR Committee (in General Comments 3, 
4 and 7) is a vital tool to the state in drafting legislation, and any court when 
attempting to give meaning to the South African housing right.  It is also clear 
from the international law that affirming the dignity of the individual is 
paramount in any attempt to interpret the housing right. 
 
Second, the particular historical background of the housing right plays an 
important role in its interpretation.  A purposive interpretation will therefore 
take into account a provision’s history and the desire not to repeat that history 
when determining the meaning of a constitutional provision. 
 
Third, budgetary implications and other objections may be taken into account 
by the courts where such budgetary implications affect the rights to life, dignity 
and equality.  In a short overview of the history of housing, it is clear that 
housing for the majority of the population was undignified, unequal and, at 
times, life threatening.  In these circumstances, it is imperative that the 
standard of review applied to the housing right take budgetary implications 
into account where appropriate – especially when dealing with those in 
desperate need. 
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In Khosa, Mokgoro J held: ‘In dealing with the issue of reasonableness, 
context is all important’.173  It is, therefore, with these two contextual factors in 
mind that we turn back to the question of the meaning and content given to 
the housing right by the state in chapter 3 and, importantly, by the courts in 
chapter 4.
                                                 
173
 Khosa para 40. 
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Chapter 3: 
National legislative and policy framework for housing 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Before the new political dispensation in 1994, several different Acts based on 
racial grounds governed housing.  By the early 1990s, the Housing Act1 was 
the principle statute regulating housing, while the Community Development 
Act,2 as well as several other Acts,3 regulated housing for black South 
Africans.  These separate pieces of legislation were blatantly discriminatory 
and cumbersome.  It was clear that new legislation and policies were needed 
to give effect to the new housing right as contained in the new Constitution.  
Indeed, the Constitution required the state ‘to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.’4   This legislation and policy framework is set out in 
this chapter, with particular emphasis on the role of local government in 
realising the housing right.  Measures adopted to budget for and spend on the 
housing right are also set out, as such legislation is integral for the housing 
right to be realised.  
 
3.2 A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa 
(White paper)5 
 
The main legislative and policy instruments drafted to give effect to the s26(1) 
and s26(2)6 of the Constitution and related provisions, post-1996, were the 
                                                 
1
 Act 4 of 1966. 
2
 Act 3 of 1966. 
3
 Development and Housing Act 103 of 1985; Housing Act (House of Representatives) 2 of 
1987; Development Act (House of Representatives) 3 of 1987; and Housing Development Act 
(House of Delegates) 4 of 1987. 
4
 Section 26(2) of the Constitution.  My italics. 
5
 23 December 1994, GG 16178. 
6
 The legislation enacted to ensure that no-one may be evicted from his or her home (in terms 
of s26(3) of the Constitution) is recognised as an important facet of the housing right, 
especially the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998. However, given the focus of this dissertation, this legislation is considered only in 
chapter 4 insofar as it is necessary to understand the context of the housing right and the 
eviction proceedings. 
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Housing Act7 and the National Housing Code enacted thereunder.8 However, 
before the housing right was constitutionalised, the December 1994 Housing 
White Paper contained many of the principles, goals and strategies of 
international law described above,  and the Housing Act to come.  
 
This was the first time in the history of the country that an overall vision, 
strategy and plan for housing applicable to all, was developed for the nation.9  
The White Paper committed government to establishing viable socially and 
economically integrated communities, situated in areas that allow convenient 
access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social 
amenities.  The White Paper further asserts that all South Africa’s people ‘will 
have access to a permanent residential structure with secure tenure ensuring 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; potable 
water; and sanitary facilities including waste disposal, and domestic electricity 
supply.’10  This assertion was later included in the Housing Act and affirmed in 
the National Housing Code, with minor changes.11 
 
The White Paper envisaged that the national sphere of government would, 
inter alia, set broad national housing delivery goals, determine a broad 
national housing policy, adopt or promote legislation to give effect to national 
housing policy and establish a national institutional and funding framework for 
housing.12  Provincial government would play a critical role in ensuring 
effective and sustained delivery, setting provincial housing delivery goals, 
                                                 
7
 Act 107 of 1997. 
8
 In terms of s4 of the Housing Act, the National Minister of Housing is under a statutory duty 
to develop, adopt, and publish a national housing code – a comprehensive housing policy that 
must be used at national, provincial and local government levels. 
9
 Gutto para 11. 
10
 White Paper para 4.2. 
11
 ‘Housing development’ in the Housing Act is defined as: 1(vi) ‘… the establishment and 
maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable public and private residential environments 
to ensure viable households and communities in areas allowing convenient access to 
economic opportunities, and to health, educational and social amenities in which all citizens 
and permanent residents of the Republic will, on a progressive basis, have access to: (a) 
permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring internal and external privacy 
and providing adequate protection against the elements; and (b) potable water, adequate 
sanitary facilities and domestic energy supply.’  The National Housing Code affirms this 
definition by stating that this definition ‘is our National Housing Vision’.  See National Housing 
Code para 2.1.  
12
 White Paper para 5.2.1. 
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determining provincial housing policy and playing an oversight role.13  In 
respect of local government, the White Paper specifically recognised that the 
physical processes of planning and housing is ‘very much a local community 
matter’14 and ‘should essentially be driven at a local and municipal level’.15  It 
also recognised that local government has an important role to play in 
enabling, promoting and facilitating the provision of housing to all segments of 
the population in areas under its jurisdiction.  Interestingly, the White Paper 
warned that ‘the absence of legitimate, functional and viable local authority 
structures will jeopardise both the pace and quality of implementation of 
housing programmes.’16  
 
3.3 Housing Act 107 of 1997 
 
The Housing Act legislates and extends the provisions set out in the White 
Paper.  Its point of departure is prioritising the needs of the poor,17 consulting 
with individuals and communities affected by housing development18 and 
regulating affordable and sustainable housing development19 through the 
principles of co-operative government.20  While the Housing Act lays down 
these general principles for housing development, it is the Housing Code 
(enacted under s4 of the Housing Act) which details the actual provision of 
housing.21   
                                                 
13
 White Paper para 5.2.2. 
14
 White Paper para 5.2.3. 
15
 White Paper para 4.1. 
16
 White Paper para 5.2.3. 
17
 Housing Act s2(1)(a). 
18
 Housing Act s2(1)(b). 
19
 Housing Act s2(1)(c). 
20
 Housing Act s2(1)(h)(ii). 
21
 The Housing Act contains no information on the actual provision of housing and, after 
reading the Act, a lay person will be none the wiser as to how housing delivery is carried out – 
this being set out in a separate policy document: the Housing Code.  McLean 55-4 (correctly 
in my opinion) raises the following concern: ‘The authorisation, by the Housing Act,  for 
virtually all rules pertaining to housing to be contained in the Housing Code – whose terms 
can be altered by ministerial fiat – is undesirable.’   She opines that this results in ‘the 
inversion of the usual relationship between policy and legislation.’  In addition, she questions 
whether it is democratically and constitutionally appropriate that most, if not all, of the housing 
development framework is contained in policy rather than in legislation.  This issue is most 
apparent when attempting to ascertain the status of a refined and renovated housing policy: 
‘Breaking New Ground: The Comprehensive Plan for the Creation of Sustainable Human 
Settlements’ introduced in 2004.  This policy has significant implications for the Housing Act 
and the Housing Code but at the date of writing, both the Housing Act and the Housing Code 
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The Housing Code in turn, sets out the national housing programmes, 
including the Housing Subsidy Scheme (HSS), the Discount Benefit Scheme 
and the Hostel Redevelopment Programme.22  In terms of this Code, low-
income housing development mostly takes place through the HSS, 
predominantly in the form of a once-off capital grant through which developers 
provide housing to be allocated to beneficiaries who meet the qualifications 
set out in the Housing Code.23  Currently, this housing subsidy is set at R36 
528 per household.24  Importantly, the Code was revised in 2004 to include 
housing programmes dealing with ‘emergency housing circumstances’25 and 
‘upgrading informal settlements’.  The former programme (which was included 
in housing policy as a direct response to Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and others v Grootboom and others26) is discussed in chapter 4 below. 
 
While s2(1)(h)(i) of the Housing Act states that all levels of government must 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution, 
the primary focus of the Act is on the role to be played by each sphere of 
government in the provision of housing.  The Act sets out that parts 2, 3 and 4 
of the Housing Act set out the roles and responsibilities of national, provincial 
and local government respectively.  This role definition in the Act confirms the 
fact that local government is an important role player in realising s26 and is 
repeated in the Housing Code as follows: 
 
‘A critical policy challenge for the governance of housing is to facilitate 
the maximum devolution of functions and powers to provincial and local 
government spheres, while at the same time,  ensuring that national 
                                                                                                                                            
have yet to be revised to take this new policy into account.  Given the focus of this 
dissertation on housing for those in dire need, no attempt has been made in this study to 
interrogate this new policy.  In any event, it is noted in the Summary Report on Rapid 
Assessment of Service Delivery and Socio-Economic Survey (2007) at 13 that the Eastern 
Cape has not used this new policy due to capacity constraints and will, in all likelihood, not 
fully utilise this new policy ‘over the next three years’. 
22
 Housing Code (http://www.housing.gov.za/ accessed on 9 December 2006). 
23
 Ibid.  See also McLean 55-6.  For a list of qualifications for the latest HSS, see chapter 1. 
24
 See Annexure B which sets out the different types of subsidies and subsidy bands. 
25
 Known as the National Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in Emergency 
Circumstances (ECP). 
26
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
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processes and policies essential to a sustainable national housing 
development process are in place.  The Housing Act … determines 
roles in respect of such devolution, and defines key national and 
provincial responsibilities with respect to empowerment at the 
provincial and local spheres of government.’27 
 
The roles for each sphere of government are set out as follows:  
 
• National government must formulate a sustainable housing policy and 
monitor implementation through the promulgation of the National Housing 
Code and the establishment and maintenance of a national housing data 
bank and information system.28   
 
• Provincial government must create an enabling environment by doing 
everything in its power to promote and facilitate the provision of adequate 
housing in its province within the framework of national housing policy. 
Provincial government, through Provincial Advisory Councils,29 must 
allocate housing subsidies to municipalities and support those 
municipalities.  It also facilitates the transfer of ownership of council 
housing to occupiers.30   
 
• Part 4 of the Act addresses the functions of local government and requires 
every municipality to set out housing delivery goals, to identify and 
designate land for these purposes and to initiate, plan, co-ordinate, 
facilitate, promote and enable appropriate development in its jurisdiction.31 
The Act makes it clear that any reference to a municipality in the Act 
                                                 
27
 Housing Code 8. 
28
 Part 2, ss 3-6 of the Housing Act. 
29
 Section 8 of the Housing Amendment Act 4 of 2001 replaced the original Provincial 
Housing Development Boards with Provincial Housing Advisory Councils.  The establishment 
of these councils is discretionary.  For the situation in the Eastern Cape, see chapter 6 below. 
30
 Part 3 of the Housing Act. 
31
 This ‘decentralisation’ seems to be in line with the Habitat Agenda which refers to the need 
for governments to ‘strive to decentralise shelter policies and their administration to 
subnational and local levels within the national framework’ and ‘provide institutional support 
for facilitating participation and partnership arrangements at all levels.’  See Habitat Agenda 
para 66ff. 
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includes a local council, a metropolitan council, a metropolitan local 
council, a rural council and a district council.32  
 
 
In terms of s9(1) of the Act, the responsibilities listed above in respect of 
housing must be included in every municipality’s process of integrated 
development planning (IDP).33  Municipalities must, as part of their IDP 
process, take reasonable and necessary steps within the framework of 
national and provincial housing legislation to fulfil a number of specific duties. 
Local government must ensure that: 
 
• the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing 
on a progressive basis; 
• conditions not conducive to the health and safety of the inhabitants of its 
area of jurisdiction are prevented or removed; and 
• services in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm-water 
drainage and transport are provided in a manner which is economically 
efficient.34 
 
In addition to these duties, a municipality needs to: 
 
• set housing delivery goals in respect of its area of jurisdiction;  
• identify and designate land for housing development;  
• create and maintain a public environment conducive to housing 
development which is financially and socially viable; 
• promote the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development 
process; 
                                                 
32
 The definition of municipality in the Act refers to ‘municipality’ as defined in s10B of the 
Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993.  Section 10B states that reference to a 
‘municipality’ includes a local council, a metropolitan council, a metropolitan local council, a 
representative council, a rural council and a district council. 
33
 See also s2(1)(c)(iii) of the Housing Act which sets out that national, provincial and local 
government must ensure that housing development is based on integrated development 
planning.  See para 3.4 below for an explanation of the concept of integrated development 
planning. 
34
 Section 9(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of the Housing Act. 
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• initiate, plan, coordinate, facilitate, promote and enable appropriate 
housing development in its area of jurisdiction; 
• provide bulk engineering services, and revenue generating services in so 
far as such services are not provided by specialist utility suppliers; and 
• plan and manage land use and development.35 
  
Section 9(2)(a) allows any municipality to participate in a national housing 
programme in accordance with the rules applicable to such programme by 
promoting a housing development project by:  
 
• promoting a housing development project by a developer; 
• acting as developer in respect of the planning and execution of a housing 
development project on the basis of full pricing for cost and risk; 
• entering into a joint venture contract with a developer in respect of a 
housing development project; 
• establishing a separate business entity to execute a housing development 
project; 
• administering any national housing programme in respect of its area of 
jurisdiction in accordance with s10; 
• facilitating and supporting the participation of other role players in the 
housing development process.36 
 
In addition, s10 allows a municipality to administer any national housing 
programme in respect of its area of jurisdiction, upon application to the MEC.   
 
The vast and specific powers enumerated above clearly illustrate an overall 
responsibility by local government for the management and co-ordination of 
housing development within its area of jurisdiction.  This approach appears in 
line with local government’s developmental mandate, as well as local 
                                                 
35
 Section 9(1)(b)-(h) of the Housing Act. 
36
 Section 9(2)(a)(i)-(vi) of the Housing Act. 
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government’s specific knowledge and interaction with its community.37  Thus, 
the principle behind the allocation of roles in the Act is that the sphere ‘closest 
to the people’ should perform government functions.  Undoubtedly, a strong 
local government with appropriate capacity is needed to fulfil the responsibility 
given to it by the legislation. 
 
3.4 Integrated Development Planning of local government 
(IDP) 
 
Since part 4 of the Housing Act requires the housing responsibilities of local 
government to be included in the IDP process, it is necessary to consider the 
legal framework for such planning and how housing should feature in such a 
plan.38 
 
Section 23 of the Municipal Systems Act39 states: 
 
 ‘(1)  A municipality must undertake developmentally-oriented planning so as 
to ensure that it— 
(a)  strives to achieve the objects of local government set out in 
section 152 of the Constitution;  
(b)   gives effect to its developmental duties as required by section 
153 of the Constitution; and  
                                                 
37
 The IDP Guide Pack, Guide V, para 4.2.8 sets out that local government is best suited to 
assess the needs, opportunities, capacities and resources available so as to set appropriate 
housing delivery goals.  
38
 The process of integrated development planning was first launched in the White Paper on 
Local Government in March 1998 and included as a central tenet of the Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000.  In the White Paper, the IDP process was presented as one of the most 
important tools for municipalities to fulfil their developmental mandate, particularly in regard to 
the need to coordinate planning between the three spheres of government.  In the Integrated 
Development Planning for Local Authorities: A User-friendly Guide (Department of 
Constitutional Development) Integrated Development Planning is seen (at 2-6) as a process 
by which future development is achieved in an orderly, sensible and manageable manner, 
and financial resources for such development are allocated in a disciplined and responsible 
way.  
39
 Act 23 of 2000.  This Act replaced The Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 which 
also required municipalities to prepare integrated development plans and financial plans in 
respect of their powers, functions and priorities. 
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(c)   together with other organs of state, contributes to the 
progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in 
sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution.’40    
 
Section 24 of the Municipal Systems Act requires that planning undertaken by 
a municipality must be aligned with, and complement, the development plans 
and strategies of other affected municipalities and other organs of state so as 
to give effect to the principles of co-operative government contained in s41 of 
the Constitution, specifically national and provincial development programmes 
as required in s153(b) of the Constitution.41 
 
The drafting of an IDP is specifically addressed in the Municipal Systems Act 
due to its status as the ‘principle strategic planning instrument’42 of a 
municipality.  The council must adopt a document that sets out how it intends 
to go about drafting, adopting and reviewing the IDP.  The drafting process 
must follow this document in terms of time frames and must allow for the local 
community to be consulted and be allowed to participate in identifying needs 
and priorities of the municipality.  Significantly, the process must identify all 
provincial and national plans and planning requirements that are binding on 
the municipality (viz. part 4 of the Housing Act).  Section 29 of the Municipal 
Systems Act sees the planning document as more than simply a ‘plan of 
action’ as it envisages that provincial government can use it to check whether 
the municipality has made provision for sufficient mechanisms for consultation 
with provincial government in the IDP formulation.  
 
In terms of regulation 2 of the Local Government: Municipal Planning and 
Performance Management Regulations 2001,43 a municipality must review its 
IDP annually in accordance with its system of performance management.44 
                                                 
40
 My italics. 
41
 See De Visser 220 where he states that the need for co-operation and the need to be 
developmentally orientated distinguish IDP planning from general strategic planning models 
that are usually used by government and the corporate sector. 
42
 Section 35(1) of the Municipal Systems Act. 
43
 GG 22605, 24 August 2001. 
44
 The regulations require that each municipality have a system of performance management, 
according to which the municipality assesses whether the goals of the IDP have been met. 
This is done by a method of setting general key performance indicators for a municipality 
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Once the IDP has been approved by the municipal council, s31(c) of the 
Municipal Systems Act provides for the submission of IDPs to each province’s 
MEC for local government.45  It envisages that the MEC assesses a particular 
IDP to check, inter alia, whether the IDP is aligned with the strategies of other 
municipalities, and those of the provincial government or national government.  
Should the IDP conflict with any of these strategies, the Act provides that the 
MEC can request that the municipality change its IDP in accordance with his 
or her proposals.46  
 
3.5 Legislation and policies regulating spending on housing 
 
In its Third Annual Economic and Social Rights Report, the SAHRC stated:  
 
‘It is incumbent that the state devises sound macroeconomic, fiscal and 
monetary policies so as to maximise the revenue pool earmarked for 
the delivery of socio-economic rights [and to] manage public finances 
in an efficient and accountable manner so as to maximise the ability of 
the service agencies to deliver services.’47 
 
Thus measures adopted to budget for socio-economic rights (i.e. the 
legislation and policies that relate to budget spending) should also be 
discussed and reviewed.  This, it is submitted, is a correct and pragmatic 
approach to realising socio-economic rights, especially in light of the fact that 
the fiscal system itself is set out in the Constitution.48  Without reviewing 
                                                                                                                                            
which the Minister will compile and publish in a report on the performance of municipalities in 
terms of these indicators.  
45
 In terms of housing and the Eastern Cape, this section takes on an added significance as 
the MEC for local government is also the MEC for housing (under the title: MEC for Housing, 
Local Government and Traditional Affairs). 
46
 Should the municipality refuse, s33 of the Act provides for a dispute resolution procedure. 
There have been no reported instances where such dispute resolution has taken place. 
47
 Third SAHRC Report 384. 
48
 Ajam and Murray 2-3 point out that most other countries have not considered it necessary 
to craft specific fiscal constitutions, and fiscal policy is generally governed mainly by ordinary 
budget laws and regulation.  It is thus significant that the framers of the Constitution thought it 
necessary to include the fiscal system in the Constitution.  According to Ajam and Murray: 
‘The fiscal constitution itself provides the context for analysing the interaction between courts 
and the intergovernmental fiscal system.’  In particular, Ajam and Murray 6 (correctly in my 
opinion) assert: ‘Because intergovernmental fiscal structures and processes are outlined in 
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measures to control the budgeting and planning for the housing right, the 
realisation of the housing right by the state (and local government in 
particular) could remain an empty promise.49  As a result, a review of 
legislation affecting the housing right cannot exclude measures adopted to 
budget for such right and the spending of such budget.50  
Chapter 13 of the Constitution sets out the fiscal system of South Africa and 
binds all spheres of government to the commitments of equity, transparency, 
accountability and operational efficiency in this fiscal system.  These 
commitments are important, given the requirement in many socio-economic 
rights that these rights are to be progressively realised ‘within available 
resources’.51  
Section 214 and s227(1) of the Constitution require an Act of Parliament to 
provide for the equitable division of nationally raised revenue among national, 
provincial and local governments.  This Act is the Division of Revenue Act 
(DORA) which is enacted annually, with the budget, to give effect to the 
Constitution.52  The Act sets out the equitable allocations for each sphere of 
government, the division of revenue between the nine provinces, and detailed 
schedules of all other allocations from national departments to provinces and 
municipalities.  Both the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)53 and the 
                                                                                                                                            
the Constitution, and because the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are justiciable, both fall 
within the jurisdiction of the court system and, finally, the Constitutional Court.’  Thus, it is 
submitted that the intergovernmental fiscal system must ensure co-operative service delivery 
in support of the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. 
49
 To this end, the Constitution provides that the Auditor-General must audit and report 
annually on the ‘accounts, financial statements and financial management of all government 
departments’ so as to ensure that government departments are properly managed and that 
their resources ‘are procured economically and utilised efficiently and effectively.’  See s20(3) 
and s28(2)(a) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004.  See also s10(4)(g) and s12(2)(e) of the 
Housing Act which set out that the Auditor-General must audit the books and balance sheets 
of the various organs of state involved in housing, specifically municipalities. 
50
 This approach is not novel.  Ajam and Murray 18 note that the German courts seem to have 
been extremely active in their intergovernmental fiscal system. 
51
 For example, s26(2), s27(2) and s29(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
52
 See, for example, Division of Revenue Act 1 of 2007. 
53The FFC is an advisory body established in terms of s220 of the Constitution.  Its mandate 
is to make recommendations on financial and fiscal matters to Parliament, the provincial 
legislatures, and any other institutions of government when necessary.  It is also mandated to 
facilitate co-operative government on intergovernmental fiscal matters.  The powers and 
functions of the FFC are contained in the Constitution and the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Act 99 of 1997.  
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South African Local Government Association (SALGA)54 are consulted in the 
preparation of DORA.   
In particular, the Housing Code requires national and provincial government to 
develop a multi-year plan called the medium term expenditure framework.55  
This provides a plan for the delivery of houses that is mindful of housing 
demand and potential supply, in terms of available funds for a period of three 
years.  The Minister of Housing thereafter prepares a multi-year plan on the 
basis of multi-year plans prepared by provincial governments. 
 In addition to the Housing Code, it is important to note the key pieces of 
legislation governing the efficient and effective delivery of socio-economic 
rights (and public service delivery in general).  These are the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA)56 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA).57  In addition, supporting regulations and implementation guidelines 
regulate the public expenditure management and accountability.58  In the 
                                                 
54
 SALGA is an organisation recognised by the Organised Local Government Act 52 of 1997 
as a representative of organised local government.  This is in pursuance of s163 of the 
Constitution which provides that an Act of Parliament must cater for the recognition of national 
and provincial organisations representing municipalities, and determine procedures by which 
local government may consult the national and provincial government, designate 
representatives to participate in the National Council of Province (NCOP) and nominate 
persons to the FFC.  
55
 Housing Code para 3.2. 
56
 Act 1 of 1999. 
57
 Act 56 of 2003.  In terms of the public finance framework, each provincial department has 
to produce an effective strategic plan.  The process of drawing up this plan involves 
identifying the most pressing social needs of the area, identifying programmes and activities 
to practically address these needs and then proposing a budget and identifying service 
delivery indicators for implementing programme activities.  It is the task of the provincial 
legislature to endorse such strategic plan and it is the task of provincial treasury to allocate a 
budget to that department.  See PSAM Submission 11. 
58
 The Intergovernmental Fiscal Review for 2003 at 161 assists in understanding the 
respective roles of provincial and local government in regard to practicalities of providing 
housing in a particular province.  In relation to provincial government,  it states that provincial 
government is responsible for ‘developing provincial housing policy within the national 
framework’ which means that the provincial government must ‘legislate on housing matters 
that fall within their provincial boundaries … promote and coordinate housing development 
and implement national and provincial housing programmes within the framework of national 
housing policy.  They approve housing subsidies and projects and provide support for 
housing development to municipalities’.  My italics.  In terms of local government 
responsibilities, the Review states: ‘Municipalities ensure that, within the framework of 
national and provincial legislation and policy, constituents within their jurisdictional areas have 
access to adequate housing.  They initiate, plan, coordinate and facilitate appropriate housing 
development within their boundaries … they provide bulk engineering services like road, 
water, sanitation and electricity … prepare local housing strategy and set goals … set aside, 
plan and manage land for housing.’ 
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housing sphere, these regulations and implementation guidelines seek to 
ensure that the requirements of the Housing Act are met; namely, that 
housing development is ‘economically, fiscally, socially and financially 
affordable and sustainable,’59 and is ‘administered in a transparent, 
accountable and equitable manner, and uphold the practice of good 
government.’60  These sections basically require that a Provincial Department 
plans and spends the funds reasonably.  The question is thus: has the state 
spent its ‘available resources’ (using the terminology of s26(2) of the 
Constitution) reasonably and, in so doing, progressively realised the housing 
right? 
What would be reasonable in the circumstances?  It is clear that the Provincial 
Department needs to monitor and account for the transfer of housing 
subsidies to local government so as to ensure the efficient and effective use 
of its resources.  This naturally follows from the Provincial Department’s 
responsibility for transferring and monitoring funds (received by the National 
Department of Housing) in both the Housing Act and supporting policy 
(including the ECP).  More specifically, a Provincial Department has to follow 
the DORA framework.61  In terms of DORA, the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA)62 and the Housing Act, a Provincial Department assumes certain 
responsibilities for monitoring resources set aside for housing subsidies.  Local 
government also assumes certain responsibilities for monitoring and accounting 
for housing subsidy resources. 
Once the financial year begins and money has been transferred to various 
provincial departments, treasury regulations63 promulgated in terms of s76 of 
the PFMA require all departments to submit regular monthly monitoring 
reports (also known as in-year monitoring reports – IYMs) to the Housing 
MEC and the Provincial Treasury.64  This mechanism ensures that the 
                                                 
59
 Section 1(c)(ii) of the Housing Act. 
60
 Section 1(c)(iv) of the Housing Act. 
61
 See also s30(1)(i) of the PFMA read with regulation 8.4.1 of the Treasury Regulations (as 
amended) and Treasury Instructions K5.1 and 5.4. 
62
 Act 1 of 1999. 
63
 See Government Notice R225, Government Gazette 27388, 15 March 2005. 
64
 National Treasury: Best Practice Guidelines 8. 
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Department complies with the Division of Revenue Act (DORA) framework.65 
More specifically, these IYMs ensure that Provincial Treasury can make 
adjustments to the consolidated budgets of all the departments throughout the 
year to avoid either over- or under-expenditure in the Province.  The IYM 
process also allows for remedial steps to be put in place at an early stage.66 
However, to measure over- or under-expenditure requires that actual 
expenditure reported to the Provincial Treasury is accurate and comparable 
and is accounted for in the appropriation accounts of the Department.  The 
IYMs are also to keep track of actual expenditure made on transfer payments 
which, in the case of the Provincial Housing Department, consists mainly of 
housing subsidies.  In other words, the Provincial Housing Department has to 
account for how much money has been transferred to a municipality, how much 
of that money has been spent, how much is unspent, etc.  In addition to the 
safeguard mechanism provided by the process of IYM reports, DORA requires 
that all conditional allocations (which include housing subsidies by virtue of 
schedule 5 of DORA) are subject to strict reporting to National Treasury and 
other oversight mechanisms.67  If this reporting is not complied with or the 
management of funds is unreasonable and affects the implementation of the 
housing programme, it is submitted that such mismanagement would 
constitute a breach of s26 of the Constitution. 
3.6 Section 26 and the responsibility of the state   
 
Section 26(2), s7(2) and s8(1) in the Bill of Rights all refer to the ‘state’ as the 
responsible agent for realising the right to have access to adequate housing 
either in: 
                                                 
65
 Act 1 of 2007.  In terms of National Treasury: Best Practice Guidelines 9, these monthly 
reports must set out the following: 
• The actual revenue and expenditure for that month in the format as determined by the 
national treasury. 
• Projections of anticipated expenditure for the remainder of the current financial year in the 
format determined by the national treasury. 
• Information of conditional grants received and actual spending against them. 
• Information of all transfers. 
• Any material variances and a summary of actions to ensure that the projected 
expenditure and revenue remain within the budget. 
66
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 44. 
67
 See for example, ss10, 12 and 13 of DORA which indicate the elevated and restricted 
status of conditional allocations set out in schedule 5 of that Act. 
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(a) taking reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources to achieve progressive realisation of this right;68  
(b) respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling the rights in the Bill of 
Rights;69 or  
(c) simply by being  bound by the Bill of Rights.70 
 
None of the sections mentioned above prescribes the duty of housing (or any 
of the fundamental rights) to a particular sphere of government.  Indeed, s239 
defines ‘organs of state’ as including the national, provincial and local spheres 
of government.71  No sphere of government can thus escape the general 
responsibility for realising the right to have access to adequate housing. 
 
However, the question is: what is the extent of the duty of local government 
(which together with provincial and national government makes up the ‘state’ 
                                                 
68
 Section 26(2) of the Constitution: ‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.’ 
My italics. 
69
 Section 7(2) of the Constitution: ‘The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.’  My italics.  In Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W) (a matter concerning s27(1)(b) – the right to have access to 
sufficient food and water) Budlender AJ stated that the terms in s7(2) each has a specific 
meaning.  The obligation to respect is a negative one that requires the state to refrain from 
infringing on existing socio-economic rights.  In the context of housing this would mean that 
the state must not limit or take away people’s existing access to housing, without good cause 
and without following proper legal procedure (see Brand 9-10).  Where such limitation is 
unavoidable, the state must take steps to find alternative accommodation and must not place 
undue obstacles in the way of people gaining access to adequate housing.  The obligation to 
protect requires the state to ensure that a framework exists to enable citizens to enjoy their 
rights without interference from others.  De Vos comments that ‘the obligation [to protect] is 
not to act positively in the sense of providing money or resources directly to individuals, but to 
protect individuals by creating a framework in which they will be able to realise their protected 
rights without interference from others’ (see De Vos (1997) 83).  Brand argues that the duty to 
protect is extended to the duty of the courts, through their powers of developing the common 
law and interpreting legislation, to strengthen existing remedies or developing new remedies 
for protection against private interference in the enjoyment of the right.  Finally, the obligation 
to promote and fulfil both, comprise the duty to create an enabling environment for the 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights.  This may require positive state action to assist and 
make provision for those that do not have the means to access basic services (Brand 10-11). 
70
 Section 8(1) of the Constitution: ‘The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.’  My italics. 
71
 Section 239: ‘In the Constitution, unless the context indicates otherwise – … ‘organ of state’ 
means – 
Any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of 
government.’  My italics. 
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referred to in s26(2), s7(2) and s8(1)) to realise the right to have access to 
adequate housing?  
 
The answer ostensibly lies in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution which set 
out the particular functional areas where each sphere of government has 
legislative competence.  Section 156(1) of the Constitution sets out that a 
municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has a right to 
administer the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and 
Part B of Schedule 5, and any other matter assigned to it by national and 
provincial legislation.  Schedule 4, Part B and schedule 5, Part B set out 
particular functional areas where local government has legislative 
competence.  Local government’s responsibilities include the provision of 
basic services such as water and sanitation services, electricity, refuse 
removal and public places.  Housing, on the other hand, is not listed as a 
functional area of local government.  It is listed as a functional area within the 
concurrent legislative competence of national and provincial government.72 
 
Effectively, this means that housing priorities are set at national and provincial 
level.  Given that housing does not fall within the competency set out in Part B 
of either Schedule 4 or 5, one may deduce that local government has no role 
in realising s26.  On this basis, it may well be concluded that local government 
has a limited role to play in realising s26.  However, the courts and most 
commentators agree that the Constitution does, in fact, impose a duty on local 
government for four reasons, namely, 
 
• the principles of co-operative governance;  
• the responsibility of local government for basic services; 
• the nature of local government’s developmental mandate;73 and  
                                                 
72
 Housing delivery takes place on the basis of subsidy applications by local government to 
their respective provincial governments who judge these applications against their standards.  
73
 The White Paper on Local Government in March 1998 effectively translated the objects of 
s152 and 153 of the Constitution into the term ‘developmental local government’ and defined 
the mandate of local government (at 17) as ‘local government committed to working with 
citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, 
economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives.’ 
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• the provisions setting out local government housing duties in supporting 
housing legislation and policy.   
 
3.6.1 The principles of co-operative government 
 
Despite the fact that housing forms only part of the national and provincial 
spheres’ list of concurrent competencies, the Constitutional Court held in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and 
others74 that the duty to provide housing fell on all three spheres of 
government – national, provincial and local.  Instead of attempting to delineate 
the responsibilities of the various spheres of government, the Constitutional 
Court reasoned that in view of the principles of co-operative government set 
out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, policies and actions of all three spheres 
must be coordinated to give effect to s26.75  
 
The principles of co-operative government set out that the three spheres of 
government are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.76  Co-operative 
government further requires that all three spheres must co-operate with one 
another in mutual trust and good faith by co-ordinating their action and 
legislation.77  The Constitutional Court stated in Grootboom: 
 
‘All levels of government must ensure that the housing programme is 
reasonable and appropriately implemented. … Every step at every 
                                                 
74
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 883 (CC) (Grootboom). 
75
 Grootboom para 39ff. 
76
 Section 40(1) of the Constitution.  In Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg 
Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) at para 26, the Constitutional Court interpreted the words 
‘interdependence’ and ‘interrelated’ as follows: ‘All the spheres are interdependent and 
interrelated in the sense that the functional areas allocated to each sphere cannot be seen in 
isolation of each other.  They are all interrelated. None of these spheres of government or any 
of the governments within each sphere have any independence from each other.  Their 
interrelatedness and interdependence is such that they must ensure that while they do not 
tread on each other’s toes, they understand that all of them perform governmental functions 
for the benefit of the people of the country as a whole.  Sections 40 and 41 are designed in an 
effort to achieve this result.’ 
77
 Section 41(1)(h)(iv) of the Constitution. 
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level of government must be consistent with the constitutional 
obligation to take reasonable measures to provide adequate housing.’78 
 
The reality is thus: various spheres of government will perform various parts 
of a particular ‘line function’ of the government.  As such, a strict separation of 
responsibilities and functions is usually impossible.  It follows then, that 
subsequent jurisprudence in the High Courts79 interprets local government’s 
role in housing against a background of co-operative government.80   
 
3.6.2 The responsibility of local government for basic services 
 
International law recognises that services such as the provision of water, 
sanitation, electricity, refuse disposal and site drainage are inextricably bound 
to the provision of housing.81  It will be recalled from chapter 2 that the 
International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
defined ‘adequate housing’ to include sustainable access to natural and 
common resources,  safe drinking water,  energy for cooking,  heating and 
lighting,  sanitation and washing facilities,  means of food storage,  refuse 
disposal,  site drainage and emergency services.82  In Grootboom the Court 
stated that the right to housing entailed more than ‘bricks and mortar’ and 
includes ‘appropriate services such as the provision of water and the removal 
of sewerage.’83  Most of these provisions are the responsibility of local 
                                                 
78
 Grootboom para 82.  On the other hand, the Constitutional Court did sketch in broad terms 
the responsibilities of each sphere of government.  It remarked that the national sphere is 
ultimately responsible for the provision of finances; the provincial government is responsible 
for the implementation of a housing programme; and local government needs to play a 
supportive role. 
79
 See chapter 4 below. 
80
 Co-operative government has also been reiterated in s3 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000.  Section 3(3) of the Municipal Systems Act states: ‘For the purpose of effective co-
operative government, organised local government must seek to (a) develop common 
approaches for local government as a distinct sphere of government; (b) enhance co-
operation, mutual assistance and sharing of resources among municipalities; (c) find solutions 
for problems relating to local government generally; and (d) facilitate compliance with the 
principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations. 
81
 See chapter 4 below. 
82
 In City v Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); 2006 
(6) BCLR 728 (W) the Court stated at para 49: ‘Housing forms an indispensable part of 
ensuring human dignity. “Adequate housing” encompasses more than just the four walls of a 
room and roof over one’s head.’  
83
 Grootboom para 35. 
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government as per Schedule 4, Part B and Schedule 5, Part B of the 
Constitution.  The nature of these services is such that they cannot be 
performed without recourse to the right to housing.84  In 2000, the national 
Department of Housing recognised the link between the provision of basic 
services and housing in its description of adequate housing in the National 
Housing Code: 
 
‘The establishment and maintenance of habitable,  stable and sustainable 
public and private residential environments to ensure viable households 
and communities in areas allowing convenient access to economic 
opportunities, and to health, educational and social amenities in which all 
citizens and permanent residents of the Republic will, on a progressive 
basis, have access to: 
 
• permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring 
internal and external privacy and providing adequate protection 
against the elements; and 
• potable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy 
supply.’85 
 
In the light of the link between basic services (the scheduled domain of local 
government) and housing (the scheduled domain of national and provincial 
government), it is inevitable that local government has a vital role to play in 
realising s26 of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 In Ex Parte: Speaker of the Kwa-Zulu Provincial Legislature: In re Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Amendment Bill of 1995; Ex Parte: Speaker of the Kwa-Zulu 
Natal Provincial Legislature: In re Payment of Salaries, Allowances and other Privileges to the 
Ingonyama Bill of 1995 1996 (4) SA 563 (CC), the Constitutional Court found that items listed 
in the schedules also include matters incidental thereto.  If basic services are inextricably 
bound to the provision of housing, then there may well be an overlap of functions.  However, 
the court did not comment on what happens when items overlap with items ascribed to other 
spheres and cannot therefore assist in the area of housing. 
85
 My italics. 
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3.6.3 Local government’s developmental mandate 
 
The notion of ‘developmental local government’ is closely linked to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights in the Constitution.  The Constitution sets 
out a number of developmental objectives of local government in ss 152, 153 
and 156.  
 
Section 152 
 
Section 152 of the Constitution specifies that local government must seek, 
inter alia, to promote social and economic development86 and a safe and 
healthy environment.87  Amongst local government’s developmental duties is 
the duty to ‘structure and manage its administration and budgeting and 
planning processes, to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and 
to promote the social and economic development of the community’.88  
 
Meeting the ‘basic needs of the community’ is also the primary concern of 
socio-economic rights.89 
 
Section 153 
 
Section 153(a) of the Constitution explicitly requires that local government 
gives priority to the basic needs of the community.  Adequate housing is not 
only a critical basic need but is also required for the satisfaction of other basic 
needs.  This is evident in the comments made by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Both the Housing Act90 and the 
                                                 
86
 Section 152(c) of the Constitution. 
87
 Section 152(d) of the Constitution. 
88
 Section 153(a) of the Constitution.  The final Constitution differs vastly from the interim 
Constitution in terms of duties of local government.  In terms of the interim Constitution, the 
duty of local government was to effect service delivery only.  In terms of ss152 and 153 of the 
Constitution, these duties now include the promotion of democracy, sustaining and improving 
an adequate standard of living, promoting a safe and healthy environment and the imperative 
to participate in national and provincial development programmes (i.e. co-operative 
government).  
89
 Steytler (2004) 164. 
90
 Act 107 of 1997. 
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Municipal Systems Act91 support this contention.  In the former Act, the 
preamble recognises that shelter as adequate housing fulfils ‘a basic need’. 
The latter Act (which provides a broad normative framework for municipal 
service delivery of social and economic needs)92 requires that the council of a 
municipality ‘must undertake developmentally-orientated planning so as to 
ensure that it … together with other organs of state, contributes to the 
progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in ss24, 25, 26, 27 
and 29 of the Constitution.’93  
 
De Visser goes as far as to argue that facilitating access to adequate housing 
is ‘the most fundamental aspect of development’.94  If this is true, the 
developmental mandate of local government must have housing as a central 
tenet.  
 
3.6.4 Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution  
 
The Constitution clearly provides that the state has a fundamental role and 
responsibility to implement legislative and other measures that will ensure that 
everyone will have access to adequate housing on a progressive basis.  While 
schedules 4 and 5 set out the legislative competence of each sphere, the 
actual role of each sphere is contained in supporting housing legislation and 
policy where national government has assigned certain aspects of the 
housing right to local government.  The allocation of this role in the Act is 
based on the principle that government functions should be performed at the 
lowest possible sphere, closest to the people.  Notwithstanding the supporting 
housing legislation and policy, it is useful to consider recent commentary 
regarding the problematic nature of schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
91
 Act 32 of 2000. 
92
 The preamble to this Act states that its objective is: ‘To provide for the core principles, 
mechanisms and processes that are necessary to enable municipalities to move 
progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of local communities, and ensure 
universal access to essential services that are affordable to all.’  De Visser 119 states that the 
Act is ‘the ultimate translation of developmental local government into institutional reality.’  
93
 My italics. 
94
 De Visser 119.  My italics. 
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In 2003 the Human Sciences Research Council was commissioned by the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government to consider changes to the 
schedules.  Unfortunately, this review has been marked confidential.95 
However, judging from academic commentary on the schedules, it is 
inevitable that housing was discussed as a problematic area.  Nothing (in the 
form of amendments to the schedules) has come from that review.  Atkinson 
suggests that one of the reasons for the general lack of service delivery by 
municipalities is the fact that schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution do not 
mention many of the new functions that municipalities have to perform, with 
the result that the allocation of powers and functions have depended on very 
loosely-articulated national and provincial departmental ideologies.96  This 
could be true of the housing function where local government is expected to 
perform a range of functions without budget or capacity.  Steytler contends 
that this results in ‘not one of the responsible governments providing the 
service, to the prejudice of the citizens.’97  This then further results in the 
national, provincial and local spheres of government pointing fingers at one 
another and shirking responsibility for lack of service delivery.98  This attitude 
resonates in the affidavits submitted by state officials in the matter of South 
African Rail Commuter Corporation v Unlawful Occupants of the Western 
Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile and Nonqkubela Stations, 
Khayelitsha,99 discussed in chapter 4.  
 
Atkinson provides an example of this ‘passing the buck’ by citing a statement 
by the National Department of Housing in June 2005.  In this statement, the 
Department of Housing acknowledged that protests were aimed at local 
government’s apparent lack of service delivery regarding housing.  However, 
the National Department of Housing pointed out that it ‘has no jurisdiction over 
                                                 
95
 See http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Research_Publication-3761.phtml (accessed on 12 February 
2006). 
96
 Atkinson (2006) 17. 
97
 Steytler (2005) 278. 
98
 Ibid.  In Steylter’s words, this results in ‘a neat case of passing the buck.’ 
99
 See chapter 4 where the supporting affidavit of the City in this matter stated that any 
constitutional breaches were due either to lack of funding or to breaches by other spheres of 
government.  An official from the provincial government in turn, argued in his supporting 
affidavit that it was bound by national policy alone and he was unable to do anything beyond 
that. 
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local government.’100  This is, Atkinson opines, a remarkable statement since 
‘it creates the impression of far more municipal autonomy than exists in 
practice’.101  The housing function has never been formally assigned to 
municipalities; with the result that there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding 
who is actually in charge of housing.102 
 
Given these problems, De Visser suggests that housing should be a Schedule 
4, Part B competency (i.e. falling under local government) given the 
developmental nature of housing.103  However, he qualifies this statement by 
adding that provincial and national government should retain the supervisory 
framework through the application of s155(7) and s 155(6)(a).104  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to clarify the legislative framework set up by the state 
in order to realise s26. In particular, the related functions, powers and duties 
set out in legislation and policies were set out, particularly with regard to local 
government’s duties.  Measures adopted by the state to budget for s26 were 
also discussed as a necessary corollary to the realisation of the right.   
 
While this chapter was largely descriptive, one major issue regarding local 
government emerges; that is, the location of the housing function in the 
                                                 
100
 This statement was made despite a resolution by the Housing MinMec that, until 
municipalities have the necessary capacity, ‘provinces would remain fully in charge of the 
provision of housing, assisted by municipalities.’  The Housing MinMec is not a statutory body 
but instead, is constituted in terms of the Housing Code, Part 2.  It comprises the Minister of 
Housing and the nine MECs responsible for housing, as well as representatives of the 
organisation representing municipalities at national level, namely SALGA.  Woolman, Roux 
and Bekink 14-26 describe a MinMec as an intergovernmental relation committee. 
101
 Atkinson (2006) 17. 
102
 Local Government Briefing June 2005. 
103
 De Visser 119. 
104
 Section 155(7) provides that the national government,  subject to s44,  and the provincial 
governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance 
by municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in schedules 4 and 5, by 
regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority referred to in s156(1).  
Section 155(6) (a) sets out that each provincial government must provide for the monitoring 
and support of local government in the province. 
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Constitution is an ‘area of discontent’.105  As a result, commentators opine that 
this ‘location’ leads to the misconception that local government has either no 
role or an extremely limited role to play in implementing s26.  Whether this 
misconception affects the actual implementation of the housing right by local 
government in ‘real, live conditions,’ is a subject which will be addressed in 
the case studies set out in chapter 6 of this dissertation.
                                                 
105De Visser 118.  Steytler (2004) 271.  Steytler describes the situation as one which is 
subject to the ‘curse of concurrent competencies’.  Steytler ascribes this term to a senior 
official who attended Steytler’s training workshop on the Municipal Finance Management Bill 
(as it then was).   
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Chapter 4: 
Section 26 in the Courts 
  
4.1 Introduction 
 
The starting point to any discussion on the content and meaning of the 
housing right in the courts, is the Constitutional Court decision of Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others.1  It is the 
first case heard by the Constitutional Court regarding the housing right, and 
the second case brought before Constitutional Court seeking to deal with 
socio-economic rights enshrined in the 1996 Constitution.2  An important 
factor to emerge from Grootboom was the need for the housing programme 
(and indeed all programmes dealing with socio-economic rights) to include a 
component that responds to the urgent needs of those in desperate 
situations.3 
 
In turn, the interpretation of the housing right in Grootboom (and specifically 
the urgent needs factor) has been used and developed in a number of 
subsequent decisions involving eviction proceedings and other socio-
economic rights.  These decisions utilise the unique approach of the 
Constitutional Court in respect of socio-economic rights; namely, that of 
                                                 
1
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (Grootboom). 
2
 The first case was Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 
1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC).  In this matter, a 41-year-old man, Thiagraj Soobramoney, a 
diabetic with ischeamic heart disease, contended that the state was obliged to provide him 
with access to kidney dialysis treatment.  This obligation, he contended, arose from s11 (right 
to life) and s27(3) (right not to be refused emergency medical treatment).  By denying him 
emergency medical treatment, the Constitutional Court created the impression that it would 
not lightly interfere with the state’s obligations with regard to socio-economic rights in 
circumstances where the state pleads that the required resources are not available.  
However, as will become clear later in this chapter, Soobramoney and Grootboom represent 
the opposite ends of the ‘spectrum’ of social and economic claims under the Constitution. 
Soobramoney was a claim for high-tech ‘tertiary’ care; it challenged an identifiable, rational 
and considered decision on the allocation of resources and the relief could, at best, provide 
temporary benefit.  On the other hand, the Grootboom claim was for the most basic and 
fundamental need: it challenged unidentifiable, arbitrary and misconceived decisions on the 
allocation of resources (if any conscious decision was ever made) and the relief could 
substantially transform the lives of some of the most vulnerable members of our society.  See 
amici Heads of Argument in President of the Republic of South Africa and another v  
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and others, amici curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); 2005 
(8) BCLR 786 (CC) para 142. 
3
 See Liebenberg 33-34. 
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reasonableness review.  These cases are set out in detail for a number of 
reasons. 
 
First, most eviction proceedings invariably deal with the poor and those who 
are4 or who were5 living in intolerable situations.  Since Grootboom highlighted 
the lack of planning to provide for those living in these very conditions, these 
proceedings are important to establish how the state has responded (or not 
responded) to the guidelines in Grootboom in respect of those in desperate 
need.6 
 
Second, these eviction proceedings consolidate two principles developed by 
the Constitutional Court.  The first principle is that, for the time being, the 
courts will not interpret the right to housing as containing a ‘core minimum 
content’ as developed by the United Nations Committee on Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights.7 The second principle is that the ‘real question’8 that the 
                                                 
4
 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W); 
2007 (1) SA 78 (W); (and the appeal of that decision in City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 SCA 25 (RSA)). In this matter the occupiers had 
occupied unsafe buildings in inner city Johannesburg for a considerable period of time. 
5
 Many people leave the intolerable situations in informal settlements in an attempt to better 
their situation.  However, the place they move to is often simply less intolerable.  This was the 
case in Grootboom, Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 
2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) and City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others 2004 (5) SA 38 (C); 
2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C), [2003] 3 All SA 517 (C) all of which are discussed below.  McLean 
55-8 notes that the private land occupied by the community in Grootboom was ‘all things 
being equal, an improvement upon the deplorable conditions of their previous settlement.’ 
6
 Eviction proceedings are necessarily included in this research because, in the words of 
Liebenberg (2005) 1, evictions are frequently ‘a reflection of unjust socio-economic 
circumstances in which communities experience widespread homelessness.’  See also Jaftha 
v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Scholtz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) where 
the Court commented at para 28 that any measure which permits a person to be deprived of 
existing access to adequate housing, limits the rights protected in s26(1).  
7
 For the purposes of this research, the vexing question of whether a court should prefer the 
minimum core approach over the reasonableness standard cannot be adequately addressed.  
The adoption of the reasonableness approach over the minimum core approach has been 
both condoned and criticised, with several scholars arguing that the courts should adopt the 
minimum core approach favoured by the UN Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights.  See the debate between Bilchritz and Wesson for an insight into the merits of each 
approach (D Bilchritz ‘Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The minimum core and its 
importance’ (2002) 119 SALJ 484, D Bilchritz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the 
minimum core’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1, D Bilchritz ‘Placing basic needs at the centre of socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 4 ESR Review 
(www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Rights/esr-review/esr-previous-
editions/esr-march-2003.pdf accessed 2 June 2005) and  M Wesson ‘Grootboom and 
beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 284).  See also Wickeri who condones the reasonableness approach 
and Roux (2003) who criticises it.  It is noted that prior to Grootboom, scholars argued in 
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courts will seek to answer in socio-economic matters will be whether the policy, 
laws and administrative measures adopted by the state to fulfil a particular 
right, is reasonable.  Third, it is submitted that the interpretation of the housing 
right and guidelines developed in these proceedings should provide the state 
with a constitutional standard against which to measure its planning and 
budgetary processes.9 
 
This chapter takes its form from the final reason mentioned above.  Its point of 
departure is a discussion of Grootboom.  A list of preliminary guidelines based 
on the interpretation of the housing right in Grootboom is then drafted.  This 
list is revisited after a discussion of subsequent socio-economic cases and 
eviction proceedings.  In conclusion, a list of comprehensive guidelines is 
drawn up that takes into account all the necessary elements that a plan or 
programme should include in order to comply with constitutional obligations.  
These guidelines are then condensed to address the particular issues of this 
research, namely: 
 
• provision for those living in dire need; and  
• the role of local government. 
                                                                                                                                            
favour of an implied minimum core obligation in s26 and s27 – see Scott and Macklem, De 
Vos (1997), G van Bueren ‘Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 
SAHJR  52 and Scott and Alston 16.  
8
 Grootboom para 33. 
9
 In this regard, eviction proceedings are particularly insightful in terms of determining what 
planning and budgetary processes have been put in place by the state.  Budlender notes that, 
since Grootboom, when local government seek to evict homeless people, ‘they no longer 
obtain a court order for the asking – courts increasingly ask the councils what they have done, 
and what they are going to do, to meet their Grootboom obligations in respect of the people 
concerned.’  See Budlender in S Leckie (ed) National Perspectives in Housing Rights (2003) 
Kluwer Law International: London 217. It is interesting to note that there is an appeal pending 
against the SCA decision in City of Johannesburg II (see footnote x below) which questions 
whether the SCA truly understood what the council had done, and what they were going to 
do, to meet their Grootboom obligations. See Applicant’s Heads of Argument Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road and another v City of Johannesburg and others para 6, 7 and 154ff.  
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4.2 Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Grootboom and others10 
 
4.2.1 Background  
 
Irene Grootboom was one of several hundred people, most of whom were 
children,11 who lived in an informal squatter settlement devoid of running  
water, electricity, proper sewerage works and refuse removal services.12  
Some members of the community had applied for a grant of subsidised low-
cost housing from the local municipality but received no indication as to when 
accommodation would be provided.13  In the light of these conditions and the 
uncertainty of future accommodation, Grootboom and the rest of the group left 
the informal settlement where they lived (Wallacedene) and moved onto  
vacant private land earmarked for low-income housing.  They called the land 
‘New Rust’ (meaning ‘New Rest’).  Three months after moving onto the land, 
the owner obtained an eviction order14 and, despite an initial refusal to move, 
the applicants were evicted from New Rust on 18 May 1999.  The  
Wallacedene community would contend later that the structures they had 
erected on the land were bulldozed and burnt, without giving them any 
opportunity to remove their personal possessions.15  This occurred during a 
cold, windy and rainy Western Cape winter.16  No alternative site had been 
                                                 
10
 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
11
 The applicants comprised 390 adults and 510 children (276 of them under the age of 8). 
See Grootboom  para 4. 
12
 In her affidavit to the Court, Grootboom described the living conditions as unsatisfactory, 
referring to the limited space available to families and health concerns due to a ‘water table 
problem’ in the area (quoted in Schneider 51). 
13
 Wickeri 14 records that some had been waiting for low-cost housing for 7 years. 
14
 The application for eviction was heard and granted in the Magistrate’s Court, Kuilsriver, on 
8 December 1998 without any of the applicants or their legal representatives being present in 
Court.  When the applicants refused to move, a rule nisi was issued in the same court, 
ordering the applicants to show cause why they should not be removed from the land.   After 
postponements and an attempted negotiation, a final order was granted whereby the 
applications were ordered to dismantle their structures.  While the order made provision for a 
‘bemiddelingsproses’ (Afrikaans for ‘mediation process’), there was dispute as to what this 
meant.   
15
 Grootboom para 10. 
16
 The Constitutional Court noted that the eviction was ‘done immaturely and inhumanely: 
reminiscent of apartheid style evictions’ (Grootboom para 10).  In chapter 2 it was noted that 
Robinson 509 characterised apartheid evictions and forced relocations by ‘bulldozing, burning 
and demolition of shacks; termination of the community’s water supply; and arrests of 
residents for trespass.’  Certain similarities with the eviction of the Wallacedene community 
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designated for the applicants before the eviction and, left to their own devices, 
the group moved to a nearby municipal sports ground.17  The applicants, 
without building materials, attempted to build temporary structures out of 
plastic.  These structures proved wholly inadequate at the first rainfall within 
the first week of the structures being erected.18  The municipality declined to 
give them assistance in any real sense19 and on 31 May 1999, the community 
lodged an urgent application to the Cape High Court directing all levels of 
government20 forthwith to provide: 
 
• shelter for the applicant children; and  
• accommodation for the applicant children’s parents in the aforegoing 
shelter.21 
  
Josman AJ heard an initial application and, after conducting an inspection of 
the sports field ‘community’, he ordered the five respondents ‘jointly and 
severally … to make available to the applicants, free of charge the 
Wallacedene Community Hall on a continuing basis in order to provide 
temporary accommodation to the various children of the applicants and in the 
case of the children who require supervision, one parent/adult for each 
child.’22 The parties agreed to postpone the full hearing and three weeks later, 
Comrie and Davis JJ heard the matter.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be ignored: at para 10 of the judgment, Yacoob J states that their structures were 
‘bulldozed and burnt’ and their personal possessions destroyed. 
17
 Grootboom para 11. 
18
 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) 282 E-F. 
19
 Schneider 52 records that a letter was written by the community’s attorney to the 
municipality requesting assistance.  The municipality replied 10 days later stating that it had 
supplied food and shelter at the local community hall and had approached the provincial 
government for assistance.  However, the local hall could house only eighty people. 
20
 The respondents to this action were cited as follows: The local municipality (first 
respondent), Cape Town Metropolitan Council (second respondent), Province of the Western 
Cape (third respondent), National Housing Board (fourth respondent) and the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa (fifth respondent). 
21
 See para 2 of the order.  For a discussion of this order, see Schneider 53. 
22
 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) 280. 
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4.2.2 Decision in the court a quo 
 
Although the right to have access to adequate housing had been in the 
Constitution for eighteen months by this time, the application by the 
Wallacedene community was the first time where a Court was asked to 
interpret the section directly.  In deciding the matter, the High Court 
concentrated on the application, and interaction of two provisions of the 
Constitution, namely s26 and s28.23   
 
Davis J first considered the claim in terms of s26 of the Constitution and found 
that the applicants had not shown that they were entitled to the relief 
requested.  Davis J, in rejecting the argument based on s26, was convinced 
that the respondents had produced ‘clear evidence’ that a rational housing 
programme was in place and was implemented to the extent that the 
government had the resources to do so.  He based this finding on the 
interpretation of the words ‘progressive implementation’ by the Constitutional 
Court in Soobramoney24 and the express wording of s26(1) and s26(2).25  
 
The second part of the judgment addressed the claim of the children for  
shelter in terms of s28(1)(c).  He found that, as opposed to s26, the question  
of ‘progressive realisation’ and budgetary limitations were not applicable to 
the determination of rights in terms of s28.  Davis J found that s28(1)(c)  
placed the primary obligation of providing shelter for children on their parents.  
The state had to provide that shelter if the parents could not.  The shelter to  
be provided, according to this obligation, was a significantly more rudimentary 
form of protection from the elements than was required by the housing right  
and fell short of the adequate housing requirement in s26.  The Court 
concluded that ‘an order which enforces a child’s right to shelter should take 
                                                 
23
 Section 28 (1)(c): Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter,  basic health care 
services and social services. 
24
 Both Chaskalson P (as he then was) and Sachs J in the judgment of Soobramoney 
cautioned against an excessively generous approach to socio-economic rights, emphasising 
the need for deference to the legislative and executive in these matters.  See Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal discussed above. 
25
 Davis J found, upon the express wording of the section, that it could not be said that the 
respondents had not taken reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right.  
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account of the need of the child to be accompanied by his or her parent.  
Such an approach would be in accordance with the spirit and purport of 
section 28 as a whole.’26 
 
In the result, the Court ordered the national and provincial governments, as 
well as the Cape Metropolitan Council and the Oostenberg Municipality, to 
provide children and their parents immediately with tents, latrines and a 
regular supply of water until the parents were able to find appropriate 
accommodation for their children.  In addition, the Court required the 
government to report back to it within three months of its decision. 
 
4.2.3 Application to appeal, admission of amici curiae and the offer by 
the municipality 
The state challenged the correctness of the Davis J’s judgment in respect of 
the s28 ruling and was granted leave to appeal by the Constitutional Court.  
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the Community 
Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape (CLC) were successful in 
their application to be admitted as amici curiae.  After the Court granted the 
application, the CLC and the SAHRC asked the Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC) to argue the case on their behalf. 
While the written arguments of both the appellants and respondents initially 
concentrated on the meaning and import of the shelter component of 
s28(1)(c), the amici brief27 sought to broaden the issues by introducing the 
notion of the housing right containing a minimum core obligation.  The 
appellants and respondents did not object to this broadening of issues in their 
further written contentions.28 
                                                 
26
 Grootboom para 18. 
27
 The Constitutional Court acknowledged these heads of arguments in Grootboom  para 18 
of the judgment and characterised them as being ‘a detailed, helpful and creative approach to 
the difficult and sensitive issues involved in [this] case.’ 
28
 Schneider 54 records in an interview with one of the state attorneys involved in the case 
that when oral argument commenced ‘we [the state] immediately realised … the Court was 
not interested in s28.  They wanted s26.’  In the circumstances, Schneider records that the 
state’s lead advocate had to argue s26 ‘on his feet’.  Given that there were no written 
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Before oral arguments were heard, the Western Cape Provincial Government 
and Oostenberg Municipality made an offer ‘in the interests of humanity and 
pragmatism’29 to the community concerned.  This offer, which was accepted, 
was to consist of temporary accommodation constituting roofs, sanitation and 
water, until housing could be made available through the provincial housing 
programme.  Four months after the agreement was reached, however, the 
community made an urgent application to the Court, alleging that the 
agreement had been breached.  This meant that the Court handed down two 
orders: an order directed specifically at the reinstated urgent application, and 
a general order to dispense with the case.  
 
4.2.4 The Constitutional Court Decision 
 
The Constitutional Court heard oral argument from 11 to 13 May 2000 and 
delivered judgment on 4 October 2000, some five months thereafter.  Instead 
of setting the decision in a s28 milieu as the High Court had done, the Court 
decided the matter on the basis of s26 and considered the obligations 
imposed upon the state by s26 under the same three contexts considered in 
chapter 2 above, namely: justiciability,30 historical context,31 and the relevant 
international law and its impact.32  
 
4.2.4.1 Justiciability 
 
In respect of the justiciability of the housing right, the Court accepted as its 
starting point the Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199633 and 
Soobramoney decisions.  The Court held that socio-economic rights were 
justiciable despite their budgetary implications, but that the Court would not 
 
                                                                                                                                            
objections to the amici heads of argument before oral argument, it is difficult to understand 
how the state did not prepare itself for this possibility.   
29
 Grootboom  para 91. 
30
 Grootboom para 19ff. 
31
 Grootboom para 6 and 25. 
32
 Grootboom para 26ff. 
33
 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC);1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) (First Certification). 
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interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by political organs whose 
responsibility it is to deal with the matters before it.34 
 
4.2.4.2 Historical Context 
 
The Court emphasised the need to interpret the s26 right in both a textual, 
social and historical context.  In respect of the latter, the Court stated very 
simply that ‘the cause of the acute housing shortage lies in apartheid’35 and 
that ‘the cycle of the apartheid era, therefore, was one of untenable 
restrictions on the movement of African people into urban areas, the 
inexorable tide of the rural poor to the cities, inadequate housing, resultant 
overcrowding, mushrooming squatter settlements, constant harassment by 
officials and intermittent forced removals.’36 
 
In emphasising this historical context, the Court repeated Chaskalson P’s 
description of this context in Soobramoney37 and by so doing, set out the task 
of the Court as essentially transformative when interpreting the content of the 
housing right in the Constitution:38 
 
‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. 
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great  
poverty.  There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social 
security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate 
health services.  These conditions already existed when the  
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to 
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, 
                                                 
34
 Grootboom para 35. 
35
 Grootboom  para 6.  See chapter 2 for a description of housing during apartheid. 
36
 Grootboom para 6.  See also Western Cape Provincial Government and others: in re DVB 
Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and another 2001(1) SA 500 (C) for 
a description of housing and planning during apartheid. 
37
 See also the comments of Mahomed DP in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and 
others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC); 1996 (8) 
BCLR 1015 (CC) para 43, albeit in a different context.  
38
 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); 2001 (10 ) BCLR 
995 (CC) para 54; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 
(SCA); 2002 (3) All SA 741 (SCA) para 17 and Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 
2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA); 2002 (4) All SA 346 (SCA) para 12 regarding the transformative 
nature of the Constitution. 
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freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. 
For as long as these conditions continue to exist, that aspiration will 
have a hollow ring.’ 39 
 
4.2.4.3 Relevant international law and its impact 
 
The Court noted that parties appearing before it attached considerable weight 
to the value of international law when interpreting s26 and they argued that 
the Court should take guidance from the interpretation given to such rights 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), an interpretation that the Court is bound to consider, but not bound 
to adopt.40  The amici pointed to a number of General Comments made by the 
United Nations Committee for Social and Economic Rights responsible for the 
interpretation and application of the Covenant.41  In particular, the amici 
argued that in interpreting s26, the Court should adopt an approach similar to 
the Committee’s approach that socio-economic rights contain a minimum 
core.42  
 
In responding to these submissions, the Court pointed out certain problems 
with this interpretation.  First, the Court recognised that it should not apply any 
principle that exists in international law unless such principle is applicable in a 
South African context.43  Thus, when construing the right to have access to 
adequate housing, the Court will be mindful of these textual differences.44 
Yacoob J suggested that the difference in the language of s26, and the 
                                                 
39
 Soobramoney  para 8. 
40
 Even though South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR to date, it must not do anything to 
undermine the values of the treaty in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty.  See also s39 of 
the Constitution: ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a Court, tribunal or forum … must 
consider international law.’  
41
 See paras 20ff of the Grootboom amici heads of argument.  Such an obligation requires 
every state party to fulfil certain minimum essential levels of the rights and failure to do so 
constitutes a prima facie failure to discharge its obligations under the ICESCR. 
42
 This approach was adopted by the Committee in para 10 of General Comment 3, 1990. 
See footnote 7 above. 
43
 Grootboom para 26. 
44
 See S Khoza’s article ‘Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone – A 
Need for Framework Legislation’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 664 at 668 where he uses the ‘textual 
differences’ interpretation found in the Grootboom judgment to predict how the Constitutional 
Court is likely to interpret the right to food, another socio-economic right protected by the 
Constitution. 
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wording of the parallel right in article 11(1)45 of the ICESCR, created two 
different rights.  While the ICESCR provides a right to adequate housing, s26 
provides a right to have access to adequate housing.  According to Yacoob J, 
the significance of this formulation (viz ‘access to’) is twofold.46  In the first 
place, it implies that the scope of the right entails more than just the physical 
structure.  Second, the formulation makes it clear that the state is not the only 
provider of the right.  The state should enable other agents in society to 
provide access to the housing right.  The ICESCR furthermore requires all 
appropriate steps to be taken47 while s26 of the Constitution requires 
reasonable measures.  In the light of these differences, so Yacoob J 
reasoned, the minimum core standard test would be an inappropriate test to 
use in assessing the constitutionality of the government’s housing policy.48 
 
Secondly, Yacoob J suggested that the determination of a minimum core 
presented difficult questions.  These difficult questions included whether the 
definition of a minimum core should be directed at specific groups of people or 
generally, and whether such a definition would serve the diverse needs of 
people in the context of access to adequate housing.  In order to determine  
the minimum core of the right, Yacoob J held that one must first identify the 
needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such right (which will vary 
according to factors such as income, unemployment, poverty etc).  He 
emphasised that the Committee had developed the concept of minimum core 
over many years of examining the reports by reporting states.  The Court did 
not have the benefit of comparable information where it could determine a 
minimum core obligation and, while it may be possible and appropriate to 
                                                 
45
 As set out in chapter 2 above, article 11(1) of the Covenant provides that the parties 
‘recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of housing 
conditions’.  Hence, the ‘parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realisation of the 
right’. 
46
 Grootboom para 35. 
47
 A more general provision of the ICESCR (article 2.1), applicable to all relevant rights, 
makes a promise ‘to take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view of 
achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including the adoption of legislative measures.’ 
48
 Grootboom para 28.  However, Liebenberg 33-22 argues that the significance of the 
difference in the formulation is more apparent than real.  She surmises this from the similar 
obligations that the UN Committee reads into the right to adequate housing in respect of 
facilitating access to private housing (in terms of article 11 of the ICESCR).  
 87 
have regard to the content of the minimum core obligation, it was not 
necessary to determine whether it is appropriate in the context before them.49 
 
Thus, instead of involving itself in a ‘brick-and-mortar versus tent’ debate,50 
the Court moved the interpretation of the right from the ‘minimum core 
obligation’ model to a model based on a reasonableness review.51  In terms of 
this review, the Court commented: ‘The real question in terms of our 
Constitution is whether the measures taken by the State to realise the right 
afforded by section 26 are reasonable.’52  
 
4.2.4.4 Analysing s26: reasonable measures and progressive 
realisation 
 
In its interpretation of s26(2), the Court departed from international 
jurisprudence by setting a reasonableness standard as a baseline  
requirement for policies to be considered constitutional.53  Yacoob J started  
his analysis by stating that s26 contains both a negative and positive  
obligation.  The negative obligation placed upon the state and all other entities 
and persons consists of the duty to desist from preventing or impairing the  
right to have access to adequate housing, including the right not be arbitrarily 
evicted.  The state’s negative obligation is therefore to ‘unlock the system’, 
providing access to housing stock and a legislative framework to facilitate self-
built houses through planning laws and providing access to financing.  Such a 
                                                 
49
 McLean 55-41 argues convincingly that the issue of evidence is a ‘red herring’ since the 
Committee of the ICESCR has laid down a minimum standard in interpreting the meaning of 
adequate housing, which could be applied, irrespective of local conditions. 
50
 The idea here is that the Court would have to determine what the ‘minimum core’ of the 
right is.  Is it a house, a tent, a piece of plastic sheeting?  The order of the Court a quo set out 
that tents, latrines and a regular supply of water should be provided (in terms of s28(1)(c)) by 
the national and provincial governments, as well as the Cape Metropolitan Council and the 
Oostenberg Municipality.  This implies that the Court thought that the provision of these items 
would constitute ‘the minimum’ of a child’s right to shelter in s28(1)(c).  However, the 
Constitutional Court avoided such an approach in respect of s26. 
51
 See also Liebenberg (2004) 8.  The Urban Sector Network has characterised the approach 
of the Constitutional Court as one that is focused on collective rights to a ‘reasonable’ policy, 
rather than individual rights to a minimum core entitlement.  See Urban Sector Network 
Report 18. 
52
 Grootboom para 33. 
53
 Liebenberg 33-22 describes this as ‘one of the most contentious issues in the development 
of South Africa’s jurisprudence on socio-economic rights.’ 
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negative obligation requires the state to address issues of development and 
social welfare especially amongst vulnerable groups such as the poor.54 
 
The positive obligation contained in s26, so Yacoob J reasoned, was to be 
found in s26(2).  The words ‘reasonable measures’ and ‘progressive 
realisation’ required positive action in the sense that all three spheres of 
government had to determine a comprehensive and co-ordinated state 
housing programme in consultation with each other as contemplated by 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution.55  
The Court emphasised that the relevant enquiry regarding these positive 
obligations would be whether the legislative and other measures taken by the 
state are reasonable.56  In determining whether a set of measures is 
reasonable, the Court noted that it was necessary to consider housing 
problems in their social, economic and historical context and to consider the 
capacity of institutions responsible for implementing the programme.57  The 
Court considered that a reasonable programme was one that was 
‘comprehensive’,58 ‘coherent’,59 and ‘balanced and flexible’.60  Significantly, a 
programme that ‘excludes a significant segment of society’ and one which  
fails to provide for ‘those whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to 
enjoy all rights is therefore most at peril’61 will not pass the reasonableness 
standard.  Reasonableness, the Court went on to say, should be assessed  
not only with regard to legislation and policy, but also to the implementation of 
the policy.62  While the Court emphasised that the term ‘progressive 
 
                                                 
54
 Grootboom para 36. 
55
 Chapter 3 of the Constitution sets out the principles of co-operative government.  See 
chapter 3 above for a more detailed discussion of these principles. 
56
 Despite rejecting the minimum core question as the central consideration in assessing state 
policy, the Court did envisage that questions around minimum core could play a role: ‘[T]here 
may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a 
minimum core obligation to determine whether measures taken by the State are reasonable’ 
(Grootboom para 33). 
57
 Grootboom  para 43.  This again ties in with factors discussed in the previous chapter. 
58
 Grootboom  para 40. 
59
 Grootboom para 41. 
60
 Grootboom  para 43. 
61
 Grootboom  para 44. 
62
 Grootboom para 42.  This is an important aspect of the judgment which Tushnet seems to 
have ignored.  Tushnet (2003) 813 argues that all that Grootboom requires is that the 
government submit a plan for public housing that contains a component dealing with the 
desperately needy.  That is, the government can fully comply with Grootboom by accepting a 
plan that it has no intention of implementing.  The plan, he says, would be like the Soviet five-
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realisation’ in s26(2) clearly showed that even though it was contemplated 
that the right could not be realised immediately, the state must take steps to 
meet the needs of all in our society.63   
 
Finally, the Court emphasised the balance between the goal and means, 
stating that the measures must be ‘calculated to attain the goal expeditiously 
and effectively,’64 but that the availability of resources is an important factor in 
determining what is reasonable. 
 
4.2.4.5 Description and evaluation of the state housing programme 
 
After describing the state housing programme, the Court asked whether the 
measures adopted were reasonable within the Court’s interpretation of s26. 
 
In answering this question, the Court lauded the state, noting that what had 
been done to date in execution of its housing programme was a major 
achievement.  The Court noted that large sums of money had been spent and 
a significant number of houses had been built.65  The Court stated that the 
programme was not haphazard and represented a systematic response in 
terms of long- and medium-term planning to a pressing social need.  The 
Court went so far as to say: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
year plans, existing on paper but having no beneficial real-world impact.  In the light of 
Yacoob J’s explicit statement on the importance of implementation, this criticism seems 
unjustified.  The Constitutional Court also specifically commented on a programme not yet 
implemented in the Cape Metro area (AMLSP) regarding the rapid release of land, stating at 
para 67 that  ‘what remains is implementation of the programme by taking all reasonable 
steps that are necessary to initiate and sustain it.  And it must be implemented with due 
regard to the urgency of the situation it is intended to address.’  Moving further down the 
timeline, the Fifth SAHRC Report at 13 commented that the emergency programme 
developed by national government was possibly unreasonable in the Grootboom sense due 
to questions of sustainability.  These factors tend to lessen the impact of Tushnet’s analogy to 
Soviet five-year plans. 
63
 Grootboom para 45. 
64
 Grootboom para 46. 
65
 The Court noted at para 53 (footnote 47) that some 362 160 houses were built or under 
construction between March 1994 and September 1997, while an overall total of some 637 
190 subsidies had been allocated for projects in various stages of planning or development by 
October 1997. 
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‘Considerable thought, energy, resources and expertise have been and 
continue to be devoted to the process of effective housing delivery.  It 
is a programme that is aimed at achieving the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing.’66 
 
Despite these praises, the Court held that the Constitution required that 
everyone be treated with ‘care and concern’67 and that, since the state did not 
provide short-term relief to those in desperate need, the programme failed to 
fulfil the constitutional requirement that ‘the basic necessities of life are 
provided for all’.68  The Court thus found no express provision in the state’s 
housing programme to facilitate access to relief for people who have ‘no 
access to land, no roof over their heads, for people who are living in 
intolerable conditions and for people who are in crisis because of natural 
disasters such as floods or fires, or because their homes are under threat of 
demolition.’69  The Court held that if the nationwide programme resulted in 
affordable housing for most people within a reasonably short time, the 
absence of this component might have been acceptable.70  However, given 
the scale of the problem and the years it would take to rectify it, the Court held 
that the state fell short of the requirements of s26(2)71 in that ‘no provision 
was made for relief to those in desperate need’.72 
                                                 
66
 Grootboom para 53.  Although not acknowledged in the judgment, the approval of most 
aspects of the national housing plan almost mirrors the UN Committee’s emphasis on 
formulating a transparent, participatory strategy and plan of action for the progressive 
realisation of the relevant socio-economic rights (General Comment 4, 1990). 
67
 Grootboom para 44.  This requirement to treat people with ‘care and concern’ is taken up 
again by Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality para 37 where he refers to the law’s 
‘compassion.’.  Jajbhay J, in the City of Johannesburg case para 52ff goes one step further by 
translating this requirement into the spirit of ubuntu.  For a discussion of this requirement, see 
footnote 195 below. 
68
 Grootboom para 44. 
69
 Grootboom para 52. 
70
 In an article for Business Day 24 October 2005 (‘Court meets needs of homeless 
wanderers through a torturous route’) Jonny Steinberg recorded a poignant moment in the 
Constitutional Court during oral argument in the Grootboom matter.  Jeremy Gauntlett, 
counsel for the government, told the Court that his client was slow in fulfilling its constitutional 
obligation, but that in the long run, ‘everyone would be housed.’  ‘In the long run,’ Chaskalson 
JP replied, citing John Maynard Keynes, ‘we are all dead.  What about people who are 
homeless here and now?  Are you saying they must wander from place to place until they find 
land from which no one will evict them?’  
71
 It should be noted that the Court found that the reasoning of the High Court in relation to 
s28(1)(c) produced an anomalous result.  People with children could have a direct and 
enforceable right to housing under s28(1)(c) while those without children were not entitled to 
housing under that section no matter how old, disabled or otherwise deserving they may be. 
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4.2.5   Response to Breach and Test Developed  
 
The Court’s response to the state’s breach of s26 was to set a 
reasonableness test regarding state policies and programmes related to 
socio-economic rights generally.  In doing so, the Constitution rejected the 
minimum core approach.  Instead, it set out certain guidelines throughout the 
judgment as to what would constitute a reasonable policy for the realisation of 
a socio-economic right.  These guidelines should, however, always be seen 
against the background of the following statement made by the Court early on 
in the judgment: 
 
‘A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether more 
desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent.  It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by 
the state to meet its obligations.  Many of these would meet the 
requirements of reasonableness.  Once it is shown that the measures 
do so, the requirement is met.’73 
 
Liebenberg, taking into account the features of reasonableness described by 
the court, has summarised the guidelines inherent in this standard or test. 
Given Liebenberg’s attention to most aspects of the judgment, this summary 
is repeated verbatim:74 
                                                                                                                                            
In the light of this interpretation, the Court found all that the section required was for the State 
to provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are 
accorded the protection contemplated by s28.  Since the children involved in the case were 
cared for by their parents, there was no obligation upon the state to provide shelter.  The 
Constitutional Court therefore held that the High Court had erred in making the order it did on 
the basis of the section.  In an interview with Schneider in 2001,  the then attorney for the 
Wallacedene community (Julian Apollo) candidly spoke about his rationale for relying on s28: 
‘We, I think,  rather cleverly thought that if we use the kids as pawns we will ultimately get the 
extension of the rights as far as the parents are concerned as well.’  See Schneider 53. 
72
 Grootboom para 69. 
73
 Grootboom para 41. 
74
 Liebenberg 33-34.  It is interesting to note how Liebenberg has refined this set of factors 
since she first attempted a list of essential components in 2002.  See Liebenberg (2002) 1 
where she sets out that the state’s programmes and policies must:  
• Be comprehensive, coherent and effective; 
• Be reasonable within the social, economic and historical context of widespread 
deprivation, and within the availability of the state’s resources; 
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‘1. The programme must be a comprehensive and co-ordinated one, 
which clearly allocates responsibilities and tasks to different spheres of 
government and ensures that ‘the appropriate financial and human 
resources are available.’75  Although each sphere of government is 
responsible for implementing part of the programme, national 
government has the overarching responsibility for ensuring that the 
programme is adequate in meeting the state’s constitutional 
obligations.76 
2. The programme ‘must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the 
right.’77 
3. Policies and programmes must be reasonable ‘both in their conception 
and their implementation.’78 
4. The programme must be ‘balanced and flexible and make appropriate 
provision for attention to housing crises and to short-, medium- and 
long-term needs.’79  A reasonable programme cannot exclude ‘a 
significant segment of society.’80 
5. The programme must include a component that responds to the urgent 
needs of those in desperate situations.  Thus, a reasonable 
programme, even though it is statistically successful in improving 
access to housing, cannot ‘leave out of account the degree and extent 
of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise.’81  
                                                                                                                                            
• Give special attention to the needs of those most vulnerable; 
• Be aimed at lowering the administrative; operational and financial barriers over time; 
• Allocate responsibilities and tasks clearly to all three spheres of government; 
• Be implemented reasonably, adequately resourced and free of bureaucratic inefficiency 
or onerous regulations. 
It is submitted that even though this summary is perfectly adequate, the factors in 
Liebenberg’s later summary are better divided and refined. 
75
 Grootboom para 39. 
76
 Grootboom para 39. 
77
 Grootboom para 40. 
78
 Grootboom para 41. 
79
 Grootboom para 42. 
80
 Grootboom para 43.  Wesson 102 argues that it is this very principle that ‘underpins, 
precedes and justifies the Court’s finding that those whose needs are most basic should not 
be excluded from the state’s socio-economic programmes.’ 
81
 Grootboom para 44. 
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Effectively, it is the last guideline which is the subject of this research (as seen 
in the case of Kholisile Kam Kam in chapter 1).  This last guideline translates 
into an obligation on the state to ‘plan, budget and monitor the fulfilment of 
immediate needs and management of crises’.82  Failure to do so, as 
happened in Grootboom, would render the policy unreasonable.83 
 
4.3 Post-Grootboom: Development of the reasonableness 
test in socio-economic cases and other relevant 
Constitutional Court cases84 
 
While the Constitutional Court has not been directly confronted with the right 
to housing since Grootboom,85 it has clarified and applied the reasonableness 
test formulated in 2000 in three subsequent cases, Minister of Health and 
others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (TAC),86 Khosa and others v 
Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and another v Minister 
of Social Development and others (Khosa)87 and President of RSA and 
another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and others (Modderklip).88  These 
cases demonstrate an application of the reasonableness test, as well as 
adding certain factors which, under relevant circumstances, should be 
considered in applying the reasonableness test.  Modderklip, in particular, is 
considered under this section, notwithstanding that the Constitutional Court 
declined to assess the matter on the housing right.  It dealt with the eviction of 
                                                 
82
 Grootboom para 68. 
83
 In addition to the factors set out above, the Court indicated that the reasonableness test 
might further require consideration of a wide range of social programmes adopted by the 
state.  The Court indicated that, in the context of the housing right, considerations that could 
be relevant were steps ‘to make the rural areas of our country more viable so as to limit the 
inexorable migration of people from rural to urban areas in search of jobs.’(Grootboom para 
34).  On a local government level, this factor is especially important given its developmental 
mandate set out in the Constitution and supporting statutes.  See chapter 3 for a discussion of 
this mandate.  The main statutes that set out this developmental mandate (apart from the 
Constitution itself) are the Housing Act and the Municipal Systems Act. 
84
 While the focus of this section is on the development of the reasonableness test in cases 
involving other socio-economic matters, an eviction matter (Modderklip) heard by the 
Constitutional Court is considered here for ease of reference. 
85
 However, see Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC), 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) where the Constitutional Court was indirectly confronted with the right 
to housing. 
86
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC). 
87
 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).   
88
 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC). 
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large numbers of people from privately-owned land and, as such, is still useful 
to consider in light of the Constitutional Court’s remarks on the 
reasonableness test and the right to housing therein.  For the purposes of this 
section, the facts of each case are set out briefly, followed by a discussion of 
the principles developed and how these principles can inform the 
reasonableness test. 
 
4.3.1 Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
others (TAC) 
 
In the TAC case, the court took a very similar approach to reasonableness as 
it did in Grootboom.  In this matter, a number of organisations and individuals 
in civil society concerned with the treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS 
approached the High Court for relief relating to the state’s programme of 
preventing or reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV.  The relief 
requested included a request that the state be compelled to make the anti-
retroviral drug, Neviroprine, available to pregnant women with HIV/AIDS 
where it is medically indicated.  The state had, at this point, set up only certain 
research sites within the country where Neviroprine was available. 
 
The High Court ruled in favour of the applicants.  Applying the Grootboom 
reasonableness test, Botha J found that a programme that is ‘open-ended and 
that leaves everything for the future cannot be said to be coherent, 
progressive and purposeful.’89  The respondents took the matter on appeal to 
the Constitutional Court.   
 
The Constitutional Court, again using the same reasoning as Grootboom, held 
that the measures taken by the state cannot leave out those whose needs are 
most urgent and thus whose ability to enjoy all rights is most at peril.90  While 
the government had set up research sites for Neviraprine (described as a 
                                                 
89Treatment Action Campaign and others v Minister of Health and others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 
(T) 385F.  The reference to ‘open-ended’ was in response to the state’s unwillingness to give 
an unqualified commitment in its plan regarding when and at what rate it was going to extend 
its programme.  See 385D-E. 
90
 TAC  para 68. 
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‘simple, cheap and potentially lifesaving medical intervention’91) for preventing 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS, the state failed to provide for the 
poor who fell outside these catchment areas and who probably suffered the 
most.92  The Court thus found the policy to be unreasonable for its inflexibility 
and its ‘policy of waiting for a protracted period’ before making any decisions 
regarding the use of Neviraprine beyond the research sites.  Importantly, the 
Court introduced a new dimension to the reasonableness test, a requirement 
of transparency: 
 
‘Indeed, for a public programme such as this to meet the constitutional 
requirements of reasonableness, its contents must be known 
appropriately.’93 
 
4.3.2 Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; 
Mahlaule and another v Minister of Social Development and 
others94 
 
In Khosa, the applicants were Mozambican citizens living in South Africa as 
permanent residents.  As ‘non-citizens’, they were excluded from receiving 
social grants in terms of the Social Assistance Act.95  They argued that their 
exclusion not only violated s27(c) that confers the right to such assistance on 
‘everyone’, but also violated their rights to equality, life and dignity.   
 
In finding that the state’s actions were unreasonable, the Constitutional Court 
considered (for the first time in a matter concerning socio-economic rights) the 
violation of the right to equality as one factor in determining whether or not the 
                                                 
91
 TAC para 73.  This accords with s32(1) of the Constitution which sets out that ‘everyone 
has a right of access to any information held by the state and any information that is held by 
another person that is required for the exercise or the protection of any right.’ 
92
 TAC para 70. 
93
 TAC para 123.  The court held that for a programme to be ‘implemented optimally’ its 
contents must be known to stakeholders.  The fact that national government and six 
provinces had not disclosed any programme to extend access to the Neviraprine treatment 
was seen by the Court to affect the reasonableness of the state’s policy as a whole. 
94
 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC), 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).. 
95
 Act 59 of 1992. In particular, the applicants were denied old age grants and the child-
support grants and care-dependency grants reserved for South African citizens.  
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manner of the implementation of the right was reasonable or not.96  The Court 
also took into account the financial considerations of the applicants in the 
distribution of social assistance and came to the conclusion that such costs 
would amount to only a small proportion of the total costs of providing social 
grants in general.  Thus, the costs were held out to outweigh the impact that 
excluding the applicants, would have on their fundamental rights to dignity 
and equality.97  
4.3.3 President of RSA and another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
and others98 
This Constitutional Court case originated from a long and complicated legal 
battle that began in October 2000 in the Johannesburg High Court.  The case 
concerned eviction proceedings which were instituted by a private individual 
against unlawful occupiers.  Two issues relevant to this research came before 
the Court.  First, the reluctance of the state to assist in the eviction. Second, 
the state’s lack of planning for such circumstances. 
In this case the applicant, acting in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act99 (PIE), successfully obtained an 
eviction order against a large group of occupiers who unlawfully settled on a 
portion of the farm ‘Modder East’ on the East Rand.  The court a quo granted 
the eviction order and authorised the sheriff to enlist the assistance of the 
police in carrying out the evictions.  The order was never complied with 
because the sheriff required a deposit of R1,8 million which the applicant was 
not in a position to pay.  A prolonged battle ensued where the applicant 
attempted to gain assistance from the state in executing the eviction order.   
 
                                                 
96
 However, it should be kept in mind that what made this case different from previous socio-
economic cases was that the policy put in place by the state in this matter was also directly 
related to unfair discrimination.  The exclusion of the applicants was not a temporary measure 
in the state’s attempts to progressively realise the right to social assistance.  See para 44ff. 
97
 Khosa para 52. 
98
 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC) (Modderklip).  For an interesting analysis of 
both the SCA decision (President of the Republic of South Africa & another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA & others, amici curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), 2005 (8) BCLR 786 
(CC) and the Constitutional Court decision, see A J van der Walt: ‘The state’s duty to protect 
property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip case’ 
(2005) 21 SAJHR 144. 
99
 Act 19 of 1998. 
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The state, however, refused to intervene in what it considered to be a civil 
matter.  Modderklip (a limited company) thus applied to the Pretoria High 
Court for an order compelling the state to enforce the eviction order.  
 
The Pretoria High Court found that the state had breached the constitutional 
rights of both Modderklip and the occupiers.  In respect of the occupier’s 
rights, the Court found that the state had failed to take reasonable steps within 
the available resources to progressively realise their right of access to 
adequate housing in terms of  s26(1) and s26(2) as read with s25(5) of the 
Constitution.100  The High Court therefore ordered the state to devise a plan 
that would end the unlawful occupation of the land in question and vindicate 
the rights of both Modderklip and the occupiers.  The state appealed against 
this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).  The SCA confirmed the 
findings of the Pretoria High Court.  In particular, the Court held that in the 
context of the facts before the court, the state has an obligation in terms of 
s26 of the Constitution to ensure that, at the very least, evictions are executed 
humanely.  In this context, it was held that the state cannot be said to be in 
compliance with this obligation unless it provides alternative land for the 
occupiers' relocation.101  The SCA therefore ordered that the occupiers could 
remain on the land until alternative land was found.  While the existence of the 
housing right was not in issue before the court, Harms JA confirmed that the 
provision for those in dire need formed an important component of the 
housing right: 
                                                 
100
 The Court found that, by failing to provide alternative accommodation to the occupiers, and 
by allowing them to continue to occupy the company’s land unlawfully, the state essentially 
sanctioned the expropriation of the applicant’s land.  This was in violation of s25(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘no-one may deprived of property except in terms of a law of 
general application.’  The Court further held that the duty to provide access to housing does 
not bind private landowners.  Therefore, by requiring the applicant to provide the occupiers 
with accommodation, the state infringed the right of the applicant to equality recognised in 
s9(1) and s9(2) of the Constitution. 
101
 The amici arguments in the SCA were simply that the state's duties in relation to the rights 
of access to adequate housing apply in any eviction situation, and even more so where it is 
known that the eviction will have the effect of leaving people homeless.  Significantly, the SCA 
acknowledged that the occupiers were not demanding that houses be built for them.  In fact, 
Harms JA noted that the occupier’s needs were limited to a small plot each on which to erect 
a shack or the provision of an interim transit camp.  See Modderklip SCA para 22. 
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‘The real issue is not the existence of the [housing] right; it is whether 
the State has taken any steps in relation to those who, on all accounts, 
fall in the category of those in “desperate need”.  The answer appears 
to be fairly obvious; it did not.  Does the State have any plan for the 
“immediate amelioration of the circumstances of those in crisis”?  The 
State, at all three levels, central, provincial and local, gave the answer 
and it is also no.  The medium and long-term plans at present also 
provide no apparent solution.’102 
 
It is against this background that the state then applied to the Constitutional 
Court for leave to appeal against this decision.  
 
Four years after Grootboom,103 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in 
the Modderklip matter.  Since emphasis had been placed on s26 in both the 
High Court and the SCA – especially regarding steps taken in respect of those 
in dire need – one would have thought that the Constitutional Court would 
utilise or clarify the reasonableness test or even decide that the time had 
come for the minimum approach to be adopted regarding the right to housing.  
The Court did neither. Instead, the Constitutional Court chose to premise its 
judgment on a totally different basis – the right of access to courts entrenched 
in s34 of the Constitution, as read with the constitutional principle of the rule of 
law.104 Despite this turn, the Court reiterated the state’s constitutional duty to 
progressively realise the rights of access to adequate housing or land for the 
homeless.  Furthermore, the Court recognised the importance of the state's 
objectives in maintaining structured land and housing programmes and 
discouraging land invasions.  It clearly stated, however, that housing 
programmes that are so rigid that they cannot be adapted to meet evolving 
circumstances, cannot be regarded as being reasonable:  
                                                 
102
 Modderklip SCA para 21.  My italics. 
103
 The Modderklip judgment in the Constitutional Court was delivered on 13 May 2005. 
104
 According to s34 of the Constitution, the state is obliged to provide the necessary 
legislative and institutional mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that arise between 
them. 
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‘If social reality fails to conform to the best laid plans, reasonable and 
appropriate responses may be necessary. … Indeed, any planning 
which leaves no scope whatsoever for relatively marginal adjustments 
in the light of evolving reality, may often not be reasonable.’105  
 
The Court found that by failing to take any steps to relieve Modderklip of the 
burden of accommodating the occupiers, the state had breached Modderklip's 
right to an effective remedy as enshrined in s34 of the Constitution.  
 
It is interesting to compare the attitude of the government in the Grootboom 
and Modderklip cases.  In the former, the state argued that it was the scarcity 
of available resources that hindered its efforts to meet its duties in relation to 
this right.  In the latter, the state deliberately chose not even to engage with 
the applicant to find a feasible solution to a problem which could have resulted 
in the same situation in which the Wallacedene community in Grootboom had 
found itself.  During the course of argument in the Grootboom case, Yacoob J 
told the state that its ‘treatment of the occupiers throughout this case could be 
likened to that of rodents.’106  Counsel for the amici submitted that the real 
issue was this: ‘Where are the homeless people entitled to be when they have 
no home to go to?’ 107 
 
As in the case of Grootboom, the Court did not seek to define the minimum 
entitlements for the homeless in relation to the right of access to adequate 
housing.  Nevertheless, it sent a clear message that the state cannot use 
blanket excuses of housing backlogs, resource constraints or the threat of 
land invasions to justify a failure to fulfil its socio-economic obligations to the 
most vulnerable in society.  Despite basing the decision on s34 and the rule of 
law, Langa ACJ recalled the language and tone of Grootboom and laid 
emphasis on the difficulties that local government faced: 
                                                 
105
 Modderklip para 49  
106
 Reported in Christmas 9. 
107
 Ibid. 
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‘The State is under an obligation progressively to ensure access to 
housing or land to the homeless.  I am mindful of the fact that those 
charged with the provision in housing face immense problems. 
Confronted by intense competition for scarce resources from people 
forced to live in the bleakest of circumstances, the situation of local 
government officials can never be easy.  The progressive realisation of 
access to adequate housing, as promised in the Constitution, requires 
careful planning and fair procedures made known in advance to those 
most affected.  Orderly and predictable processes are vital.  Land 
invasions should always be discouraged.  At the same time, for the 
requisite measures to operate in a reasonable manner, they must not 
be unduly hamstrung so as to exclude all possible adaptation to 
evolving circumstances.’108 
 
4.3.4 Test Developed 
 
The socio-economic cases set out above (viz. TAC and Khosa) developed the 
original Grootboom reasonableness test in two ways.  First, the TAC case 
added the requirement that a reasonable government programme must be 
transparent, and that its contents must effectively be made known to the 
public.109  Second, in the Khosa case, the court recognised the close 
relationship between socio-economic rights and the founding values of dignity, 
equality, freedom and the right to life.110  The impact of the state’s action on 
these rights would have to be taken into account in appropriate  
circumstances, along with the availability of human and financial resources in 
 
                                                 
108
 Modderklip  para 49.  My italics. 
109
 TAC para 123.  On a procedural aspect, the Court in the TAC case went further than 
Grootboom in that it compelled the government to act (ie. to do something).  By doing so,  the 
Court retained jurisdiction over ‘reasonableness’ in the sense that should the state fail to 
implement the order, application could be made to the Court alleging non-compliance with the 
order.  In City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C); 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 
(C): [2003] All SA 517 (C), the High Court went one step further by requiring the state to 
submit a report to the Court stating what measures they had taken to remedy the breach of 
the right.  See para 4.4.2 below. 
110
 Khosa para 40. 
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determining whether the state has complied with the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness.111 
 
The significance of the Modderklip judgment lies in the Court’s discussion of 
the reasonableness test.  In particular, Modderklip provides insight into the 
Court’s pre-occupation with the requirement that a state programme must be 
flexible in order to meet the reasonableness standard.112  This flexibility, the 
Court held, is needed ‘for relatively marginal adjustments in the light of 
evolving reality.’113 
 
Following TAC, Khosa and Modderklip, two additional considerations need to 
be added to Liebenberg’s summary of the reasonableness test:  
 
1. The programme must be transparent, and its contents must have been 
made known effectively to the public. 
2. The programme must take into account the founding values of dignity, 
equality and freedom, and the right to life, where unfair discrimination of a 
group is possibly at issue. 
 
The emphasis on flexibility would also require a slight amendment (set out in 
italics below) to paragraph 4 of Liebenberg’s summary: the programme must 
be ‘balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for attention to 
housing crises and to short-, medium- and long-term needs.’114  In particular, 
the programme must leave scope for relatively marginal adjustments in the 
light of evolving reality.115  A reasonable programme cannot exclude ‘a 
significant segment of society.’116 
                                                 
111
 Khosa para 44. 
112
 This was one of the factors mentioned by Yacoob J in Grootboom at para 43 and included 
in Liebenberg’s list.  Thus, this matter does not provide an additional factor as such, but 
merely highlights an existing one (viz flexibility of a programme). 
113
 Modderklip para 49. 
114
 Grootboom para 42. 
115
  For example, assisting in providing alternative land for people facing eviction (viz. the 
facts in Modderklip). 
116
 Grootboom para 43.  Wesson 102 argues that it is this very principle that ‘underpins, 
precedes and justifies the Court’s finding that those whose needs are most basic should not 
be excluded from the state’s socio-economic programmes.’  
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4.4 Post-Grootboom: Development of the reasonableness 
test in eviction proceedings 
 
In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Scholtz,117 the Constitutional Court held 
that any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to 
adequate housing, limits the rights protected in s26(1).  In these 
circumstances, the Court found that eviction proceedings must be understood 
within the context of the right to housing as a whole: 
 
‘Section 26 of the Constitution must be read as a whole.  Section 26(3) 
is the provision which speaks directly to the practice of forced removals 
and summary eviction from land and which guarantees that a person 
will not be evicted from his or her home or have his or her home 
demolished without an order of court considering all of the 
circumstances relevant to the particular case.  The whole section, 
however, is aimed at creating a new dispensation in which every 
person has adequate housing and in which the state may not interfere 
with such access unless it would be justifiable to do so.’118 
 
Given that almost every eviction proceeding could lead to a crisis situation or 
one where those evicted will have, in Grootboom terms, ‘no roof over their 
head’,119 eviction proceedings provide a rich source of jurisprudence on the 
right to housing and state provision for short-term needs in a social 
programme.120  
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 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC).  
118
 Jaftha para 28 (footnote omitted). 
119
 The importance of eviction proceedings in clarifying the right to housing must not be 
underestimated.  Jajbhay J in City of Johannesburg at para 26, comments: ‘Eviction is 
fundamentally a constitutional matter.  The historical, contextual approach to eviction under 
our new constitutional order has now been accepted unequivocally by the Constitutional 
Court.’  See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers cited with approval in 
Modderklip at paras 36, 55 and 56.   
120
 It is important to note that there was no right to have access to adequate housing (and its 
corollary viz. the right not to be evicted) in the interim Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993.  As noted in chapter 1, the affidavits and heads of argument in an 
eviction proceeding prior to the final Constitution (The Transitional Metropolitan Substructure 
of Cape Town v the occupants of erven 182, 183, 194 and 196 (unreported case no 1791/96 
CPD)) display the innovative ways in which legal representatives sought to protect their 
clients from eviction.  It will be recalled that counsel for the unlawful occupiers contested their 
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Therefore, it is useful to consider how eviction proceedings post-Grootboom 
have sought to use and develop the reasonableness test (and by so doing, 
amend or add to Liebenberg’s summary where necessary).  Three Western 
Cape eviction proceedings121 and a Johannesburg inner-city eviction 
proceeding are considered below.  These decisions focus on the crisis type 
situation envisaged by Grootboom.  
 
However, before considering these proceedings, it is necessary to comment 
on an initiative that the state adopted as a direct result of the Grootboom 
decision.  The adoption of this initiative took place in 2004 and most of the 
eviction proceedings discussed below comment directly on this initiative vis-à-
vis the guidelines set out in Grootboom. 
 
4.4.1 National Housing Programme: Housing Assistance in 
Emergency Circumstances (ECP)122 
 
Up until 2004, none of the provisions in either the Housing Act or the National 
Housing Code provided for the kind of ‘desperate need’ situation that came 
                                                                                                                                            
eviction on primarily three grounds: (1) legitimate expectation; (2) the right to fair 
administrative action in terms of s24(b) of the interim Constitution; and (3) the right to life.  In 
respect of the latter ground, counsel sought to link the right to life to the right to a livelihood 
using Indian jurisprudence.  By removing the occupiers to a night shelter far away from the 
central business district (as suggested by the local authority), counsel argued that the 
occupiers would effectively be deprived of their right to a livelihood, and therefore, their right 
to life.  The application for eviction was withdrawn on 21 August 1996 due to an agreement 
with the local authority that the occupiers be moved to another area where better facilities 
were made available to them (interview with Steve Kahanowitz, LRC 7 September 2006).  
This early reference to the right to a livelihood foreshadows the City of Johannesburg 
judgment in the court a quo exactly ten years later where the issue of the right to a livelihood 
is again raised and accepted by the court a quo – this time as a dimension of the right to have 
access to adequate housing.  The City of Johannesburg case is discussed at para 4.4.5. 
121
 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C); City of Cape Town v 
Various Occupiers of the Road Reserve of Applicant Parallel to Sheffield Road, Phillipi 
(unreported case, CPD Case No A5/2003); and South African Rail Commuter Corporation v 
Unlawful Occupants of the Western Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile and Nonqubela 
Stations, Khayeltisha (unreported case no 2452/03 CPD).  There is no judicial decision in the 
last-mentioned case as the parties agreed to negotiations in May 2004.  However, it is 
important to record the sentiments expressed in the affidavits deposed by officials on behalf 
of national, provincial and local government. It is submitted that these affidavits display a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the principles set out in Grootboom and are thus important 
for this research. See para 4.4.4 for a discussion of this matter. 
122
 The acronym ECP (Emergency Circumstances Programme) is used throughout the rest of 
this dissertation as a reference to the National Department of Housing’s programme for 
Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances. 
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before the Constitutional Court in Grootboom.  To remedy this defect, the 
Minister of Housing introduced the concept of a national emergency housing 
programme in her presentation to the national legislature’s housing portfolio 
committee123 two years after the Grootboom decision.124  However, it took 
another two years for the ECP to be adopted in April 2004.  In her introduction 
to the programme, the Minister of Housing recognised that the ECP was 
conceptualised as a result of the Grootboom precedent, as well as flooding in 
the Limpopo province in the year 2000.125   
 
Essentially, the stated main objective of the policy is to provide temporary 
assistance in the form of secure access to land and/or basic municipal 
engineering services and/or shelter in a wide range of situations of 
exceptionally urgent housing need.  This is achieved through the allocation of 
grants to municipalities, instead of housing subsidies to individuals. 
Assistance is provided through grants to municipalities, administered, like all 
other subsidies, through the provincial housing departments.  The role of the 
municipality is therefore to apply for project approval, via the provincial 
government’s Department of Housing, to the Member of the Executive Council 
(MEC) responsible for housing of the provincial government.126  It is implicit in 
the national programme that a municipality has its own local plan which 
makes provision for: 
 
                                                 
123
 Housing Priorities for 2002: Briefing by Minister 7 May 2002 
(www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=1597 accessed on 1 July 2005). 
124
 In addition to an ECP, these initiatives included the following: 
• a medium density housing initiative; 
• a rental housing policy framework; 
• a social housing development programme; 
• a national home builders registration council’s warranty scheme to the housing subsidy 
scheme financed houses (NHBRC); and 
• a Human Settlement Redevelopment Programme. 
All the initiatives above, bar the ECP, clearly cater for people with some level of income and 
therefore do not directly answer the main problem raised by the Constitutional Court in 
Grootboom – that of providing for the needs of those people who have no roof over their 
head, and those in intolerable conditions and in dire situations.  
125
 ECP 4. 
126
 The application for relief described by McLean 55-21 at footnote 4 is incorrect insofar as it 
refers to an Emergency Housing Steering Committee in the national Department of Housing. 
The idea of a committee at the national sphere, considering applications was removed in the 
final version of the programme. 
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• procedures to monitor land use, including illegal land invasion, within 
its area of jurisdiction; 
• pro-active procurement measures (these can include annual contracts 
and the establishment of panels of suitable contractor and consultants); 
and 
• liaison channels and procedures both within its organisation and with 
other public and private bodies to deal with emergency situations 
effectively when they arise. 
 
The role of the Provincial Department is to ‘guide, assist and collaborate with 
municipalities in the preparation and submission of applications and in the 
implementation of projects and also co-ordinate actions with any disaster 
initiatives as well as with the actions of other role players in an approved 
project.’127 
 
According to the national Department of Housing, the programme applies to 
‘emergency situations of exceptional housing need.’128  These situations exist 
when the MEC, on application by a municipality and/or the provincial Housing 
Department, deems that persons affected, owing to situations beyond their 
control: 
 
• ‘have become homeless as a result of a declared state of disaster, where 
assistance is required, including cases where initial remedial measures 
have been taken in terms of the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 
57 of 2002) by government, to alleviate the immediate crisis situation; 
• have become homeless as a result of a situation which is not declared as 
a disaster, but destitution is caused by extraordinary occurrences such as 
floods, strong winds, severe rainstorms and/or hail, snow, devastating 
fires, earthquakes and/or sinkholes or large disastrous industrial incidents; 
• live in dangerous conditions such as on land being prone to dangerous 
flooding, or land which is dolomitic, undermined at shallow depth, or prone 
to sinkholes and who require emergency assistance; 
                                                 
127
 ECP 5. 
128
 ECP 8. 
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• live in the way of engineering services or proposed services such as those 
for water, sewerage, power, roads or railways, or in reserves established 
for any such purposes and who require emergency assistance; 
• are evicted or threatened with imminent eviction from land or from unsafe 
buildings, or situations where pro-active steps ought to be taken to 
forestall such consequences; 
• whose homes are demolished or threatened with imminent demolition, or 
situations where proactive steps ought to be taken to forestall such 
consequences; or 
• are displaced or threatened with imminent displacement as a result of a 
state  of civil conflict or unrest, or situations where pro-active steps ought 
to be taken to forestall such consequences; 
• live in conditions that pose immediate threats to life, health and safety and 
require emergency assistance.’129 
 
In addition to the situations described above, the MEC can also deem an 
emergency situation to exist where, on application by the municipality and/or 
the provincial housing departments, persons affected are in a situation of 
exceptional housing need, which constitutes an emergency that can 
reasonably be addressed only by resettlement or other appropriate 
assistance, in terms of this programme.130  
 
In terms of the ECP, the grants allocated to municipalities cover the costs of 
compiling, inter alia, the project application, relocation of affected persons, 
and the provision of temporary shelter or supply of materials for the 
construction thereof.131  Notably,  the grants allocated to municipalities may 
not cover basic services such as, inter alia, refuse removal, street lighting and 
electrical services,132 any operation, maintenance and management costs of 
                                                 
129
 ECP 7-8. 
130
 It appears that the government has distinguished between situations where persons are 
affected ‘owing to situations beyond their control’ and situations where they find themselves in 
a situation of exceptional housing need.  It is submitted later in this chapter that the definition 
of ‘emergency’ in terms of the programme is inadequate. 
131
 ECP 9-10. 
132
 Except that the provision of high-mast lighting could be considered in special 
circumstances. 
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developments, delivery of water and repair of eroded access roads.133  The 
absence of provision for these services are, according to the ECP, to be met 
by ‘pro-active planning’ by the municipality in terms of their IDP processes.  
By utilising the IDP process, a municipality will be able to identify and prepare 
for possible emergency housing situations.  The ECP envisages that the IDP 
will be utilised by municipalities to plan for identifying possible emergency 
housing situations in the following ways: 
 
• Identification of communities that do not have access to basic municipal 
services.  In this way, existing and potential emergency situations can be 
identified, risks assessed, and contingency plans made. 
• In determining the municipality’s development priorities and objectives, 
give consideration to existing emergency situations and identify potential 
emergency situations to be reflected in its priorities and projects.  
• A spatial development framework that includes basic guidelines for a land 
use management system.  Information about existing emergency housing 
situations where alternative land or development projects that may be 
required should be identified and reflected in the spatial framework. 
Threatening and potentially threatening situations, disaster-prone areas, 
and communities at risk, identified in the municipal disaster management 
plan that may qualify for assistance under this Programme, must also be 
identified.  
• Land must also be identified that can be utilised for emergency 
situations.134 
 
It will be seen how this ECP was subjected to the reasonableness test 
developed by the Constitutional Court in some of the eviction cases that 
follow.  It should be noted for ease of reference that the ECP was only a draft 
when the matter of City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others135 first came 
before the courts. 
 
                                                 
133
 ECP 10-11. 
134
 ECP 27. 
135
 2004 (5) SA 39 (C); 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) [2003] 3 All SA 517 (C) (Rudolph) and the 
unreported return of the structural interdict (Rudolph II). 
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4.4.2 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and others  
The community (47 respondents in all), much like the Wallacedene 
community in Grootboom, decided to move to vacant land owned by the city 
in order to escape the desperate conditions in the informal settlement in which 
they were living.  The City of Cape Town sought to evict the community and 
contended in its application to the Cape High Court that the respondents were 
land grabbers and not ‘in crisis’ in the Grootboom sense.  Moreover, the City 
had a policy in place, with which it was complying, and were thus doing all it 
could do in respect of housing rights. 
The respondents opposed the application and brought a counter-application in 
which they contended that the City’s housing policies failed to give effect to 
Grootboom. The counter-application asked for a structural interdict and 
included questions related to: 
• The housing list and the efficacy thereof;136  
• Integrated development planning processes;  
• The rapid release of land;  
• The state’s obligations in respect of people living in intolerable conditions; 
and  
• The state’s positive obligation in respect of people who are homeless and 
landless.’137 
 
The issue of the counter-application two-and-a-half years after Grootboom, 
was whether the City had complied with its constitutional duties as declared 
by the Constitutional Court and if not, what the appropriate remedy should 
be.138  In dealing with the justifications by the local government of its policy 
choices, Selikowitz J made a direct reference to Grootboom: 
                                                 
136
 The judgment records at 49B-C that the applicant confirmed that there are in excess of a 
quarter of a million applicants for housing on its waiting list.  The waiting list grows by some 
25 000 names a year with only enough funding to build 10 000 houses a year.  
137
 Mohamed 3. 
138
 Rudolph 79G-H. 
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‘It is astonishing to find that the applicant’s Head of Housing makes the 
assertion that none of the respondents are “persons in crisis” as 
contemplated in Grootboom.  This statement is indicative of a state of 
denial on applicant’s part and a failure to recognise and acknowledge 
that there is, in fact, any category of persons to which it has any 
obligation beyond the obligation to put them on a waiting-list for 
housing in the medium to long term, because they are people, “with no 
access to land, no roof over their heads, and who were living in 
intolerable conditions or crisis situations.”  It is, in my view, precisely 
the same failure as was held, in Grootboom, to constitute a breach of 
the Constitution.’139 
 
The Court found that the policy of the City was not justified in that it failed to 
give adequate prioritisation to those in desperate need and, in so doing, failed 
to comply with the requirements of the Constitution and with the order made 
by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom.  The order granted by the Court 
included a declaration of a constitutional breach; together with a requirement 
that the City deliver a report to the court stating what steps it had taken to 
comply with the court order and what future steps it would take.140  
 
In granting the order, Selikowitz J justified the nature of the remedy by stating 
that the Constitutional Court had already made a declaration [in Grootboom] 
and that since the declaration ‘has not induced the applicant to comply with its 
obligations, something more is … necessary.’141  Thus, the Court in effect 
asked the City to come back to show the Court what provision it had made for 
people in a crisis situation, such as the present respondents. 
                                                 
139
 Rudolph 81H-82A.  Applicants described the events as an ‘orchestrated land grab’ in 
terms of which the occupiers ‘decided to take the law into their own hands and to resort to 
self-help by invading the park for residential purposes’. 
140
 The report was to be submitted within four months of the court order.  The order also made 
provision for the respondents to comment on the report or reports of the applicant, for the 
applicant to reply, for the matter to be set down for hearing on the report or reports, 
commentary on them and reply (Rudolph  88F-H and para 4-7 of the order of court). 
141
 Rudolph 88E.  Both Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC); 1997 (7) 
BCLR 851 (CC) and the TAC cases were used in support of the order made which included 
both a declaratory order and a structural interdict. 
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The findings of the Cape High Court in the first hearing strongly resembled the 
order in Grootboom bar the implementation of a structural interdict which was 
included in Rudolph.  The findings in Rudolph  were that: 
 
• The housing policy must make short-term provision for people in a crisis or 
desperate situation. 
• The housing policy must give adequate priority and resources to the needs 
of people who have no access to a place where they can lawfully live. 
• The allocation of housing must have adequate regard to relevant factors 
such as the degree and extent of the need of the applicants, as well as the 
length of time an applicant for housing has been on the waiting list.142 
 
When the matter came back to court a year later (Rudolph II), four reports 
from the City and three responding reports from the respondents had been 
delivered to the Court.143  In its first report, the City stated that the response of 
national government to Grootboom was to add a chapter to the National 
Housing Code dealing with housing assistance in emergency housing 
situations.  The report submitted that the City was bound by the National 
Housing Code, and bound to follow that programme by making ‘application for 
approval of funding for a particular housing project to assist people in a crisis 
situation.’144  
 
Although the City indicated in this report that it would apply to the Provincial 
Authority for funding for the applicants in terms of the ECP, the City did not do 
so.  In its second report to the Court, the City expressed serious doubts that 
an application of this nature would succeed.  The rationale for this doubt was 
                                                 
142
 This factor seems closely related to those considered in an equality-type enquiry where 
the position of the complainant in society is an important consideration. 
143
 The first report was filed on 22 January 2004.  The second report was filed on 12 May 
2004.  The third report was filed in October 2004.  The fourth and final report was filed on 12 
November 2004.  Steve Kahanowitz (a lawyer from the Legal Resources Centre who 
represented the respondents) commented in a telephonic interview (15 March 2006) that the 
City’s final report was only drafted in response to the judge admonishing the City for the lack 
of substance and change in their first three reports.  According to Kahanowitz, the matter was 
postponed for a day to allow the City to draft and present the report.  This background is not 
apparent from the judgment. 
144
 Rudolph II 12. 
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the fact that the applicants were supposedly currently housed; they had 
access to basic municipal services and were not threatened with eviction.  
Consequently, their situation did not fall within the then recently-drafted 
definition of emergency housing circumstances as provided for in the ECP.145 
 
The second report acknowledged that there was still the same defect in the 
housing programme identified by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom some 
four years previously, and to which Selikowitz J had again pointed some ten 
months previously.146  Regarding the defect, the City official conceded that 
despite the existence of a national housing programme, there was still no 
provision in the ECP or any other housing programme that made provision for 
a place where people with exceptional and immediate housing needs could be 
accommodated temporarily, until a more permanent solution could be found 
for them.147  The City official who authored the report stated therein that he 
was ‘working on a proposal’ to remedy the defect.148  However, the Court 
found that the report as at May 2004 represented no more than a statement 
by a City official – the City itself had not adopted a policy to remedy the 
constitutional breach, nor had it implemented any steps to remedy the 
breach.149 
 
The third report stated that the Mayoral Committee had adopted a policy on 6 
October 2004 dealing with the establishment of temporary settlement areas. 
The report commented that this would overcome the defect in the ECP, in that 
people could be accommodated while waiting for the application (in terms of 
that programme) to be processed.  Other people who did not fall within the 
                                                 
145
 Rudolph II 11. 
146
 Rudolph II 14. 
147
 Boaden, an emeritus professor of housing development and management and an expert 
called on behalf of the respondents in Rudolph II, also criticised the ECP contending: ‘The 
procedures to be followed in obtaining assistance [in the ECP] are so complex and highly 
regulated that the rate of delivery of housing opportunities under this programme [the ECP] is 
likely to be slower than the existing formal housing programme.’  (Boaden affidavit para 47).  
The procedures provided for in the programme are remarkably time-consuming and 
expensive for measures aimed at providing a temporary solution, which invariably will give 
rise to considerable uncertainty concerning access to land in the future (Boaden affidavit para 
49).  In admitting the deficiencies in the programme, the City acknowledged the correctness 
of Boaden’s assertions. 
148
 Rudolph II 14. 
149
 Rudolph II 26. 
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ambit of the programme, but who had exceptional and immediate housing 
needs would be similarly accommodated in these temporary settlements.150 
 
The fourth report submitted by the City shifted ground dramatically.  Firstly, 
the City stated that it considered that the applicants were no longer ‘in a crisis 
or desperate situation’, and urgent relief was consequently no longer needed 
to be provided for them.  Secondly, the City stated that it no longer intended to 
proceed with an application in terms of the ECP.  Instead, the report proposed 
that the applicants should be offered accommodation in the Mfuleni 
Emergency Housing Project which was intended principally for the occupiers 
in the South African Rail Commuter Corporation eviction case,151 or the Delft 
7 to 9 Project, or the Delft Symphony Way Project, whichever became 
available first.  The reason given for this shift of position was: ‘An application 
on their behalf under section 12 of the National Housing Code [the national 
housing programme] is a time-consuming process and, given the applicants’ 
current circumstances, their application may be refused by the province.’152  
 
The Court found the resettlement approach of the City in its fourth report 
inconsistent with the Constitution in that the decision to resettle the occupiers 
in Mfuleni or in one of the Delft projects had been made without consultation, 
without reference to the preferences of the people concerned and without 
reference to their actual needs, such as where they work, where their children 
go to school, or their family and social connections.153  The Court emphasised 
consultation as a requirement in considering alternative accommodation.  In 
this regard, Selikowitz cited the case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers which emphasised that the local council must take account of the 
                                                 
150
 Rudolph II 16. 
151
 An obvious reference to South African Rail Commuter Corporation v Unlawful Occupants 
of the Western Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile and Nonkqubela Stations, 
Khayeltisha (unreported case no 2452/03 CPD).  See para 4.4.4 below. 
152
 Rudolph II 18. 
153
 Rudolph II 19.  These factors replicate some of the factors raised in Grootboom and other 
socio-economic cases, especially the need for consultation (as set out in TAC), as well as 
those factors considered important to the UN Committee for Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights. 
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‘actual situation of the persons concerned’; must treat everyone with ‘care and 
concern’ and respond to the needs of ‘those most desperate.’154 
 
Selikowitz J also emphasised that one of the requirements of ‘reasonable 
measures’ set out in Grootboom was that the programme or policy had to be 
implemented reasonably, or at least evidence must be shown of an 
implementation plan.155  In this matter, there was no evidence regarding the 
City’s implementation of the policy approved by the Executive Mayor and 
Members of the Mayoral Committee.156  
 
The Court also found that the City had failed to give adequate priority and 
resources to the needs of the applicants who have no access to a place 
where they may lawfully live.  While the Court noted that the City undertook to 
‘do a survey of persons … to identify those falling within the ECP’s definition 
of emergency housing need’157 in its first report, the City abandoned this in 
their second report.  The City’s response is summed up in its fourth report 
where it stated: 
 
‘In its [the City’s] replying report, the City invited people living in crisis 
to report their situation to it.  This notwithstanding, only one person … 
has done so.  … Should people … make such a complaint to the 
respondent, they will be prioritised for housing set forth in paragraph 
13.1 of the respondent’s replying report.’158 
 
This, in effect, meant that the City’s only means of communicating with the 
community was through the court report.  This seems a ludicrous strategy 
                                                 
154
 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 29. 
155
 See para 42 of Grootboom where Yacoob J stated: ‘[Housing] policies and programmes 
must be reasonable both in their conception and their implementation.  The formulation of a 
programme is only the first stage in meeting the state’s obligations.  The programme must 
also be reasonably implemented.  An otherwise reasonable programme that is not 
implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state’s obligations.’  See 
discussion of Mark Tushnet’s views in footnote 62 above. 
156
 Selikowitz J also questioned, but left open whether or not the resolution of the Executive 
Mayor and Members of the Mayoral Committee was binding on the City and was enforceable 
(Rudolph II 29). 
157
 Rudolph II 30. 
158
 Rudolph II 31.  
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especially when dealing with a group that is obviously poverty-stricken and 
lacks the means of accessing the report, or may lack appropriate levels of 
literacy to read it! 
 
The Court found that the attitude of the City probably led to the crises and 
land invasions in the first place.  The Court summarised the City’s response 
as follows: The City will operate solely in reactive mode and it will initiate no 
steps to identify or anticipate crises or potential crises.  By relying on 
‘paragraph 13.1’ of the report, the City was found to have, in effect, said the 
following:  
 
‘When such crises emerge, it will in effect put the people concerned on 
an accelerated waiting list which at best will take 12 to 18 months to 
produce any result.’159 
 
Despite finding that the City had failed to comply with its constitutional 
obligations, the Court refused to grant a further structural interdict.  In 
declining to do so, Selikowitz J stated that the original structural interdict was 
necessary because the City had failed to acknowledge that it had a duty 
towards the people who are in a crisis or desperate situation in respect of 
accommodation and housing.  He found that, while the City had not 
adequately complied with the order granted, it now appreciated and 
acknowledged its obligations and was making efforts to comply with the order 
granted.160  The structural interdict therefore had attained its goal: that of 
achieving recognition by the Court of the rights of the applicants.161 
                                                 
159
 Rudolph II 32. 
160
 Rudolph II 41. 
161
 Rudolph II 43.  The reasoning for not extending the structural interdict is somewhat 
strained, with the court effectively washing its hands of the matter despite a continuing breach 
of the City’s housing obligations.  It is suggested that this attitude is probably a result of the 
difficulties the judge experienced in trying to administer the structural interdict and/or the 
judge’s sympathy for the mammoth task faced by the City.  In this regard, Selikowitz J stated 
(at 43) that the City had to achieve a balance ‘so at to optimise the benefits to be achieved 
from a limited budget, the vast number of claimants and the constraints imposed by the 
decisions of the central government and the provincial authority.’  In the recent decision of 
Property Lodging Investments (Pty) Ltd and another v The unlawful occupiers of erf 705 
Halfway Gardens and others (unreported case no 6292/06 TPD, 23 March 2007), the Court 
also imposed a structural interdict in respect of an impending eviction.  In a similar fashion to 
Rudolph II, the report of the municipality (the City of Johannesburg) failed to set out in any 
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4.4.3 City of Cape Town v Various Occupiers of the Road Reserve of 
Applicant Parallel to Sheffield Road, Phillipi162 
 
In this matter, several hundred persons moved onto land owned by the local 
government.  Many of the respondents had moved onto the land because 
their previous accommodations in backyard dwellings had become 
unavailable due to renovations undertaken by owners who received 
government subsidies to improve their own homes.163  On 28 September 
2001, a magistrate granted the City an application for eviction.164  In the 
appeal the eviction was confirmed, but stayed, pending the availability of 
alternative land.  Both the City and occupiers appealed the decision.  In the 
appeal papers, the City used substantially similar arguments as those it put 
forward in the Rudolph case.  It claimed that the respondents were land-
grabbers and were amongst many people who could be said to be ‘in crisis’ 
for which the City had few resources. 
 
In response, the respondents submitted that the housing programme of the 
City made no provision for people who are in a desperate situation while 
waiting for relief from the medium- and long-term measures being taken by 
the City.  This is set out poignantly in the respondents’ heads of argument in 
the appeal: 
                                                                                                                                            
detail the measures that the City had taken or would take.  In this regard, Prinsloo J 
commented (at 10): ‘In summary, I consider it fair to state that the reader of this report is left 
with the impression that the fourth respondent [the City of Johannesburg] shirks its 
responsibility, “prays for patience” and undertakes to do something which is not detailed, only 
“when available sources and funds” are available.  In my opinion this is not an approach 
which a court can endorse because it cannot lead to any relief for any of the parties.’  Unlike 
Rudolph II, the Court in the Property Lodgings matter found (at 13) that the City had ‘ignored 
or perhaps overlooked inadvertedly’ the ECP or efforts to approach the province for 
assistance.  As a result, the eviction was granted but only on the basis that that alternative 
accommodation could be arranged and with the direction that the City make short-term 
provision for the respondents ‘who are in a crisis or in a desperate situation’, as intended by 
the statutory and constitutional obligations vested in the City (at 17).  In a rather strange 
conclusion, Prinsloo J suggested one of the circumstances that he took into account when 
granting the eviction was ‘the demands of the 2010 World Cup and what will happen after 
that’ (at 16). Unfortunately, a discussion on the structural interdict in this matter lies outside of 
the scope of this research.   
162
 Unreported case A5/2003 CPD. 
163
 Sheffield para 4. 
164
 Sheffield para 11. 
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‘The Respondents say that they have nowhere else to go.  The Council 
says that the Respondents should go somewhere else, but it does not 
suggest where that somewhere might be, where they can lawfully live. 
The Respondents accordingly are and upon eviction will be, in the 
words used by the Constitutional Court, people who are in desperate 
need because they are “people who have no access to land, no roof 
over their heads, and people who are in crisis because of natural 
disasters … or because their homes are under threat of demolition.”’165 
 
In considering the appeal, the Court held the view that ‘[t]he principles laid 
down in the Grootboom … govern the present case.’166  The Court found that 
the appellant had not shown what measures it had taken to provide some 
form of relief for ‘people in desperate need such as respondents’.  In addition, 
the court found that, given the importance of the s26 right, consideration of 
alternative land was appropriate regardless of the distinct requirements of 
s4(6) and s4(7) of PIE.167   
 
4.4.4 South African Rail Commuter Corporation v Unlawful Occupants 
of the Western Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile and 
Nonkqubela Stations, Khayelitsha168  
 
In this matter, the South African Rail Commuter Corporation (‘SARCC’), an 
organ of state,169 sought to evict persons living next to the railway line on the 
                                                 
165
 Heads of argument on behalf of the respondents, paras 12-13. 
166
 Sheffield para 25.   
167
 In an application for eviction under s4(6) of PIE, a Court must consider all the relevant 
circumstances but there is no requirement in that subsection for the Court to consider whether 
land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by an organ of state or 
another land owner for their relocation.  However, s4(7) provides that where the occupiers 
have been on the land for more than six months, the court must consider the availability of 
alternative accommodation.  This distinction has typically led to attempts by applicants to 
bring such proceedings before six months has passed under the Act. 
168
 Unreported case no 2452/03 CPD.  Given that the matter was settled before a decision 
was handed down, recourse is had to affidavits and court papers available from the LRC in 
Cape Town (the occupiers’ legal representatives). See also footnote 121 above. 
169
 SARCC is a corporation created in terms of s22 of the Legal Succession to the South 
African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989 (as amended).  All the issued shares of SARCC are 
held by the state.  It is a national government business enterprise listed in Part B of Schedule 
3 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.  
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outskirts of Khayelitsha, a township near Cape Town.  The national, provincial 
and local governments were joined by the respondents as third parties, whom 
the respondents claimed had each breached their constitutional duty to 
provide access to adequate housing.170  
 
Local, provincial, and national government all departed from their usual 
arguments regarding land grabbers (probably given its previous success 
rate)171 and adopted a rather novel, if not rather startling approach.  In effect, 
the response was as follows: 
 
• The national Minister stated that it was the responsibility of the provincial 
minister;172 
• The MEC for Housing Minister stated that it was the responsibility of the 
local government (viz. the City Council); and 
• The local government stated that any constitutional breaches were due 
either to lack of funding or breaches by other spheres of government.   
 
In particular, the City argued that Grootboom set out that the national 
government bears the overall responsibility for the implementation of s26, and 
therefore, the City was not required to take any such steps.  Furthermore, the 
City argued that even if it was required to implement a policy to deal with 
people in crisis, it would be wholly unable to do so as it was already being 
owed millions of Rand in rental arrears, and facing non-payment for services 
and lack of land.173   
 
                                                 
170
 It is interesting to note that prior to the institution of action against the unlawful occupiers, 
the SARCC instructed their attorneys to address written submissions to the relevant organs of 
state; namely local, provincial and national levels of government.  These submissions outlined 
SARCC’s problem and enquired about the availability of alternative accommodation or land 
for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers in the rail reserve.  See founding affidavit of the 
SARCC para 30.   
171
 See discussion of judgments of Rudolph  and Sheffield. 
172
 The National Housing Department filed no papers.  Instead, a letter from the Minister of 
Housing dated 6 November 2002 responded to the matter by referring the issue to the 
provincial minister ‘for further action and finalisation.’  See para 86 of respondent’s affidavit 
(Thabo Sakelele Nqandela) 4 June 2003. 
173
 Affidavit of the City of Cape Town 9-13.  It was further submitted in the affidavit that 
although SARCC is a government corporation, it alone is responsible for making land 
available – the respondents have no recourse elsewhere. 
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The provincial government, in turn, argued that it was bound by the national 
policy alone, and was unable to do anything beyond that.174  The province 
further stated that if the occupants were evicted this would ‘remove the 
occupants from potential danger, after which they will be in exactly the same 
position as the thousands of homeless people on our waiting list.’175  In doing 
so, the provincial government implied that it was the responsibility of local 
government to respond to the occupants’ needs, and that the provincial 
government had done what it needed to do.  The litigation in this matter came 
to a halt in May 2004 due to negotiations.176 
 
4.4.5 The City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
others177 
 
In this matter, three applications were consolidated and set down together.178  
In terms of these applications, the City sought the eviction of over 300 people 
from six properties in the inner city.  In contradistinction to the evictions 
discussed above, all the properties were in urban and densely populated 
areas.179  The City appealed to the Court ‘not to place a stop sign on its 
difficult road to upliftment of the inner city’180 and relied on its statutory powers 
                                                 
174
 Affidavit of the Province of the Western Cape 10. 
175
 See para 82 of respondent’s affidavit (Thabo Sakelele Nqandela) 4 June 2003 which 
quoted a letter from the Minister of Housing, Western Province 11 February 2003. 
176
 The LRC attorney for this matter, Steve Kahanowitz, commented (in a telephonic interview 
on 19 April 2007) that the occupiers as at April 2007 were still living next to the railway line 
but were due to be relocated in May 2007, exactly three years after the matter was halted. 
This relocation was as a result of an application by the City in terms of the ECP.  The reason 
for the delay related mainly to the allocation of land and issues around the submission of 
plans for electricity in the area.  The land that was initially identified for residence by the 
occupiers was unsuitable in that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) had been 
negative.  The second piece of land identified was suitable and was made available with 
money obtained from the province in terms of the ECP.   However, the matter took on a 
developmental aspect: the City recognised that adjoining land could also be allocated for 
housing.  Therefore, two processes in respect of funding were followed: process A (in terms 
of the ECP) and process B (financing obtained via the usual channels set out by the Housing 
Code).  Services and one toilet for every five plots on both pieces of land could commence 
only after both processes were completed.  
177
 Court a quo: 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W).  Supreme Court of Appeal decision: 2007 SCA 25 
(RSA). 
178
 These applications are referred to in the judgment as (1) the Joel Street Applications, (2) 
the 197 Main Street application and (3) the San Jose Application. 
179
 See Wilson 9 for an interesting discussion on the socio-economic and political context 
leading up to the matter.  
180
 City of Johannesburg para 6.  After judgment was delivered in the court a quo, C Benjamin 
writing for Business Day (‘Evictions judgment raises investment fears’ 16 March 2006) quoted 
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and duties to prevent dangerous living in conditions in its area of jurisdiction 
as a basis for eviction.181  While the matter largely turned on the 
constitutionality of these statutory powers,182 both the court a quo and the 
SCA found that the ECP was relevant in this situation. 
  
In the court a quo, the respondents contended that, inter alia: 
 
• Section 12(4)(b), s12(5) and s12(6) of the National Building Regulations 
and Building Standards Act183 were unconstitutional in that they violated 
s26(3) and s9 of the Constitution.184 
• The provisions of PIE applied to at least some of the occupiers and, in the 
circumstances, s6 (the requirement concerning the provision of suitable 
alternative accommodation) had not been met.185 
• The City’s housing programme failed to comply with the constitutional and 
other statutory obligations of the City in its failure to address the situation 
of those in desperate need.186  Thus the occupiers’ rights to access to 
adequate housing in terms of s26 would be unjustifiably violated if the 
relief sought were granted to the Applicant.187 
 
                                                                                                                                            
a senior city official as stating that the ruling was a ‘disaster for inner city development’ and 
that the judgment ‘could see some investors taking their money elsewhere.’ 
181
 The City relied on s12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards 
Act 103 of 1977 (NBRA), s20 of the Health Act 63 of 1977 and the City’s fire by-laws.  The 
provisions of s12(1) and s12(4) of the NBRA provide for the issuing of notices by the 
Applicant directing the demolition, alteration or evacuation of buildings in circumstances 
where the Applicant is of the opinion that the building is in such a state as to be dangerous or 
to show signs of becoming dangerous to life or property, or where it deems it necessary for 
the safety of any person.  Section 20 of the Health Act directs that the applicant take all 
lawful, necessary and reasonably practical measures to maintain its district at all times in a 
hygienic and clean condition and to prevent conditions that will or could be harmful or 
dangerous to the health of any person.  The City’s fire by-laws allow the chief fire officer to 
issue notices to remedy fire-hazards identified on premises and empower the Applicant to 
take such steps as are necessary in the opinion of the chief fire officer to remove the risk or 
danger (see City of Johannesburg paras 7-9). 
182
 viz. the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBRA), 
s20 of the Health Act 63 of 1977 and the City’s fire by-laws. 
183
 Act 103 of 1977. 
184
 City of Johannesburg paras 11.6 and 12.4. 
185
 City of Johannesburg para 11.3.  It is noted that the City sought to evict the occupiers on 
the basis of the regulations and by-laws and not in terms of PIE. 
186
 City of Johannesburg paras 11.7 and 12.4. 
187
 City of Johannesburg para 11.5. 
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After conducting an inspection in loco of the properties concerned, Jajbhay J 
considered that the respondents were in an emergency situation.  He 
described the living conditions of the occupiers as ‘appalling and at times 
disgraceful’188 and ‘abysmal’,189 as well as containing health and fire risks.  
Whilst Jajbhay J recognised that these conditions were a health and fire risk, 
he considered their current situation to present the lesser of two evils: secure 
shelter from the elements with access to water, as opposed to the 
consequences of eviction: literal homelessness with no protection from the 
elements.190 
 
In finding for the respondents, Jajbhay J did not consider it necessary to 
decide on the constitutionality of s12(4)(b) of the NBRA except to state that 
the section must be read as if it contained the words ‘subject to section 26(3) 
of the Constitution’.191  After considering the measures put in place to give 
effect to the housing right, specifically the measures taken at national level 
(viz. the Housing Act and the ECP), Jajbhay J found that the City did not have 
a local programme in place to deal with emergency housing circumstances. 
The later reference by Jajbhay J to the ‘practical implementation’ of the 
programme192 is, in effect, a reference to the failure of the City to fulfil the 
requirement in the ECP that municipalities have to adopt local measures.  In 
                                                 
188
 City of Johannesburg para 18. 
189
 City of Johannesburg para 19. 
190
 See City of Johannesburg para 57.  In City of Johannesburg II para 46, Harms ADP found 
this contention to be faulty, stating that ‘to deprive a person of unsafe housing denies him or 
her access to adequate housing is not correct. The corollary would be that to deny someone 
poisonous food is to deny that person food.’ Harms ADP’s approach is both vigorously 
rejected (by the applicants) and defended (by the respondents) in their heads of argument 
prepared for the appeal to the Constitutional Court in August 2007. See paras 126-139 of the 
Applicants heads of argument and paras 175-192 of the Respondents heads of argument.  
191
 City of Johannesburg para 36.  Section 26(3) of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary 
evictions.  Wilson 13 characterises Jajbhay J’s decision as one of ‘judicious avoidance’ in that 
Jajbhay J declined to rule on the constitutionality of the NBRA, the municipality’s eviction 
practice, or on the occupiers’ prayer for a structural interdict.  Currie coined the term ‘judicious 
avoidance’ in an article of that same name in the SAJHR (Currie ‘Judicious Avoidance’ (1999) 
15 SAJHR 138).  In this article, Currie looked at the practice of  'decisional minimalism' in the 
Constitutional Court, a practice of avoidance of decisions that do not have to be made, 
avoidance of first-order reasoning when decisions can be made on a deductive or analogical 
basis and a preference for avoiding large-scale theorising when substantive decision-making 
is unavoidable.   
192
 City of Johannesburg para 53 is, in effect, a reference to the failure of the City to fulfil the 
requirement in the ECP that municipalities have to adopt local measures.  In terms of the ECP 
(at 10-11) municipalities are required to plan pro-actively and use their integrated 
development plan to identify and plan for possible emergency housing situations. 
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terms of the ECP193 municipalities are required to plan pro-actively and use 
their integrated development plan to identify and plan for possible emergency 
housing situations.  To this end, the City had to secure the necessary 
resources and assistance from national and provincial government to deal 
with the crisis situation and engage in constructive dialogue with the 
occupiers.194   
 
The Court declined a request by the respondents for a structural interdict and 
instead declared that the City’s housing programme failed to comply with its 
constitutional and statutory obligations.  In addition, it directed the City ‘to 
devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-
ordinated programme to progressively realise the right to adequate housing to 
people in the inner city of Johannesburg who are in crisis or otherwise in 
desperate need of accommodation.’195  
                                                 
193
 ECP 10-11. 
194
 City of Johannesburg para 61. 
195
 City of Johannesburg para 3 of the order.  There are two interesting aspects to come out 
of this eviction matter which demand attention. First, Jajbhay J’s decision implied that the right 
to have access to adequate housing implies a right to a specific location within a reasonable 
distance of livelihood opportunities. This conclusion was firmly rejected by Harms ADP who 
held firmly that the City is not obliged to provide housing for the poor in the inner city 
specifically.  See Wilson 13 and City of Johannesburg II para 75. This issue is pending 
resolution by the Constitutional Court on 26 August 2007. Second, Jajbhay J spent a great 
deal of the judgment translating the Grootboom requirement that the state treat everyone with 
‘care and concern’ into the concept of ubuntu (see City of Johannesburg para 63). While this 
consideration is important in the context of our divided past, the practical implications of the 
use of ubuntu is difficult to gauge or measure except as a guiding principle, much like the 
principles set out in s7(1) of the Constitution.  Jajbhay J does, however, use the concept of 
ubuntu to reject the City’s suggestion that ‘the Respondents be relocated to an informal 
settlement’ as this suggestion ‘flies in the face of the concept that “a person is a person 
through persons”’. Jajbhay continues: ‘Recent experience has shown that this alternative is 
fundamentally skewed.  Occupiers of shacks in these informal settlements have not only lost 
their possessions through floods and fires but also their lives.’ If this is the case, the state 
faces a mammoth task in providing for an estimated 9.1 million people who live in these 
circumstances (see chapter 1 above). The suggestion in this statement is that the City would 
be relegating the occupiers to a worse situation in the informal settlements than that which 
they faced in the appalling conditions of the inner city of Johannesburg, especially with regard 
to flood and fire hazards.  This statement affirms the tentative suggestion in the Fifth SAHRC 
Report at 14 that many of those living in informal settlements are in ‘a crisis situation’ and 
‘living in intolerable situations’. Although it would be too general to state that every person in 
an informal settlement is ‘in crisis’ (given the different levels of service, structure, and social 
opportunity in different settlements), it is submitted that both Jajbhay J and the SAHRC’s 
conclusion lead to a requirement that any housing programme by the state needs to include a 
provision for urgent informal settlement upgrading projects where these people are living ‘in 
intolerable situations’. This would be ascertained through judging whether the informal 
settlement is characterised by, inter alia, a lack of basic services (e.g. the bucket system) and 
health hazards.  Such upgrading projects could, in turn, take priority over investment planning 
such as the inner city development project by the City of Johannesburg in the present matter.  
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Both sides appealed Jajbhay J’s decision and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) delivered judgment in this matter on 23 March 2007.  The main 
complaint by both sides was the failure of the court to decide whether 
s12(4)(b) of the NBRA was constitutional and whether PIE applied to the 
particular circumstances.  In a unanimous judgment, Harms ADP found that 
the City’s action in terms of the NBRA was neither unconstitutional nor 
unlawful.  While these issues fall outside the scope of this research, the 
fundamental proposition that a local authority has to have short-term 
measures in place for emergency circumstances was confirmed by the 
SCA.196  In this regard, the Court held that ‘eviction at the hand of the City 
creates an emergency for some that triggers … special duties.197  Thus, while 
the SCA permitted the sheriff to remove all persons occupying the properties 
in question (should such persons not vacate the property), the Court did 
require the City ‘to offer and provide to those respondents who are evicted 
and are desperately in need of housing assistance with relocation to a 
temporary settlement area as described in Chapter 12 of the National Housing 
Code  [the ECP] … within its municipal area.’198   
 
The Court noted that, in accordance with the procedure set out in the ECP, 
the City had filed a Chapter 12 application on 22 December 2005 shortly 
before the hearing in the court a quo.199 Notwithstanding follow-up requests 
by the City, the provincial authorities had not responded in any manner to the 
application (ie. as at date of delivery of the SCA judgment: 23 March 2007).200  
The Court spelt out that simply filing an application and ‘writing a letter or two’ 
to the provincial authorities was not enough to fulfil the special duties 
triggered by the eviction.  In this regard, Harms ADP reiterated the Grootboom 
requirement that a plan must not only be reasonable in conception but also in 
 
                                                 
196
 S Wilson, writing for Business Day on 12 April 2007, calls this confirmation ‘the sting in the 
tail of the judgment.’  Wilson goes on to state that  the practical effect of the judgment was 
that the City was forced to provide alternative accommodation in these particular eviction 
circumstances – an obligation its appeal was designed to escape. 
197
 City of Johannesburg II para 77. 
198
 City of Johannesburg II para 78, section (c) 2.1 of the order.  
199
 City of Johannesburg II para 29. 
200
 City of Johannesburg II para 29. 
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implementation: ‘I am not satisfied that the City has pursued with any vigour 
the application under Chapter 12. … Plans are one thing, execution is 
another.’201 
 
4.4.6 Test Developed 
 
The judgments (and arguments contained in affidavits) in the eviction 
proceedings cited above, clearly show how the reasonableness test in 
Grootboom has enabled communities to attack the state’s housing 
programme.  Litigation has shown up broad failures of policy for specific 
groups of persons, notwithstanding the introduction of a special programme 
by the state to deal with emergency circumstances.202  In the light of this 
eviction jurisprudence, the following guidelines should be added to the original 
Liebenberg summary:203 
 
1. The programme must include measures to deal with people in crisis 
whenever eviction proceedings, in particular, are brought before the 
court.204   
                                                 
201
 City of Johannesburg II para 77.  My italics. 
202
 ‘Success’ in the sense that the state is required to draft policies that meet the Grootboom 
standard. For the applicants themselves, this ‘success’ is less tangible.  After a victory in 
court, they will in all probability go back to their shacks and lack of facilities and wait for the 
outcome of the policy. In fact, a finding by a court that the state has failed to carry out its 
s26(2) obligations, does not necessarily mean that the occupiers will not be evicted. It is, 
however, noted that in most instances the parties to the proceedings are able to consider 
some sort of immediate amelioration in the form of building materials and basic services.  
203
 It will be recalled that the objective of this chapter stated in para 4.1 was to reconsider the 
Liebenberg summary in the light of subsequent jurisprudence.  This paragraph marks the 
development of the test vis-à-vis eviction proceedings. 
204
 Given the most recent jurisprudence on this aspect (see City of Johannesburg I and II) it is 
submitted that the state (read: local authority) would need to have measures in place even if it 
is found by the Court that the occupiers in eviction proceedings fall within the four types of 
situations (set out by Blignaut J at para 20 of the Sheffield judgment) where the state would 
be justified in evicting the unlawful occupiers, notwithstanding the plight of the persons 
affected, namely: 
• A land invasion for the purposes of coercing a state structure into providing housing; 
• A situation where an inevitable choice must be made between two groups of people; 
• A situation where the occupation of land causes a real threat to safety; and 
• A situation where the landowner urgently requires the land, particularly for social 
developmental purposes.   
See City of Cape Town v Persons who are presently unlawfully occupying Erf 1800, 
Capricorn:  Vrygrond Development and others [2003] 3 All SA 371 (A) for a situation where 
the court found that some of the respondents had, in fact, attempted a land invasion (set out 
in the first type of situation above).  While denouncing the unacceptable delay in providing the 
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2. The programme must place adequate emphasis on co-operative 
governance and the need for open, accountable and responsive 
governance by all three levels of the state.205  
3. The programme must be capable of securing the necessary financial and 
human resources and assistance from national and provincial government 
to deal with crisis situations on an urgent basis. 
 
Principles two and three above can be traced back to Grootboom where the 
Constitutional Court emphasised the need for co-operative governance in the 
following explicit terms:  
 
‘A co-ordinated state housing programme must be a comprehensive 
one determined by all three spheres of government in consultation with 
each other as contemplated by Chapter 3 of the Constitution.’206  
 
One would have thought that this point was well-made.  However, this 
important aspect of the judgment seems to have been ignored in later eviction 
proceedings, especially in the SARCC matter.  It is submitted that the ‘finger-
pointing’ attitude of each sphere of government contravened Grootboom on 
two levels.  First, it ignored the fact that the Constitutional Court explicitly 
recognised that all spheres are ‘intimately involved in housing delivery’.207 
Second, the attitude of each sphere of government ignored part of the 
reasonableness test which asks whether the housing policy is coherent.  This 
attitude may well be in breach of the Constitution, which requires ‘[a]ll spheres 
of government and all organs of State within each sphere [to] … provide 
effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic 
as a whole.’208  
                                                                                                                                            
respondents with the houses promised to them, the Court could not condone the unlawful 
occupations.  It therefore issued an order which prohibited the eviction of certain respondents, 
while authorising that of others.   
205
 This guideline needs to be emphasised to counter arguments by various levels of 
government that another sphere is responsible.  
206
 Grootboom  para 40. 
207
 Grootboom para 47. 
208
 Section 41(1)(c) of the Constitution.  It is worth noting that Wickeri 19-20 argues that the 
very statements of the Court in Grootboom could be to blame for this finger-pointing.  She 
states that whereas the Court initially set out the broad contours of national, provincial and 
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This kind of governance (in respect of housing) should also be emphasised in 
light of both the local and provincial sphere’s unacceptable action (or, rather, 
lack of action) as recorded in the City of Johannesburg II and the Property 
Lodging Investments (Pty) Ltd and another v The unlawful occupiers of erf 
705 Halfway Gardens and others matters.209  In City of Johannesburg II, the 
provincial authority failed to respond to an application in terms of the ECP for 
an effective 15 months (22 December 2005 to 23 March 2007).  To 
exacerbate matters, the local authority did no more than ‘write a letter or two’ 
in pursuing the application.210  In a similar vein, the local authority in the 
Property Lodging matter basically ‘ignored or perhaps overlooked 
inadvertently’ the ECP or efforts to approach the province for assistance.211  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The socio-economic and the eviction cases discussed above are significant, 
not only because of the impact they have had on communities living in 
intolerable conditions and crisis situations, but, as importantly, because of the 
standards being developed by this jurisprudence.212   
 
                                                                                                                                            
local government responsibility (namely, that budgetary allocation falls to the national 
government, with most implementation tasks to the provinces and delegated to local 
government (at para 40ff of the Grootboom judgment)), the Court backtracks from this division 
somewhat, affirming that all spheres are ‘intimately involved in housing delivery.’  This 
backtracking, she argues, has led to the difficulty in subsequent cases regarding the failure of 
a sphere to take responsibility.  While this view does attract some merit, it ignores the many 
and varied mechanisms ensuring co-operation between the spheres as set out in the Housing 
Act, the Municipal Systems Act and statutes dealing with intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(see chapter 3 above), not to mention chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
209
 Unreported case no 6292/06 TPD, 23 March 2007. 
210
 See City of Johannesburg II para 77. 
211
 Property Lodgings para 13. 
212
 While it is beyond the scope of this research, it is interesting to note how the courts have 
begun to use Grootboom as a basis for issuing structural interdicts.  These kinds of interdicts 
have come about to remedy the complaint that the order in Grootboom ‘lacked clarity’, while 
still protecting the separation of powers doctrine.  By issuing these structural interdicts, the 
courts are able to maintain jurisdiction over any policy which the state itself drafts in order to 
comply with the court ruling.  See Rudolph I and II and Property Lodgings for examples of 
how structural interdicts have been used. See also K Roach and G Budlender ‘Mandatory 
Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable?’ (2005) SALJ 
325 for a general discussion of structural interdicts. 
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The challenge is now to test whether local government has taken cognisance 
of the guidelines identified in this chapter (especially regarding short-term 
measures) when they conduct their planning and budgeting processes. 
Failure to ensure that these jurisprudential developments guide policy and 
budgetary processes could have the effect that South Africa’s ‘constitutional 
scheme itself [is] put at risk.’213  Since the Court held in Khosa, that it is the 
government’s duty to ensure that it places evidence before the court with 
regard to socio-economic rights which may have ‘significant budgetary and 
administrative implications’, so too is there a comparable duty that requires 
government organs to apply the standards laid down by the courts in 
developing and financing programmes relevant to the realisation of socio-
economic rights.  It is submitted that this is the essence of the rights-based 
approach set out in chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
 
With reference to Liebenberg’s summary and the cases studied, it is 
submitted that the assessment of a programme aimed at progressively 
realising the housing right should proceed as follows: 
 
• Is there a programme designed to advance the housing right? 
• If yes,  is the programme ‘reasonable’ in terms of the following Grootboom 
and other socio-economic cases criteria: 
1. Is the programme a comprehensive and co-ordinated one, which 
clearly allocates responsibilities and tasks to different spheres of 
government and ensures that ‘the appropriate financial and human 
resources are available’?214 
2. Does the programme recognise that each sphere of government is 
responsible for implementing part of the programme, with national 
government assuming the overarching responsibility for ensuring that 
the programme is adequate in meeting the State’s constitutional 
obligations?215 
                                                 
213
 Creamer 222. 
214
 Grootboom para 39. 
215
 Grootboom para 39. 
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3. Is the programme capable of facilitating the realisation of the right?216 
4. Is the programme reasonable ‘both in [its] conception and [its] 
implementation’?217 
5. Is the programme ‘balanced and flexible’ and does it make appropriate 
provision for attention to housing crises and to short-, medium- and 
long-term needs?218  In particular, does the programme leave scope for 
relatively marginal adjustments in the light of evolving reality?219  A 
reasonable programme cannot exclude ‘a significant segment of 
society’.220 
6. Does the programme include a segment that includes a component 
that responds to the urgent needs of those in desperate situations?  
Thus, a reasonable programme, even though it is statistically 
successful in improving access to housing, cannot ‘leave out of 
account the degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour 
to realise.’221  
7. Is the programme transparent with its contents made known effectively 
to the public? 
8. Does the programme take into account the founding values of dignity, 
equality and freedom, and the right to life, where unfair discrimination 
of a group is possibly at issue? 
 
Within the broader context of these guidelines, research within each local 
government case study will focus on three aspects within these guidelines 
which directly impact on the provision for those in desperate need and the role 
of local government:222 
 
1. Has the local government institution proactively planned for emergency 
situations in their IDP or any other programme which allows for immediate 
relief for those in emergency situations?    
                                                 
216
 Grootboom para 40. 
217
 Grootboom para 41. 
218
 Grootboom para 42. 
219
 Modderklip para 49. 
220
 Grootboom para 43.  
221
 Grootboom para 44. 
222
 As is clear from para 4.4.6, these aspects are mostly those raised in eviction matters. 
 128 
2. Does the programme place adequate emphasis on co-operative 
governance and the need for open, accountable and responsive 
governance by local government? 
3. Is the programme capable of securing necessary financial and human 
resources and assistance from national and provincial government to deal 
with crisis situations on an urgent basis? 
 
It is acknowledged that the emphasis on co-operative government here is a 
repetition of the Grootboom criteria.  However, this repetition is justified in 
much the same way as Selikowitz J justified the nature of the remedy given in 
the case of Rudolph.  Since the Constitutional Court has already made a 
declaration in Grootboom regarding the importance of co-operative 
governance and since the declaration ‘has not induced the applicant to 
comply with its obligations, something more is … necessary.’223  
 
                                                 
223
 Rudolph  88E.  My italics.  That ‘something more is necessary’ reverberates through most 
of the eviction matters, especially the recent Property Lodgings and City of Johannesburg II 
cases.  In both decisions, the judges expressed their dismay at the fact that there was no sign 
of proactive planning on the part of the City and that the City had not pursued an application 
in terms of the ECP with any vigour (see Property Lodgings 13 and City of Johannesburg II  
para 77 respectively). 
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Chapter 5: 
Case studies: Historical and socio-economic context in 
three case studies 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Local government is an important vehicle in implementing the right to have 
access to adequate housing.  This has been established through an analysis 
of housing legislation and case law in the two preceding chapters.  However, 
the question remains: in the light of statute and case law, what effect has this 
had on the conduct of life outside the courtroom – more particularly – the 
conduct of state?1  This chapter and the next one attempt to answer this 
question by considering housing planning and provision in three Eastern Cape 
local municipalities. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the rationale for considering three specific 
municipalities originates from a growing concern amongst researchers that 
the trend in socio-economic research is to pay more attention to theoretical 
questions relating to socio-economic rights rather than researching practical 
questions relating to their implementation.  By applying the decisions of the 
courts in these case studies, one is able to gauge the effect of housing 
legislation and policy in ‘actual, live conditions’.2 
 
Before considering these ‘actual, live conditions’ in each case study area in 
chapter 6, this chapter attempts to put the current environment of each case 
study in its historical context. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide a 
brief historical overview of the different local government systems which 
operated within each case study area in the Eastern Cape prior to 1994, and 
the subsequent transformation of such structures post-1994. In order to 
contextualise the historic events in each case study, this chapter commences 
with an overview of the general transformation issues of local government in 
                                                 
1
 See chapter 1 para 3.1 for an explanation of the rationale behind the case study approach. 
2
 Moseneke 318. 
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South Africa. This overview is then followed by a descriptive account of each 
case study’s history, namely: 
• Makana Local Municipality; 
• Sakhisizwe Local Municipality; and 
• Ngqushwa Local Municipality. 
 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the socio-economic environment in 
each of the case study areas. When the transition to democracy took place in 
1994, South Africa – and the Eastern Cape in particular – inherited a largely 
dysfunctional local government system based on inappropriate jurisdictions, 
structures and programmes.3  It will be seen in this chapter that the reaction to 
this system was to design a local government structure which is arguably the 
most important level of government for the purpose of promoting 
development.4  However, it is important to put such high expectations of local 
government5 in the context of current social and economic realities. This is 
achieved by considering socio-economic indicators for each case study area 
at the end of this chapter.6  
 
                                                 
3
 Atkinson (2002) 1.  See Kriegler J in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) para 121 
where he notes: ‘The impact of the apartheid system is particularly evident in the area of local 
government.’  He goes on to state: ‘Nowhere is the contrast in existential reality more stark 
than in the residential areas of the cities, towns and villages of South Africa.  In this case we 
are concerned with the vast conurbation that developed in the economic heartland of the 
country.’ 
4
 Atkinson (2002) 3. 
5
 It will be recalled from chapter 3 that s152 and s153 of the Constitution set out the objects 
and developmental duties of local government.  In order to fully appreciate the extent of local 
government’s developmental mandate, it is useful to repeat these sections here in full.  
Section 152(1) sets out the objects of local government, namely,  
• to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
• to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
• to promote social and economic development; and 
• to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. 
Section 153 provides that local government must: 
• structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give 
priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community; and  
• participate in national and provincial developmental programmes. 
6
 These social and economic realities are, in the words of Kriegler J, ‘the consequences … of 
the vastly inferior living conditions imposed on the majority of residents, merely by reason of 
their skin colour.’ See Fedsure para 21. 
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5.2 Local government up to 1994: some general 
characteristics 
 
It is important to note that pre-1994, there was no single local government 
system for South Africa and the territory of the Eastern Cape in particular. 
However, the nature of all these local government systems was the same: 
racist, subservient, exploitative and illegitimate.7  Local government bodies 
which formerly exercised powers and duties were of two sorts.  Typically, 
those in historically ‘white’ areas were characterised by developed 
infrastructure, thriving business districts and valuable rateable property. 8  By 
contrast, those in so-called ‘black’, ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ areas were plagued 
by underdevelopment, poor services and vastly inferior rates bases.9  Despite 
blacks being given some representation in ‘white’ South Africa, white local 
authorities and central government ultimately remained in charge of black 
townships.  As a result, little development of commercial and industrial 
activities took place due to deliberate restrictions by legislation.  In the 
Transkei and Ciskei homelands, while traditional leaders were given powers 
over land allocation and development matters in areas with communally 
owned land,10 there was very little evidence of effective local government, if at 
all.  
 
The problem with the different local government systems operating in the 
Eastern Cape (and the whole of South Africa) pre-1994 was that they were 
structured along ideological lines. The real purpose of these local government 
structures was not to serve the community but rather, to reinforce the 
apartheid policies of segregation and exclusion.  An historical overview of 
local government in three different areas of the Eastern Cape makes it clear 
that various attempts by government to create local government for the black 
                                                 
7
 De Visser 57. 
8
 In Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); (1998 (3) BCLR 257), the Court 
noted at para 35 the fact that ‘there are for historical reasons enormous differences in the 
overall quality of services provided to what were formerly white suburbs and black townships.’ 
9
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) para 2 for a description of local 
government institutions in the former Transvaal. 
10
 See the White Paper on Local Government, Section A. 
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population were simply an attempt to compensate for restricted rights and an 
attempt to maintain law and order. These structures were designed according 
to the apartheid principle that, eventually, all black people (except for migrant 
labourers) had to be moved to the homelands where the policy of ‘own 
management for own area’11 could, in theory, be applied.12  However, both 
outside and inside the homelands, there was a lack of participation in the 
political process at local level.  The provision of housing was, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, particularly affected by this principle. 
 
5.3 Local government and apartheid: changes in the 1990s  
 
It is often forgotten that the crisis in local government was a major force 
leading to the national reform process.13  Organised consumer and services 
boycotts in the 1980s led to severe financial restraints on white municipalities.  
This, in turn, led to negotiations between white municipal officials, township 
representatives and civic organisations.  It became clear that transformation 
of the entire system was needed.   
 
The first major local government development in the 1990s was two 
investigations by the Council for the Coordination of Local Government 
Affairs14 which resulted in the Thornhill Report I and Thornhill Report II15 and 
the subsequent passing of the Interim Measures for Local Government Act.16 
As the title of the Act implies, the Act was an interim measure which enabled 
government to review the existing system of local authority in totality.17  This 
                                                 
11
 This concept is taken from the White Paper on Local Government, Section A.  This principle 
was to apply in both the townships and the homelands.  See chapter 2 above. 
12
 See chapter 2 for a description of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 and other legislation that 
reinforced racial exclusion. 
13
 See White Paper on Local Government March 1998, Section A and Bekink 25. 
14
 This council was a statutory body which existed to advise the then government on local 
government matters which required co-ordination. 
15
 See De Beer and Lourens 81-83 for a discussion of these reports. 
16
 Act 128 of 1991. 
17
 The Act allowed able local authorities to enter into agreement on local government affairs 
with neighbouring authorities.  The most common type of agreement entered in terms of the 
Act, was the service rendering arrangement.  An example of this agreement would be where 
a local authority agreed to render certain services to a neighbouring black local authority.  
See De Beer and Lourens 84. 
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Act was criticised for number of reasons.18  One of the main criticisms of the 
Act was that it did not cater for the Transkei and Ciskei until after their 
incorporation into South African territory.19  This meant that the local 
government structures in the Eastern Cape would be particularly affected.  By 
leaving the two homelands out of the process, it effectively meant that the 
establishment of formal local negotiating forums (as contemplated by the Act) 
took place only in the areas which formed part of the former Cape Provincial 
Administration. 
 
During the opening of Parliament in 1993, the former Minister of Local 
Government, Dr Tertius Delport, delivered an extensive speech during the 
debate on the State President’s opening address.  His speech referred briefly 
to the creation of a forum for local government to bring about ‘stable, non-
racial viable local authorities with sound administration.’20  The forum would 
have to address two issues: the extensive administrative rationalisation of the 
own affairs and general affairs departments in central government, as well as 
rationalising different local authorities in the same areas.  In dealing with 
these problems, the Minister stated: 
 
‘The system of management committees and local affairs committees 
were built on the concept of own affairs government and does not fit 
into the new point of departure … An issue that must be pointed out as 
a second anomaly, is that different local authorities in the same areas 
(and neighbouring) are being regulated in terms of different legal 
provisions.  I am of course referring to the position of black local 
authorities which are regulated by the Black Authorities Act, 1982, and 
other local authorities that are regulated by the relevant ordinances. … 
The various sets of legislation are an anomalic (sic) remain of a 
                                                 
18
 For example, the African National Congress (ANC) and South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) rejected the Act in that it, inter alia, provided for the continuation of 
existing racially based local authority structures (through amalgamating existing racially based 
local government structures) and the lack of guiding principles on which new local authorities 
could be based.  
19
 Cloete 5. 
20
 Quoted in De Beer and Lourens 113. 
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specific political and constitutional philosophy. … One possibility is of 
course to scrap the Black Local Authorities Act, 1982, and deem all 
local authorities to have been established in terms of the relevant 
ordinances.  If this method is followed, certain transitional provisions 
will be necessary.’21  
 
Approximately three months later, the Local Government Negotiating Forum 
(LGNF) was officially launched on 22 March 1993.  The LGNF’s mission 
statement, announced at its official launch, was a refinement of the Minister’s 
stated objective in his parliamentary speech, viz. ‘to contribute towards 
democratisation of local government and the creation of a democratic, non-
racial, non-sexist and financially viable local government system.’22  The 
LGNF was composed of representatives of statutory local government 
institutions and organisations entrusted with local government, including the 
central and provincial tiers of government and ‘non-statutory’ bodies and 
organisations.  It comprised 50 members, 25 from each delegation.23  In this 
regard, the most important element to the agreement was the notion of ‘one 
city one tax base’.  This element highlighted the previous grossly inequitable 
distribution of resources between different population groups in local 
government structures.24  
 
The agreements reached by the LGNF can be translated into three measures:  
an agreement on local government finances;25 a Local Government Transition 
Act26 (LGTA); and a chapter on local government in the interim Constitution.27  
                                                 
21
 Quoted in De Beer and Lourens 114. 
22
 Quoted in De Beer and Lourens 116.   
23
 In other words, 25 from the body comprising statutory institutions and 25 from the body 
comprising non-statutory institutions. 
24
 De Visser 60. 
25
 See Pimstone 5A-3.  In addition, agreements were reached on writing off the arrear 
accounts of many black local authorities.  
26
 Act 209 of 1993. In Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature, and others v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC); (1995 (10) BCLR 1289) para 
162(e) and (f), the court set out the essence of the LGTA: 'The Transition Act was intended 
and drafted to govern the reconstruction of local government from A to Z.  (In many areas of 
the country “reconstruction” was a euphemism for creation.)  Its principles and terms were 
separately negotiated.  It was then passed by the ‘old’ Parliament as part of the statutory 
scaffolding agreed upon by the negotiating parties as necessary before, during and after the 
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The road to transition was mapped out in three phases: a pre-interim phase, 
an interim and a final phase.  This three-phase process was an 
acknowledgement by negotiators that ‘simply democratising local government 
structures does not mean that local government will be equipped to perform 
the developmental role ascribed to it in the final Constitution.’28  
 
5.3.1 Pre-interim phase 
The pre-interim phase commenced with the passing of the LGTA on 2 
February 1994 and was operative until the first local government elections 
were held in November 1995.29  The LGTA provided for the disbanding of 
race-based municipalities and the establishment of transitional councils.  The 
LGTA provided for a negotiating forum in each municipal area, comprising 
statutory representatives (existing local government bodies such as white, 
Indian and coloured local governments) and non-statutory representatives 
(civic organisations, trade unions and previously unrepresented political 
parties).  Members of these forums were nominated onto the transitional 
council in the area on a 50/50 statutory/non-statutory basis.  These locally 
negotiated transitional councils governed the local authorities until the 
elections in 1995/6.  The LGTA also established a specific demarcation board 
for each of the provinces of the country.  These demarcation boards were 
given powers to investigate and make recommendations regarding the 
demarcation of any area of local government.  The LGTA was amended at 
various stages during the pre-interim phase to address certain shortcomings. 
One important amendment was the LGTA Second Amendment Act30 which 
sought to create a basic framework for rural local government, which was at 
                                                                                                                                            
transition of national and provincial government.  The Transition Act represented a ‘turn-key 
operation’, commencing with tentative negotiating forums for local councils, continuing with 
temporary local government structures, and carrying on until new structures have been 
democratically elected and put in place.'  See also Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 
(CC) para 129. 
27
 Chapter 10 of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
28
 Rycroft 154. 
29
 It should be noted that two provinces held local government elections in the following year.  
Local government elections took place in the Western Cape in May 1996 and in KwaZulu 
Natal in June 1996. As such, further reference to these elections will be to the local 
government elections of ‘1995/1996’. 
30
 Act 89 of 1995. 
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the time, not properly addressed.31  This amendment also sought to make the 
Act applicable to the entire territory of South Africa including the Transkei and 
Ciskei, thus filling the gap left by the Local Government Interim Measures Act. 
 
It should be noted that the interim Constitution came into effect only two 
months after the commencement of the LGTA in April 1994.  Section 245 of 
the interim Constitution set out that the transitional phases of the restructuring 
of local government had to be done in terms of the LGTA.32  Importantly, the 
interim Constitution set out the commitment to establish democratic 
institutions at local government level and to include traditional authorities in 
such processes.33 
  
5.3.2  Interim phase 
The 1995/6 elections ushered in the interim phase which ended with the 
implementation of the final Constitution model at local level.  This phase 
lasted between three to five years and was dealt with by the interim 
Constitution and the LGTA.  Following the election in 1995, transitional local 
authorities were established in the urban and rural areas of South Africa.34  
The councils were elected on the basis of a system that combined ward 
representation (60% of the seats) with proportional representation (40% of the 
seats).35  In the Eastern Cape, 183 local councils were established, consisting 
of six district councils, 94 urban local councils, 76 rural councils and seven 
                                                 
31
 In terms of this amendment, Part VA (entitled ‘Rural Local Government’) was inserted. 
32
 See Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) and ANC v Minister of Local Government and 
Housing 1998 (3) SA 1 (CC).  Here the Constitutional Court confirmed that the restructuring of 
local government could only be effected in terms of the LGTA until elections had been held 
under its provisions.  
33
 See chapter 10 of the interim Constitution.  The inclusion of traditional authorities in local 
government structures is mentioned in this research insofar as the chiefs and headmen 
system was ‘legislated’ in 1951.  The issue of traditional authorities, post-1994 is beyond the 
scope of this research.  For a fascinating analysis of traditional authorities, see Ntsebeza 
Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa (2006). 
34
 Section 8(2) of the LGTA empowered the Administrator to delimit the boundaries for the 
interim local authorities and to determine their powers and functions. 
35
 Although the legitimacy of the municipal councils was infinitely greater than under all the 
previous dispensations, they did not constitute democratically-elected councils on the basis 
that the ward representation was still based on the old racially-based wards.  See De Visser 
61. 
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rural local councils. This constituted by far the most fragmented local 
government system among the provinces in South Africa. 
 
During the interim phase, critical pieces of legislation were passed which 
impacted on the future role of local government.  The final Constitution was 
adopted in 1996.  In terms of chapter 7 of the Constitution, the Municipal 
Structures Act36 and the Municipal Systems Act37 were passed during this 
time.  These Acts were preceded by the White Paper on Local Government in 
1998 which set the course for a developmental, autonomous and democratic 
local government.  It was also during this time that the Local Government: 
Municipal Demarcation Act38 was passed.  This Act provided for an 
independent Municipal Demarcation Board to determine the new municipal 
boundaries, thus fulfilling the requirement in s151(1) of the Constitution that 
municipalities must be established ‘for the whole of the territory of the 
Republic’.  The interim phase ended on 5 December 2000 when local 
government elections took place, thus commencing the final phase as 
contemplated by the LGTA. 
 
5.3.3 Final phase 
The second municipal election in December 2000 consolidated the local 
government system following the municipal demarcation process.39  The new 
municipalities amalgamated an average of four transitional local government 
structures stemming from the municipal election of 1995.40  This phase 
established 38 B-municipalities (including Makana, Sakhisizwe and 
Ngqushwa Local Municipalities), one metropolitan area (Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan) and six C-municipalities within the Eastern Cape.41  District 
management areas (DMAs) were established in areas of the province where 
                                                 
36
 Act 117 of 1998. 
37
 Act 32 of 2000. 
38
 Act 27 of 1998. 
39
 Cloete 6. 
40
 See www.dmarc.org.za for an overview of the district management areas (accessed on 12 
April 2006). 
41
 See s155 of the Constitution which sets out the final version of various categories of 
municipalities.  
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local government objectives could not be achieved; for example, in 
demarcated parks or in areas displaying low population density.42   
 
The aim of this rubric is to portray the transformation of local government so 
as to provide a general background for the more specific history of 
transformation in the case study areas chosen for this research.  The 
following section gives a brief historical background of the local government 
structures operating in each area and sets out the current status of its housing 
policies and the particular socio-economic conditions prevalent in each 
municipality.43  
  
5.4 Case study areas: Historical Context 
 
5.4.1 Makana Local Municipality 
 
Makana Local Municipality falls under Cacadu District Municipality in the 
Eastern Cape Province.  Makana Local Municipality incorporates the city of 
Grahamstown, the smaller towns of Alicedale and Riebeeck East, and 
surrounding rural areas.  Prior to the demarcation process in the late 1990s, 
the rural areas included under the current Makana Local Municipality fell 
under the erstwhile Western District Council.  Prior to 1994, Grahamstown, 
Alicedale and Riebeeck East had two separate local government entities for 
their white and black populations, each set up under the Cape Government 
Ordinance44 and the Black Local Authorities Act45 respectively. Given that 
Grahamstown is the current municipal seat of Makana Municipality, the focus 
                                                 
42
 In terms of the success of political parties in the area, the ANC was the foremost successful 
political organisation in the Eastern Cape.  The coalition of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and 
the New National Party (NNP) enjoyed its strongest electoral support in the areas of the 
previous Cape Province, including Makana Local Municipality.  See Southall and Wood 235-
238.  
43
 As set out in chapter 1, information on the current status of housing policies and their 
implementation in each municipality was gathered by means of semi-structured interviews 
with local government officials and an analysis of literary sources, most notably the IDP of the 
municipality, and linked documents.  
44
 Ordinance 20 of 1874. 
45
 Act 102 of 1982. 
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of this historical background is on the previous local government structures 
operating in Grahamstown itself.  
 
It is important to note that none of the areas now falling under Makana Local 
Municipality was ever designated as a native reserve46 or formed part of an 
independent homeland. So, different local government structures existed in 
Makana from those found in both the areas that are now known as Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality and Sakhisizwe Local Municipality.  
 
The entire Makana area originally fell under the Cape Province, one of the 
four provincial authorities of South Africa, demarcated in terms of the South 
Africa Act.47  In terms of this Act, a three-tier unitary system of government 
was formed.48  At this early stage, the third tier (local government) became, at 
least in part, a responsibility of each province.49  Whilst each province could 
(and did) enact its own Local Government Ordinance,50 there was little 
difference in the systems developed in the four provinces.  Even at this early 
stage, the arrangements for local government excluded the black population 
in totality. This arrangement was premised on central government’s insistence 
that it was the only policy maker with regard to ‘blacks’ and that their presence 
in cities was to be regarded as temporary.51  As a result, the system of local 
government awarded no rights to blacks to participate or benefit from its 
structures.  
 
Grahamstown local government in the early 1900s consisted of a white town 
council which took responsibility for many of its locations.  These locations 
were populated by (1) resettled Mfengus who had moved from the Peddie 
                                                 
46
 As proclaimed in terms of the Land Acts 1913 and 1936. 
47
 Act 1909.  The South Africa Act 1909 was an Act of the British Parliament.  This Act 
created the Union of South Africa from the British Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, 
the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal.  
48
 The first tier, Parliament, was based on the British Westminster system in terms of 
structure, procedure and practice.  The second tier consisted of four provinces whereby 
power was shared between a centrally-appointed Administrator and the elected local council.  
Local government, as the third tier, was created by provincial authorities, which defined their 
scope.   
49
 De Visser 57. 
50
 As set out earlier, local government in the Cape Province operated in terms of the Local 
Government Ordinance 20 1974. 
51
 De Beer and Lourens 28.  See chapter 2 regarding the operation of the Stallardist doctrine. 
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district; (2) Xhosa refugees of the 1879 Frontier War; and (3) people who 
were attracted to Grahamstown by railway construction.52  Following the 
national trend,53 the Town Council is reported to have made a profit from the 
rents and rates of the location sites, while spending only a small amount of 
money on meeting the desperate needs of its residents in the locations.54 
 
Despite the powers given to the Town Council by the Housing Act,55 the 
Council paid very little attention to the living conditions of blacks in the 
locations.  Only 76 houses were built in the locations of Grahamstown in toto: 
26 houses in 1928 and 50 sub-economic houses in 1938.56  However, after 
the amendments to the Housing Act, the Council placed more emphasis on 
housing.  One thousand houses were built in Joza57 from 1957 to 1962 and a 
site-and-service scheme was established by the Council in the 1960s.58  With 
central government intensifying its homeland policy from the 1950s onwards, 
many forced removals of the black population in urban areas took place 
around the country.  These forced removals were made possible through the 
Group Areas Act59 and the general homelands policy.  Referring to the 
implementation of the Group Areas Act, a local commentator noted that the 
Group Areas Act was an extraordinary feat of town planning which,  
 
‘sought to destroy at the stroke of a pen the historical and cultural 
centre of black Grahamstown, the scene for over a hundred years of 
intense community life, of education and of the adaptation and 
development of the African residents to an urban way of life.’60 
 
However, the central government did not manage to destroy community life 
completely.  Grahamstown is said be unique among the South African cities at 
                                                 
52
 Mǿller 2. 
53
 See chapter 2. 
54
 Sellick in Mǿller 2. 
55
 Act 35 of 1920. 
56
 Mǿller 4.  This information roughly corresponds with Taylor 62 who sets out that houses 
were built adjacent to the Fingo village and adjacent to the Tantye area in 1930 and 1938 
respectively. 
57
 A location of Grahamstown. 
58
 Taylor 62. 
59
 Act 21 of 1950. 
60
 Charton, quoted in Taylor 64. 
 141 
the time in that its black population was never resettled.61  This is evident in 
the central government’s failure to relocate the black population in both 1957 
and again in 1970.  Both moves were vehemently opposed by the Town 
Council and Grahamstown’s black and white population and as a result, 
central government abandoned the plan in 1980.62   
 
Despite this small victory, renewed efforts by the Council to address the 
housing problems in its locations in 1967 proved unsuccessful.  Having 
applied for a loan in terms of the Housing Act,63 central government turned 
down the Council’s application to build more houses in its locations.  The 
application was turned down on the grounds that future housing for blacks 
would have to be in the homelands64 and that central government wished to 
enforce its policy of discouraging permanent residence of blacks in urban 
areas. 65 
 
In the early 1970s, the central government sought to centralise control of the 
blacks in urban areas of South Africa and in 1974, the Eastern Cape 
Administration Board (ECAB) took over the municipal functions previously 
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 See chapter 2 regarding the forced removals that took place over this period generally. 
62
 In 1957, Fingo village (a suburb in Grahamstown) was designated a coloured residential 
area, with small Chinese and Indian sections making up parts of it.  Despite objections to the 
proposal by the Town Council, the central government proclaimed Fingo village a designated 
coloured area in 1970.  The central government then planned to move 5 500 Fingo village 
residents to Committee’s Drift (located in the Ciskei, 40 km from Grahamstown).  In 1975 the 
government shelved the proposed move and in 1980, the central government abandoned its 
plan completely.  See Mǿller 3.  According to one source, the planned removal was 
abandoned because ‘[c]oncerned white Grahamstownians set up an advice office to help 
residents fight the expropriation of their land [in 1970]. … After a further ten years of 
resistance, Fingo village was deproclaimed in 1980 and its residents assured of title to their 
own land.’  See Black Sash 29.  Grahamstown therefore had characteristics not found in 
many other South African cities ie. private (freehold) ownership of property by black South 
Africans.  See Taylor 55, 59 and 63 for a discussion of Fingo village. 
63
 Act 4 of 1966. 
64
 Mǿller 3.  This view is confirmed by the Riekert Commission, in reflecting on this situation in 
1979: ‘The official [housing] policy from 1968 was, in regard to black workers in white areas, 
to provide family housing in the black states as far as possible rather than in the black 
residential areas surrounding the white cities and towns where they worked.  This change in 
policy is very clearly reflected in the allocation of funds for black housing in white areas in the 
annual budgets of the Minister of Finance from 1968.  Whereas the allocation to the 
Department of Community Development of funds for black housing – from which the boards 
obtain their allocation – declined since 1968, the allocations to the Development Trust and to 
the governments of black states rose sharply so that the total funds for black housing for the 
country as a whole also rose fairly sharply.’  See Riekert Commission 1979 para 4.387. 
65
 Black Sash 31 and 40.  
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exercised by the Grahamstown Town Council in respect of its locations.66 
Amongst its functions, ECAB acted as a local authority for black persons with 
regard to the Housing Act.67  This entailed the acquisition and development of 
township land, as well as acting as township manager and lessor of all 
housing stock in its area.68  The ECAB intensified its strict control of building 
activities in the locations of Grahamstown and by 1979, its demolition of 
‘unapproved dwellings’69 created many hardships for the location residents.70   
By 1983, there was a blatant housing crisis in the area.71 
 
On a local level, a new black authority in Grahamstown, Rhini Town Council, 
was constituted in 1983.72  It also suffered the same lack of support and 
illegitimacy as the ECAB.  Only 4.6 per cent of the registered voters took part 
in the elections for Rhini Town Council.73  In the same year as the Rhini Town 
Council was constituted, the black residents of Grahamstown formed a civic 
body known as the Grahamstown Civic Association (GRACA) as an 
alternative forum for the black population in Grahamstown.74  As in other parts 
of the country, the black residents of Grahamstown engaged in a rent and 
service boycott in the 1980s which crippled the Rhini Town Council.  
Interestingly, a sample survey conducted in black Grahamstown during the 
boycotts listed housing as the most serious community grievance, ahead of 
demands such as minimum wages and the lifting of the state of emergency.75  
By the late 1980s, it was clear that most townships and rural areas throughout 
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 Bekker and Humphries 19 and Mǿller 3.  This board was one of 22 boards established 
around South Africa in terms of the Black Affairs Administration Board Act 45 of 1971. These 
22 boards were later reduced to 14 boards. 
67
 Act 4 of 1966. 
68
 See Bekker and Humphries for a comprehensive analysis of the changing role of the 
Administration Boards in South Africa from 1971 to 1983.  
69
 Despite these demolitions, it was reported in 1980 that more than half the black residents in 
Grahamstown (estimated at over 80 000 in 1980) lived in self-built dwelling units, built mainly 
with wattle and daub, and corrugated iron.  See Bekker and Humphries 86. 
70
 Mǿller 4. 
71
 Taylor 55. 
72
 In terms of the Black Local Authorities Act. 
73
 Manona 108. 
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 GRACA was banned in 1985 but was unbanned in February 1990 along with other 
community organisations in the country.  GRACA joined the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO) in 1992 and existed locally as SANCO Grahamstown.  See Manona 
116. 
75
 Roux and Hellicker in Mǿller 4. 
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South Africa were effectively ungoverned and that a new dispensation and 
structure was urgently needed.  The situation was so dysfunctional that by 
1991/1992, 125 of the 264 black local authorities were inquorate.  Whilst the 
Rhini Town Council still reached quorum at this stage, it was clear that it was 
in a financial crisis.76  However, the Rhini Town Council ceased to exist only 
one year later – for different reasons – which are explained below. 
 
The idea of a single administration in Grahamstown was first discussed in 
September 1988, long before the official local government negotiating forums 
were set up.77  These discussions had three objectives:  to create (1) a united 
city with a non-racial democratic local government; (2) an integrated society 
with good communication; and (3) trust between local communities.78 These 
discussions led to the establishment of the Grahamstown Joint Negotiating 
Forum in 1990 which dealt with the problems associated with land invasions 
and squatter settlements and later handled development issues such as the 
provision of water and toilets to the local informal settlements.79 According to 
one source, these early attempts at negotiations were important ‘in that they 
gave Grahamstown leaders some experience in talking to each other.’80 
 
In 1991, Grahamstown Town Council, Rhini Town Council, GRACA, 
Grahamstown Ratepayers Association, the Grahamstown Management 
Committee and the Indian Association all met to pursue the idea of a single 
city.  Out of all the negotiating parties, only Rhini Town Council did not 
support the one city initiative.81  The Rhini councillors eventually abandoned 
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 Manona records that with a debt of R767 338 in unpaid electricity, water and rates in 1993, 
the Rhini Town Council was forced into an arrangement with SANCO Grahamstown whereby 
residents would pay a flat rate of R25 for rent and services.  Manona 116. 
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 These initial discussions were organised by a group called ‘The Grahamstown Initiative’. 
This forum was one of hundreds of informal local-level negotiations which were set up 
throughout the country.  Swilling and Boya 173-176 maintain that these local-level type 
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 See Manona 116 and Mǿller 4. 
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 Manona 116 and Mǿller 4. 
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 This attitude is understandable if one considers that they were effectively negotiating their 
own destruction! 
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the negotiations in April 1993.  The Rhini Town Council ceased to exist shortly 
thereafter.82  This happened when SANCO members occupied the offices of 
the Rhini Town Council overnight and two councillors’ houses were stoned.83 
 
The first meeting of the local government negotiations (in terms of the Local 
Government Transition Act) took place in Grahamstown on 1 March 1994 and 
was attended by many organisations.  These negotiations included both 
statutory and non-statutory participants (as contemplated by the Act).  There 
was no dispute as to boundaries for the newly constituted Transitional Local 
Council for Grahamstown and a transitional local government agreement was 
signed in September 1994.84  Local government elections were then held in 
1995 in which the African National Congress (ANC) was given a well-
supported mandate.  Despite continued problems with unpaid accounts during 
the next five years,85 documentary research and interviews conducted with 
councillors during 1997 showed that the Grahamstown Transitional Local 
Council had performed relatively well in relation to the enormous challenges 
facing it: 
‘The minutes of the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council which were 
read carefully during the research showed much transparency in the 
decision-making practices of this council.  Issues were discussed at 
length and, on the whole, the councillors were interested in their work.  
Another positive feature in this case was the sense of community and 
unity which had developed in Grahamstown.  To a large extent, this 
resulted from the fact that Grahamstown has a strong historical 
consciousness of being one town.  During the research it was clear that 
this had produced a good measure of consensus between the statutory 
and non-statutory members.  This sense of community represented good 
vision and confidence in the future of the town.  Some of the councillors 
who were interviewed said that there was a good spirit among the 
                                                 
82
 The day-to-day running of the affairs of the black population in Grahamstown came under 
the control of an administrator who worked for the Cape Provincial Administration. 
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 Manona 117, Mǿller 4. 
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 Manona 118. 
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 Mǿller 4. 
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councillors.  Some of them saw this as the councillors’ conscious effort to 
unite the various segments of this city which has all along been racially 
divided.  The relatively good performance of the Grahamstown Council is 
not surprising if one takes into account the many years of serious 
discussions and negotiations which had taken place there.’86 
 
Due to the demarcation process undertaken in 2000, the original local 
government jurisdiction of Grahamstown was increased from 100 square 
kilometres to 2 500 square kilometres to form Makana Local Municipality.  In 
this process, the transitional local councils of Alicedale and Riebeeck East, as 
well as the adjoining rural areas, were incorporated.  To date, elections which 
have been held in the newly-constituted Makana Municipality confirm the ANC 
mandate given to the Transitional Local Council in 1995.  
 
5.4.2 Ngqushwa Local Municipality 
 
Ngqushwa Local Municipality falls under the Amatola District Municipality in 
the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa.  It consists of two urban centres 
(Peddie and Hamburg)87 and 112 villages.  Ngqushwa Local Municipality (as 
with all other local municipalities) was created during the demarcation process 
in the late 1990s.  The geographical area of Ngqushwa Local Municipality is 
mainly made up of the former magisterial district of Peddie, but also includes 
some parts of the former magisterial district of Zwelitsha.88  
 
The socio-economic character of Ngqushwa Local Municipality is largely 
shaped by the colonial and apartheid policies which turned parts of both 
Peddie and Zwelitsha districts into an impoverished African reserve and, later, 
the Ciskei homeland.89  As such, it is necessary to discuss these colonial and 
                                                 
86
 Manona 119. 
87
 It is useful to note that the district (most notable, the urban areas of Peddie and Hamburg) 
never originally formed part of the native reserves but were incorporated into the homeland of 
the Ciskei only during the South African government’s phase of consolidation in the 1970s 
undertaken in terms of the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, as amended.  Prior 
to incorporation, these areas would have fallen under the Cape Provincial Administration. 
88
 Manona 110, Ainslie 66, Lind 140. 
89
 This view is confirmed in the light of the socio-economic indicators set out below. 
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apartheid policies, especially as they related to local government and housing 
in the area now known as Ngqushwa Local Municipality.  
 
Both the Peddie and Zwelitsha districts were declared native reserve areas in 
terms of the Native Land Act.90  This meant that, apart from the urban areas of 
Peddie and Hamburg and the immediate surrounding farming areas, the local 
government structures under the Cape Ordinance (as discussed under 
Makana Local Municipality) were never implemented in this area.  After the 
unification of South Africa in 1910, the first important step (in terms of local 
government structuring) was the enactment of the Native Affairs Act.91  This 
Act provided for the establishment of local councils for the native reserves and 
empowered a local council to provide a number of functions within its area of 
jurisdiction, from taxation to weeding.92  Following this Act, the Peddie Local 
Council was established;93 being one of nine councils established in the 
Ciskei reserve.94  The Peddie Local Council was merely an advisory body and 
it operated under the guidance of a Native Commissioner in Peddie.  In 
general, the ability of these councils to carry out their functions was severely 
curtailed by their lack of revenue.95  They had no powers to develop housing 
schemes or raise loans for their respective populations.  In 1950, research in 
the neighbouring district of Keiskammahoek concluded that the population 
was apathetic towards their local council96 and did not support it.97  There is 
no reason to believe that the situation was any different in the Peddie district. 
 
Notwithstanding the introduction of local councils, it should be noted that the 
system of headmen still operated in the rural areas, including the Peddie 
                                                 
90
 Act 27 of 1913 (as consolidated by the Native Land and Trust Act 18 of 1936). 
91
 Act 23 of 1920. 
92
 Groenewald 85. Ainslie 96.  In terms of the reserve as a whole, the Act also provided for 
the establishment of a General Council.  This General Council was established in Ciskei in 
1934.  It is interesting to note that the men in Tyefu (a location within the Peddie District) 
refused to elect representatives to this Council, claiming that there was no such thing as a 
General Council in Tyefu.  See Ainslie 98. 
93
 In terms of Proclamation 127 of 1927. 
94
 Groenewald 87. 
95
 This revenue had to be raised by local taxes and fees paid by the residents in the districts 
or locations.  See Ainslie 97. 
96
 Ainslie 97 records that research conducted in 1950 found that both the meetings to 
nominate councillors and ordinary meetings of council were poorly attended. 
97
 Apart from the dipping of stock, the people in Keiskammahoek complained to researchers 
that the council ‘had done nothing for them.’  See Ainslie 97. 
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District.  This meant that the ‘chain of command’ was: location headman – 
Native Commissioner – Chief Native Commissioner – Minister (Secretary) of 
Native Affairs.98 
 
In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act99 changed the set-up of local government in 
the native reserves.  The then Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr Eiselen, stated 
in his opening address to the Ciskeian General Council: 
 
‘The Councils in the rural areas have not been able to convert the 
Native population to a more progressive mode of life.  We find more 
deterioration rather than progress.  We must, therefore, ask the 
question whether the council system, based largely on Western 
concepts of social organisation, is a suitable instrument for guiding and 
controlling the development of Bantu people.  The councils, as you 
know, devoted a great deal of their time to criticising and advising on 
Government measures.  It is considered essential to foster a more 
positive attitude and therefore a Bantu authority will be expected to 
initiate and exercise in its own sphere local government in all its 
ramifications.  … The Minister has therefore found it necessary to 
devise an alternative system for stimulating Bantu progress.’ 
 
In terms of this Act, all local councils, including the Peddie Local Council, 
were abolished and tribal authorities set up in their place.100  This Act 
effectively ‘retribalised’ the native reserves by using chiefs and headmen as 
local government administrators.  Tribal Authorities consisted of a tribal chief 
and his councillors who dealt with local tribal matters.  Tribal Authority 
councillors were nominated by the tribal authority itself (viz. the chief) and 
were thus not necessarily representative of any major constituency in the rural 
villages.101 The problem with this set-up was that chieftancy in the Peddie 
                                                 
98
 Ainslie 98 comments that this resulted in ambiguous and dissonant management of the 
rural areas. 
99
 Act 68 of 1951. 
100
 Ainslie 101, quoting Bundy, comments that the Act effectively delegated much of the local 
administrative authority to a system of direct rule through ‘ethnic and reconstituted pseudo-
traditional chiefs and headmen.’ 
101
 Ainslie 102. 
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District was highly contested because of the earlier relocation of the Mfengu 
into the area by Governor D’Urban in the early 1800s.102  This resulted in 
amaXhosa people being subject to a Mfengu chief or Mfengu people being 
subject to a Xhosa chief – despite no customary affiliation to the chief or the 
people.  As a result, the tribal authority system in Peddie did not have popular 
support.103  In general, tribal authorities were inefficient for the same reasons 
as the local councils, namely financial resources.  This inevitably led to the 
centralisation of local government functions, as many of the chiefs themselves 
were also members of the tribal authority and later, of the Legislative 
Assembly and Cabinet of the Ciskei.104 
 
In terms of the Ciskei Proclamation,105 the Ciskei was declared a self-
governing state in 1972.  The declaration was a natural consequence of the 
government’s thinking of the time on labour control, housing and segregation. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the South African government set out to 
consolidate scattered portions of the designated reserve areas so as to form 
one geographical area which would later become the independent Ciskei 
homeland in 1981.106  In the Peddie area, this involved incorporating the 
former so-called proclaimed urban areas of Peddie and Hamburg and 
surrounding farm land into the homeland of the Ciskei area.107 
 
When the Ciskei gained its independence in 1981, Chief Lennox Sebe was 
appointed ‘president-for-life.’  After an unpopular nine years, Brigadier Oupa 
                                                 
102
 See Manona 106, 114 and 102.  See Ainslie 113. 
103
 Manona 113. 
104
 Groenewald 89.  See also Ainslie 102. 
105
 Proclamation 187 of 1972. 
106
 The legal vehicle through which this acquisition and transfer took place was the 
Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, as amended. Section 4(1) of the Act established 
the South Africa Development Trust (SADT) which was to be administered ‘for the settlement, 
support, benefit and material and moral welfare of the blacks of the Republic.’  The Act 
empowered the SADT to acquire certain specified categories of land only, including land 
within a released area for black settlement.  An area became defined as released by 
resolution of (the then) both Houses of Parliament, whereafter it was declared a released area 
by proclamation of the State President in the Government Gazette. 
107
 In terms of Proclamation 257 of 1972 published in Government Gazette No 3637 dated 13 
October 1972, the particular district of Peddie was proclaimed to be a released area.  For an 
interesting account of how farms were expropriated from white farmers in the Peddie district 
during this time, see Randall and another v Minister of Land Affairs; Knott and another v 
Minister of Land Affairs 2006 (3) SA 216 (LCC). 
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Gqozo took over from him in a bloodless coup in 1990.  One of Gqozo’s first 
moves was to suspend all headmen.  This resulted in tribal authorities ceasing 
to function, mainly because of their reliance on headmen to collect taxes.  In 
the absence of an effective local government structure, residents in the 
various districts formed residents’ associations.  These associations, despite 
no formal status, took up many of the functions of the Council, including the 
allocation of land.  In the Peddie district, Peddie SANCO was formed to carry 
out these functions.108 
 
With no official local government operating in the area, Gqozo’s military 
government did an about-turn by abolishing all residents’ associations and re-
instituting headmen as a method of exercising control over the Ciskei.  This 
was an unpopular move which resulted in violent opposition.  As a result, a 
state of emergency was declared in the Ciskei in October 1991.   
 
Against the backdrop of the Local Government Negotiating Forum and 
negotiations to incorporate the homelands back into South Africa, an 
amendment to the Local Government Transition Act provided for local 
government forums to be established in all parts around the country including 
the former Ciskei.  The first meeting of the local government forum in Peddie 
in 1994 was acrimonious, with Peddie SANCO refusing to recognise 
councillors from the Tribal Authority.  This situation was soon resolved and the 
provincial government accepted the decision of the Peddie forum regarding 
the jurisdiction of the newly-formed transitional councils in December 1994.109 
 
Following South Africa’s first municipal election in 1995, one transitional 
representative council (TRC) and two transitional local councils (TLCs) were 
established in Peddie and Hamburg.110  From 1995 to 1997, three pilot 
housing projects were implemented in the Peddie and Hamburg area.111  
While these projects together realised only 58 completed houses, the projects 
                                                 
108
 Manona 113. 
109
 Manona 118. 
110
 Lind 146. 
111
 Lind 151 reports that these pilot housing projects stemmed from a provincial policy initiated 
by the first MEC for housing in the Eastern Cape Province. 
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were regarded as successful in terms of council management, as well as the 
quality of the housing project.112  Following the municipal demarcation 
process in 2000, the local transitional councils were amalgamated into a 
unified Ngqushwa local government, consisting of Peddie and Hamburg 
TLCs, as well as the Peddie TRC, part of the King William’s Town Rural TRC 
and parts of the Victoria East TRC. 
 
5.4.3 Sakhisizwe Local Municipality 
 
The area that is now known as Sakhisizwe Local Municipality consists mostly 
of the magisterial district of Xhalanga situated in the former Emigrant 
Thembuland which, in turn, formed part of the erstwhile Transkei homeland. 
Like Ngqushwa Local Municipality discussed above, it also includes a former 
Cape Provincial Administrative urban area, namely, the town of Elliot.113  
 
The town of Cala (the seat of the former district of Xhalanga) and its 
surrounding area is renowned for its popular resistance to Chief Kaiser 
Matanzima (later the head of state of the independent homeland of the 
Transkei).  More relevant for this research, Xhalanga is renowned for its 
resistance to the restructuring of local government which inhabitants saw, 
rightly so, as a fiction of apartheid planning.114  Up until 1956, the interaction 
of bureaucratic, traditional and elective advisory bodies formed the pattern of 
Transkeian local government.115  
 
                                                 
112
 Lind 153. 
113
 Significantly, Circular 1 of 2006 of the Demarcation Board set out a possible 
redetermination of the boundaries of Sakhisizwe Local Municipality which would exclude the 
area of Elliot from Sakhisizwe.  In the Circular, the Demarcation Board commented that 
‘Sakhisizwe will be without a significant node and tax base.  Only Cala will remain.’ Having 
considered this proposal, the Municipal Demarcation Board noted in December 2006 that it 
was concerned with ‘the alleged poor service delivery and the deterioration of Elliot.’ Whilst it 
did not totally exclude the possibility of redetermining the municipal boundaries, it commented 
that ‘these matters should not be addressed by re-determining municipal boundaries, but 
through interventions by the MEC.’  
See http://www.demarcation.org.za//Documents/Circulars/2006Nov07/CIRCULAR%204%20-
%202006%20BOARD%20RESOLUTIONS%20ON%20REDETERMINATION%20OF%20BO
UNDARIES.mht (accessed 4 June 2007). 
114
 Bank 93. 
115
 Carter et al 88.  
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In 1917 the Xhalanga district was subdivided into 18 locations,116 with the 
Cala reserve being proclaimed a location in this district in 1927.117  In line with 
the Native Affairs Act118 (which, it will be recalled, set up a district council 
model in all the reserves), the South African government issued Proclamation 
301 establishing a district council in the Xhalanga District.  As in other parts of 
the Transkei and Ciskei, two rural local government structures now existed:  
the District Council at a district level and headmen, at an administrative, 
location level.119  While the people initially supported the Xhalanga District 
council, the council quickly lost support as most Xhalanga residents realised 
that it was little more than a colonial administrative structure drawing on 
headmen to promote colonial policies. 
 
Throughout the period of the Xhalanga District Council, the involvement of the 
two dethroned chiefs in the area was marginal.120  This role is attributed to the 
fact that, even before the district council was set up, the authority of the chiefs 
in the Xhalanga area was contested.121  Despite this, central government 
                                                 
116
 In terms of Government Notice 301 1917. 
117
 This proclamation was in conformity with the provisions of an earlier proclamation, namely, 
Proclamation 241 1911. 
118
 Act 23 of 1920. 
119
 In terms of the whole reserve, all district councils in the Transkei were federated in the 
United Transkeian General Council (UTTGC) in 1931.  The UTTGC or Bunga met annually 
and consisted of the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, who acted as chairman, 26 
magistrates, and three members appointed for each district council from amongst their 
number.  The three paramount chiefs of Eastern Pondoland, Western Pondoland and (after 
1936) Thembuland, sat on the Council ex officio making 108 members in all.  The Bunga had 
limited control over certain locally raised funds, which were allocated mainly for road-building 
and other public works, agricultural improvements, and scholarships.  In terms of housing 
functions, the Council was occasionally responsible for the resiting of homesteads.  It also 
discussed any proposed legislation by the white South African Parliament which affected 
blacks.  However, any resolutions taken were not binding – they were merely submitted to the 
Official Conference of Magistrates who supported, did not support, or forwarded such 
resolutions without comment to the Governor-General for information.  It is clear from the 
aforegoing that while there was some measure of representation at local level at this stage, 
ultimate authority at every level in the Transkei was vested in the government in Pretoria.  
See Hammond-Tooke 187 and 192.  Nelson Mandela, in a 1956 article written for Liberation 
(described as a ‘journal of democratic discussion’) characterised the Bunga system as 
‘discriminatory and largely powerless.’ 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1950s/nm55-56.html£N_6 accessed 21 
August 2006). 
120
 Chief Gecelo and Chief Stokwe.  See Ntsebeza 128. 
121
 See Ntsebeza for an interesting account of chiefs in the area before and after unification. 
Ntsebeza 4 argues, throughout the book, that chieftancy has always been contested and that 
it has ‘throughout its history since colonialism been dependent on the support of the state that 
was moreover highly fickle and constantly changing.’  In particular, Ntsebeza argues that land 
issues in Xhalanga – such as the struggles of landholders against apartheid’s engineered 
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sought to give these chiefs powers at the local Tribal Authority level to 
execute government policies in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act.  The 
people of Xhalanga, perhaps more than any other area within the Transkei, 
resisted the imposition of these traditional authorities.  However, because 
rural residents could not gain access to government resources (especially 
land) without the chief’s endorsement, they had no option but to use the tribal 
authorities’ structure even if they did not support it.122  In effect, the new local 
government structure effectively shifted power from the headmen to the 
chiefs.123 
 
Despite resistance by many of the people in Xhalanga, the Bantu Authorities 
Act took effect in the Transkei in 1956.124  Four tribal authorities were set up in 
Xhalanga, namely: KwaGcina, emaQwathini, eHlathini and eQolombeni; 
under the chiefs Gecelo, Stokwe, Msengana and Nvinjelwa respectively.125  A 
letter from the Xhalanga Residents Association to the Secretary of Bantu 
Affairs in 1957 indicates the feeling of the people at the time: 
 
‘(W)e beg with respect to inform you that the Chief Magistrate of the 
Transkeian Territories visited Xalanga District to introduce the Bantu 
Authorities Act … at the Plantation Ward.  The Xalanga people told the 
Chief Magistrate that the Bantu Authorities Act was not acceptable to 
them as it was a measure … calculated to diminish and/or deprive 
them of their rights.  Subsequently Chief Kaizer Matanzima of 
Confimvaba District visited the same ward and unsuccessfully 
persuaded the people to accept the Bantu Authorities Act. … From 
Confimvaba, Chief K Matanzima came with a large retinue between 
                                                                                                                                            
‘retribalisation’ – gave chieftainship in the area a specific trajectory.  At 297, Ntsebeza argues 
that the chieftainship in the area of Xhalanga was contested right from the establishment of 
the Xhalanga district in 1865. 
122
 Ntsebeza 253. 
123
 In addition, the Bunga was replaced by the Territorial Authority which was composed 
entirely of chiefs.  This meant that from 1956 until the Promotion of Bantu self-Government 
Act 1958 and the Transkei Constitution Act 1963, there was no elective element in the 
Transkeian structure above the district level – and only the slightest of representation below 
that level.  See Carter et al 90. 
124
 In terms of Proclamation 180 of 1956. 
125
 These 4 tribal authorities were established in terms of Government Gazette 1149, 2 
August 1957. 
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forty and fifty people.  When it came to voting for or against Chief 
Matanzima’s proposal, some of the people forming the retinue voted for 
this proposal, whereas they are not Xalanga people.  The people 
appeal to you, Sir, to try and prevail over the Chief Matanzima to stop 
coming or calling at Cala (Xalanga District).  His visits are likely to 
cause friction and much unpleasantness.’126 
 
Two issues are raised in this letter.  Firstly, the Xhalanga residents clearly 
were not in favour of the Bantu Authorities Act.  Secondly, Kaiser Matanzima 
was intimately involved in the politics of the Xhalanga district and was not fully 
supported.  It was due to his political manoeuvrings that the central and north-
western Transkei was divided into two tribal regions, Thembuland and 
Emigrant Thembuland, the Xhalanga district falling into the latter.  In terms of 
this division, Kaiser Matanzima was elevated to the position of paramount 
chief of Emigrant Thembuland from the position of a less senior chief,127 
thereby setting himself up for greater political ambitions.128  This division was 
seen by the Xhalanga residents as a fiction of apartheid planning and 
blatantly accused Kaiser Matanzima of being an ‘impostor’ in the region.129  
This resistance to fictional divisions and tribal authorities became more 
organised and militant, and the period of the late 1950s-1960s was 
characterised by the term ‘tshisa, tshisa’ (‘burn, burn’)130 and the draconian 
Proclamation 400.131  
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 Letter from the Xhalanga Residents’ Association to the Secretary of Bantu Affairs, dated 
23 December 1957 quoted in Ntsebeza 131 and 150.  The letter was signed by Eleazor 
Masoka ‘on behalf of the people.’ 
127
 Bank 93. 
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 As paramount chief, he would have been able to participate in the Bunga. 
129
 Bank 93.  According to Ntsebeza 187, Matanzima was aware of the hostility he faced in 
the Xhalanga District in his reference to its people as amadyakobi.  Ntsebeza opines that this 
term presumably refers to a form of the word ‘Jacobins’, denoting the French Revolutionary 
political group.  As an educated chief with a Bachelor of Arts degree, Matanzima probably 
saw similarities in the hostility he received in Xhalanga to the hostility or extremism displayed 
by the Jacobins during the revolution.  At 292, Ntsebeza contends that because of this 
hostility, Matanzima singled out the Xhalanga district for punishment for rejecting him as their 
chief when Bantu Authorities were introduced in the 1950s. 
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 According to Ntsebeza, the phrase indicated the burning of huts of both pro- and anti-
government figures in the district.  This action was apparently a popular method of resistance 
against tribal authorities in many rural areas in the former homelands.  See Ntsebeza 175. 
131
 Proclamation 400 provided, amongst other things, for the banning of meetings and the 
banishing of individuals.  It also gave wide-ranging powers to the chiefs, including the power 
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According to the South African government publication Bantu, the Promotion 
of Bantu Self-Government Act132 that followed in 1959 ‘gave the Bantu people 
of South Africa a categoric assurance that the South African government had 
irrevocably set a course on a road that would lead the homelands to 
meaningful self-government.’133 Smit, Olivier and Booysens134 give a more 
plausible rationale for the Act.  They comment that the Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act reflected an increased awareness by government that 
an urban structure was absolutely essential if the homelands were to be 
guided towards independence. In terms of this Act, a number of white 
Commissioners-General were appointed to act as agents of the central 
government in the homelands, and to set up eight Bantu territories, one of 
them being the Transkei.  In terms of the Transkei Constitution Act,135 the 
newly-formed Transkei Legislative Assembly was given authority over African 
local government; that is, over the structures of Bantu Authorities below the 
level of the Transkeian Territorial Authority (which was disestablished when 
the first Transkeian Cabinet was constituted in1963).136  In 1972, John Dugard 
commented on the reality behind this legislation: 
 
‘Basically, the law fulfils four functions.  First, it constructs a legal order 
based on racial discrimination and differentiation.  Secondly … by 
legitimising discriminatory practices, it neutralises the immorality of 
such practices in the eyes of the majority of the white population who 
accept without question any rule which has been blessed by 
Parliament. Thirdly, those laws which institutionalise separate 
                                                                                                                                            
to banish their opponents, but also to demolish the immovable property of their victims.  See 
Ntsebeza 191. 
132
 Act 46 of 1959. 
133
 Quoted in Rogers 41. 
134
 Smit, Olivier and Booysens 96. 
135
 Act 15 of 1976. 
136
 A spate of legislation followed dealing with mainly administrative matters connected with 
the homelands.  These Acts all affected the status of the blacks in ‘white’ South Africa, 
seeking to control and exclude.  Dugard comments that common features of this legislation 
were the lack of political process at local level, as well as the intention of the South African 
government to remove any rights that Transkei ‘citizens’ had had in South Africa.  See 
Dugard 98-99.  This legislation included: The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 26 of 1970, 
the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act 21 of 1971, the Constitution Act 1 of 1971, the Bantu 
Laws Amendment Act 7 of 1973, the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 70 of 1974, and the 
Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act 71 of 1974. 
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development provide a convenient façade for the outside world.  The 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, the Transkei Constitution 
and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act are useful for foreign 
consumption as they adopt the rhetoric of self-determination and self-
government without disclosing the realities of South African life.  Legal 
tinsel is used to conceal the fact that most of the African population 
lives outside the homelands and cannot in fact participate in the 
homeland’s political process; that the African people themselves have 
not been consulted about their future; and that self-determination inside 
or outside the homelands is meaningless while the harsh security laws 
remain in force.  Fourthly, the drastic security laws … create a 
repressive atmosphere in which meaningful political debate and activity 
is stifled.’137 
 
In 1976, the Transkei was granted independence by the apartheid 
government138 with Kaizer Matanzima as head of state – the same year as the 
Soweto uprising.  In that same year and shortly before the uprising, several 
Cala youths were arrested and severely punished for their association with 
the events that led up to the uprising.139  This set the scene for youth politics 
in the Xhalanga district which flourished during the 1980s and was intimately 
linked to the housing crisis in the area.  The youth politics in the area created 
the impetus for the creation of various organisations, one of which was the 
Xhalanga Youth Congress Organisation (XAYCO) in 1989 and the Cala 
Residents Association (CRA) in 1990 (modelled along the lines of the civic 
associations in South Africa).140 
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 Dugard 98-99.  Dugard’s reference to ‘security laws’ in the extract points to the fact that, 
on ‘independence’, the Transkei effectively adopted South African legislation on all security 
matters.  The subsequent Transkei Public Security Act 30 of 1977 (which repealed all security 
laws applicable in South Africa) made it an offence equivalent to treason to refuse to 
recognise the Transkei’s independence or advocate that it should be ‘part of another country’ 
(ie. South Africa).  The maximum sentence prescribed was death. 
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 In terms of the Status of the Transkei Act 100 of 1976. 
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 Bank 93. 
140
 Bank 95. 
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Both the CRA and XAYCO concerned themselves with the housing crisis that 
beset Cala and the surrounding area.141  At the beginning of 1990, the CRA 
sent various petitions to the Transkei government (now under the leadership 
of General Bantu Holomisa) requesting that attention be given to the housing 
crisis in Cala.  Despite promises by officials visiting the area, nothing had 
been done in the area by June 1990 and XAYCO stepped into the picture.  
XAYCO convinced CRA to initiate squatting as a political response to the lack 
of action by the Transkei government.142  In the ensuing months, the CRA 
began allocating residential sites to residents.  However, by mid-1991 the 
whole issue of urban housing in Cala was in complete disarray with difficult 
political groups claiming ‘irregularities’ in site allocation.143  The response of 
the Transkei government was to revive the unrepresentative town council 
which was disbanded in 1989.  Despite controversy and protest, a new town 
council was elected in September 1991.144 
 
As a result of the changes at national level, local government in the area 
consisted of the Cala Transitional Local Council, Xhalanga Transitional 
Representative Council, Elliot Transitional Representative Council and Elliot 
Transitional Local Council.  After 2000, these councils united to become 
Sakhisizwe Local Municipality. 
 
5.5 Case study areas: socio-economic indicators145  
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 Developments in Cala around the housing crisis motivated youth activists in surrounding 
rural areas, most notably, in the area of Emnxe.  See Ntsebeza 241. 
142
 Bank 97. 
143
 It was claimed that the CRA gave sites to members of the ANC, or people who paid the 
joining fee of the ANC.  Bank 97.  See also Ntsebeza 248.  
144
 Bank 98. 
145
 The socio-economic indicators in this chapter are sourced from the 2000 District Profile 
Reports compiled by the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Council (ECSECC) instead of from 
the 2007 District Profile Reports. The reasons for this are clear from the two caveats listed 
below. ECSECC is a Schedule 3 Public Entity (in terms of the PFMA) established in 1996 as 
a formal Consultative Council comprising the social partners of government, organised 
business, organised labour, the higher education sector and NGOs in the Province of the 
Eastern Cape. According to its Annual Report for 2005/2006, ECSECC was established ‘to 
assist Provincial Government accelerate the pace of socio-economic transformation, and 
address the principal challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty in the Province.’ 
See ECSECC Annual Report (2005/2006) 10. The statistics published by ECSECC in their 
2000 District Profile Reports are used to paint a general picture of the environment in each 
municipality but are subject to two caveats: 
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Before considering the current status of housing provision in each case study 
area, current socio-economic indicators for each case study area are set out. 
These data are not analysed in any depth – the data are merely set out to 
give the reader some context of the kind of conditions within which each of the 
local municipalities must endeavour to meet their housing obligations. 
However, as will become apparent, the current socio-economic environment 
in each case study area is largely a product of its own peculiar history as 
discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
 
5.5.1 Population profile 
 
Local 
Municipality 
Black Coloured Asian White Other Total Male Female 
Makana 
Local 
Municipality 
 
 
55 362 
(91%) 
 
9 281 
(4%) 
 
806 
(0.2%) 
 
10 462 
(4%) 
 
271 
(0.4%) 
 
76 
182 
 
36 199 
(48%) 
 
39 957 
(52%) 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
 
48 555 
(97%) 
 
329 
(0.6%) 
 
84 
(0.1%) 
 
922 
(2%) 
 
183 
(0.3%) 
 
50 
073 
 
 
23 136 
(46%) 
 
26 895 
(54%) 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
 
93 443 
(99.4%) 
 
137 
- 
 
5 
- 
 
187 
- 
 
225 
- 
 
93 
997 
 
43 777 
(47%) 
 
50 210 
(53%) 
Table 5.1 Population profile 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1.  The statistics provided in these reports appear to be inaccurate at times: there are some 
instances where the numbers and / or percentages simply do not add up. The 2000 District 
Profile Reports record the source of these statistics (for example, the Municipal Demarcation 
Board) but one cannot check their accuracy by cross-reference because (1) the format of the 
tables is different from its recorded source, and (2) certain statistics from consultants cannot 
be accessed by the general public. For example, statistics sourced from a privately-held 
company, Global Insight (formally Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates), are not 
available to the public. See www.globalinsight.co.za (accessed 21 August 2006).  
2.  The statistics are approximately seven years old. Although ECSECC has produced 2007 
District Profile Reports, these reports have not been used because they do not allow for 
comparison between municipalities in different districts. This is because not all statistics in 
each report are recorded in the same format. In addition, certain indicators simply do not 
feature at all in a district report. For example, no poverty index is recorded for Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality and no comparable education statistics are provided for both Makana Local 
Municipality and Ngqushwa Local Municipality. Many of the latest statistics (recorded in the 
reports as ‘RSS 2007’) are sourced from the Rapid Assessment of Service Delivery and 
Socio-Economic Survey, a survey commissioned by the Premier of the Eastern Cape 
government in 2005. To date, only an abridged version of the survey has been released to the 
public. This survey is discussed more fully in chapter 7. 
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From the data above, larger black populations are to be found in the former 
Transkei and Ciskei areas (viz. Sakhisizwe Local Municipality and Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality respectively) than in the previous Cape Provincial 
Administration (viz. Makana Local Municipality).  This can be attributed to 
settlement policies and the migrant-labour system which segregated these 
areas according to race and ethnic lines.  In terms of gender profile, the 
percentage of women in all three case studies is similar to the Eastern Cape 
Province as a whole – 47% male and 53% female.  Research by IDASA146 
indicates that women generally have lower incomes than men, with more 
female-headed households living in poverty.  The opportunities afforded to 
women would then impact on the quality of life of all members of the family.147  
 
5.5.2 Development indicators  
 
In 1999 WEFA South Africa148 measured the life expectancy, literacy and 
income (together known as the Human Development Index – HDI)149 in all the 
magisterial districts in the Eastern Cape. The data for the three municipalities 
under discussion can be seen in the table below.  The massive differences in 
the poverty gap in the magisterial districts are indicative again of the 
underdevelopment of areas in the previous homelands.  If one considers the 
local government history above, the following is apparent: the poverty gap is 
less in the magisterial districts where those districts were not, or only later, 
amalgamated with a homeland territory.  The magisterial district which was 
originally part of a native reserve and a homeland (ie. Cala), has by far the 
worst poverty gap data.  The most encouraging data are for the magisterial 
district of Albany which was never part of either a native reserve or a 
homeland and has not been incorporated with any former homeland territory.  
Elliot’s data are alarming, considering that it never formed part of a native 
                                                 
146
 Institute for Democracy in South Africa. 
147
 See ECSECC Profile: Amatole District Council (no page number). 
148
 WEFA South Africa is now named ‘Globalinsight’. The WEFA data were obtained through 
the research of ECSECC. See footnote 145 above. 
149
 The HDI is a composite, relative index which attempts to quantify the extent of human 
development within a community.  See Alebiosu 38.  It is based on measures of life 
expectancy, literacy (education) and income.  Developed by the Pakistani economist, Mahbub 
ul Haq, it has been used by the United Nations in its Human Development Programme (the 
UNDP) since 1993.  See www.undp.org (accessed 25 August 2006). 
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reserve or homeland. However, this may be attributable to the fact that it has 
now been amalgamated with a district that was both a native reserve and later 
a homeland.150  Finally, the magisterial district of Peddie follows the Albany 
district with the best data.  This can be explained by the fact that the district 
was originally part of the Cape Provincial Administration but was then 
incorporated into the homelands of the Ciskei during the 1970s.  
 
Local 
Municipality 
Magisterial 
District 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Persons living 
in poverty 
(number) 
Persons living 
in poverty (%) 
Poverty 
Gap151 
(R million) 
Makana 
Local 
Municipality 
 
 
Albany 
 
0.57 
 
39 248 
 
47.6 
 
44 
 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
 
Elliot 
Cala 
 
0.47 
0.45 
 
12 354 
42 747 
 
71.0 
73.5 
 
471 
1 171 
 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
 
Peddie 
 
0.44 
 
51 943 
 
79.9 
 
77 
 
Table 5.2 Development Indicators 
 
 
5.5.3 Education: functional literacy and education status 
 
The functional literacy rate of the three municipalities is calculated on the 
percentage of the population that is literate (20 years and above).  Once 
again, literacy varies significantly between the three municipalities with a 
literacy rate of 68.1% recorded for the Magisterial District of Albany (Makana), 
compared to the 58% literacy rate in Elliot and the 48% literacy rate in Cala. 
These low literacy rates are reflected in the levels of education of each 
municipality’s populations. 
 
 
                                                 
150
 Xhalanga district (ie. Cala). 
151
 The poverty gap is explained by ECSECC at 9 as ‘an indicator that incorporates both the 
depth and incidence of poverty: it shows both the proportion of households living in poverty, 
as well as how far they are below the poverty line.  It is calculated by summing up the 
differences between the income of each poor household and the poverty line.’  
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Local 
Municipality 
No formal 
schooling 
Grade 
0-6 
Grade 
7-9 
Grade 
10-11 
Matric 
only 
Matric + Total 
Makana Local 
Municipality 
 
4062 
(6.1%) 
13 806 
(20.8%) 
15 891 
(23.9%) 
9 127 
(13.7%) 
10 751 
(16.2%) 
6 410 
(9.6%)152 
66 445 
 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
5417 
(13%) 
12 297 
(30%) 
12 976 
(31%) 
6 662 
(2%) 
2 904 
(7%) 
974 
(2%) 
41 230 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
4778 
(11%) 
14 160 
(34%) 
1 231 
(30%) 
560 
(14%) 
3 001 
(7%) 
1 291 
(3%) 
42 021 
 
Table 5.3 Education status   
 
5.5.4 Labour market indicators: unemployment  
 
The unemployment rate in all three municipalities has been captured by 
WEFA South Africa and, again, follows the lines of underdevelopment in the 
former homeland areas.  The unemployment rate would obviously put greater 
demands on the municipalities of Sakhisizwe and Ngqushwa to provide 
housing for those who cannot provide for such housing themselves. 
 
Local 
Municipality 
Magisterial 
District 
Unemployed 
persons (%) 
Unemployed 
persons (number) 
Makana Local 
Municipality 
 
 
Elliot 
Cala 
 
42 
70 
 
2 111 
5 971 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
 
Albany 
 
37.2 
 
10 459 
 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
Peddie 75.6 
 
11 385 
 
Table 5.4 Unemployment 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152
 This level may be explained by the existence of Rhodes University in Grahamstown (part 
of Makana Municipality) where many academics would be resident. 
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5.5.5 Service infrastructure 
 
In chapter 3, emphasis was placed on General Comment 4 (adopted in 1991) 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which set out that 
the term ‘housing’ should include seven aspects of adequacy, such as safe 
drinking water and washing facilities, sanitation and energy for cooking, 
heating and lighting.  In chapter 4 emphasis was placed on the fact that 
‘housing’ is inextricably linked to the provision of services by municipalities.  
Given these two emphases, the service infrastructure of the three case 
studies regarding access to water, sanitation and electricity is an important 
facet in understanding the socio-economic challenges facing the three local 
municipalities in the provision of housing.  As such, the data set out below 
show that none of the municipalities can be said to provide all aspects of 
adequate housing.  Nevertheless, it is apparent that those municipalities 
which were part of the former homeland territories have a far greater need 
than that of Makana Municipality. 
 
Local 
Municipality 
Water in 
Dwelling 
On site Public 
Tap 
Tanker Bore- 
hole 
Natural Other Un-
specified 
Makana 
Local 
Municipality 
 
6735 
(41.2%) 
4874 
(29.9%) 
3542 
(21.7%)
153 
(0.94%) 
560 
(3.44%) 
376 
(2.31%) 
7 
(0.04%) 
45 
(0.28%) 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
1564 
(16%) 
1674 
(17%) 
2782 
(28%) 
127 
(1%) 
872 
(9%) 
2895 
(29%) 
95 
(1%) 
95 
(1%) 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
321 
(1.5%) 
383 
(2%) 
10327 
(50%) 
425 
(2%) 
1164 
(6%) 
7973 
(38%) 
75 
(0.3%) 
90 
(0.4%) 
Table 5.5 Access to water 
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Local 
Municipality 
Flush Pit Latrine Bucket Latrine None Unspecified 
Makana Local 
Municipality 
 
5826 
(36%) 
2953 
(18%) 
5821 
(36%) 
1643 
(10%) 
49 
(0.3%) 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
 
1786 
(18%) 
5707 
(57%) 
903 
(9%) 
1535 
(15%) 
70 
(0.7%) 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
288 
(1.4%) 
17 978 
(87%) 
206 
(1%) 
2199 
(10%) 
86 
(0.4%) 
Table 5.6 Access to Sanitation 
 
Local 
Municipality 
Local 
Authority 
Other Gas Paraffin Candles Other 
Source 
Unspecified 
Makana 
Local 
Municipality 
 
11602 
(71%) 
59 
(0.3%) 
71 
(0.4%) 
4155 
(25.5%) 
356 
(2%) 
0 49 
(0.3%) 
Sakhisizwe 
Local 
Municipality 
2450 
(24%) 
44 
(0.4%) 
65 
(0.6%) 
5118 
(51%) 
2254 
(23%) 
0 79 
(0.8%) 
Ngqushwa 
Local 
Municipality 
 
4672 
(22%) 
85 
(0.4%) 
223 
(1%) 
15192 
(73%) 
477 
(2%) 
0 108 
(0.5%) 
Table 5.7 Access to Electricity 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out the historical context of local 
government in South Africa with reference to the peculiar histories of the case 
studies in question. The aim was also to set out a brief overview of socio-
economic indicators in each of the three case studies.  
 
What can be concluded from these contextual discussions?  First, while local 
government is touted, post-1994, as being the sphere closest to the people, it 
is clear from the history of local government that this was not always the case.  
In fact, a feature of the apartheid era was the systematic emasculation of local 
government (especially for specific race groups) and the implementation of 
the policy of ‘own management for own area’ in the form of homelands.  Even 
in the homelands, the contested authority of the tribal authorities – especially 
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in Cala – meant that the people did not feel at all close to their form of local 
government. From this history, it must be acknowledged that local 
government institutions face an enormous task in fulfilling their constitutional 
objectives (including their housing responsibilities) while, at the same time, 
attempting to address the legacy of local government as an oppressive and 
ineffective arm of government.  
 
Second, it is evident that the particular historical context has contributed to the 
current social and economic environment in each case study area.  The socio-
economic indicators for each case study area displays the difficult conditions 
in which the housing right must be realised. It also reflects how the three case 
studies vary in need and capacity. This theme is taken up into chapter 6 which 
considers the actual housing provision in each of the case studies and 
analyses such housing provision in the light of criteria set out in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 6: 
Housing provision in three case studies within the Eastern 
Cape Province 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter commences with a summative account of the planning and 
implementation of the housing right in the three case studies. This entails a 
description of housing provision in each case study area based on interviews 
conducted during the period July – September 2006 and local government 
documentation.  Having described the housing provision in each area, the 
chapter then evaluates the reasonableness of such provision in the light of the 
three criteria identified in chapter 4.  The discussion of the first two criteria 
focus on the role of local government in (1) pro-active planning and 
implementation of the ECP and (2) co-operative governance. Both pro-active 
planning and co-operative governance have been considered as components 
of the housing right.  Discussion on the third criterion (namely, adequate 
budgetary and resource allocation) turns its focus on the role of provincial 
government given its responsibility in approving applications under the ECP 
and its vital role as distributor of housing grants generally. 
 
6.2 Current housing provision in three case study areas 
 
6.2.1 Makana Local Municipality 
 
It will be recalled that s9(1) of the Housing Act1 requires that a local 
municipality must include its housing responsibilities in its IDP.  Thus, it is 
used as a starting point in discussing the planning for housing in all three of 
the case study areas.   
 
                                                 
1
 Act 107 of 1997. 
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Makana’s IDP for the financial year 2006/2007 lists housing as its second 
highest priority2 with ten housing projects listed.  The IDP sets out each 
housing project, documenting the budget, source of funding and notes relating 
to completion.  No reference is made to the National Housing Programme:  
Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances (ECP) or any other 
planning document for housing in the municipality.  However, prior to national 
government’s formulation and adoption of the ECP (April 2004), Makana 
already adopted measures to deal with similar-type emergency situations in 
2001/2002, albeit only in terms of provision of land and access to water.  This 
was a direct result of the proceedings discussed in chapter one, namely, 
Davies and others v Makana Municipality.3 Simply stated, the municipality 
surveyed and reserved 440 erven outside the town of Grahamstown.  The 
idea behind this move was that it wished to provide a place where people 
could live temporarily until they were provided with a house in terms of the 
normal route of applying for a housing subsidy.4  In terms of this project, no 
building material was provided on these erven but water was provided by 
standpipe.  
 
When asked to describe the type of people who were assisted and allowed to 
reside on these erven, the Makana official stated that although the 
municipality had its own disaster management section to deal with floods, 
fires and the like,5 it needed to make provision for two sections of the 
populations, namely (1) ‘another category of people, people who are dumped 
here in Grahamstown by the farmers’6 and (2) those who have been renting 
                                                 
2
 IDP 2006/2007 para 6.2. Section 26(c) of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires 
that a municipality ‘reflect the council’s development priorities and objectives for its elected 
term; including its local economic development aims and its internal transformation needs.’   
3
 Unreported case no 391/02 ECD. 
4
 The allocation of these erven is apparently strictly controlled and supervised by Mayibuye – 
a company contracted by the municipality to assist in building and relocating.  See Makana 
interview 12.  
5
 Makana interview 9-10.  See also Makana interview 13: ‘… if a person his house burns 
down and flood (sic) comes in, then that is a different issue.  That is disaster management.’ 
6
 Makana interview 10.  The official followed this comment up by stating: ‘You can have all 
these nice things about your rights etcetera but that process is going to be a lengthy process, 
trying to find out whether the rights of these people have not been violated by the farmer.  But 
basically, the fact remains is that the person is here and he has been dumped here and he is 
here in front of us.’  The SAHRC’s comments in its Fifth SAHRC Report at 56 recognises the 
reality of the situation described above: ‘After nine years of democracy and despite the 
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and, unable to pay the rent through the loss of a job, are ‘kicked out’7 by their 
landlords.  In this regard, the official states quite simply that:  
 
‘This is the township, the township is not like town.  The man [i.e. the 
landlord] is not going to go for an eviction order, he is going to do so 
himself. … So that is why you have to speak to this man and tell him,  
you can’t evict him now,  give this man two days so that we can … try 
and assist this man.  It is only then that we say that this falls under 
emergency … that this man must get a site.’8 
 
Many of the housing project entries in the IDP have not been completed by 
the municipality in the timeframes allocated.9  In addition, despite Makana 
Local Municipality applying to the province for several housing projects in line 
with its housing obligations, all such projects lie dormant until 2007/2008.  
This is borne out in various documents.  Out of nineteen housing projects 
recorded in an IDP Implementation Report submitted to Makana Municipal 
Portfolio Committee on Land, Housing and Infrastructural Development on 18 
July 2006, seven housing related projects had the status: ‘Housing Application 
is on-hold until 2007/2008.’10  Similarly, the 2006/2007 IDP sets out that six of 
the ten housing projects listed are on hold until 2007/2008 due to the 
moratorium declared by the department.11  Before this moratorium came into 
effect, Makana received a Vuna Award12 and an award for provision of 
housing in 2003.13  
                                                                                                                                            
existence of human rights values in South Africa, the use of violence, harassment and other 
tactics to facilitate eviction remains common.’ 
7
 Makana interview 13. 
8
 Makana interview 13. 
9
 A comparison between the entries in the 2004/2005 IDP and the 2006/2007 IDP bears this 
out.  Most of the housing projects listed in the 2004/2005 IDP are again listed in the 
2006/2007 IDP ie. they have not been completed.  
10
 Makana IDP Implementation Report, 18 July 2006 (no page numbers). 
11
 Makana IDP 2006/2007 (no page numbers). 
12
 The Vuna awards are the initiative of the Department of Provincial and Local Government, 
together with the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the National Productivity Institute (NPI).  The Vuna 
awards rewards the municipalities that go beyond standards to give their communities 
excellent service and governance (see http://www.dplg.gov.za/vuna/vunamain.htm accessed 
21 September 2006).  Despite the awards’ stated intention, it is questionable whether the 
award to a certain municipality can be used as a true measure of service delivery.  Atkinson 
(2006) 15 comments on the award as ‘the paradox of formal success combined with popular 
grievances’ using, amongst others, the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Council as an example. 
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6.2.2 Ngqushwa Local Municipality 
 
Ngqushwa Local Municipality’s IDP for 2006-2011 lists housing as its third 
highest priority.  The IDP sets out the intention to ‘lobby with the Department 
of Housing and Local Government to embark on the People Housing Process, 
CIMP,14 Rapid Release Programme etc’,15 and sets out one ambitious project 
for the construction of 3000 housing units in 5 villages16 to the amount of R49 
million.17  
 
There is currently one estate officer who is responsible for housing, land and 
town planning.  Despite the envisaged provision for another two staff 
members in this area, none has been advertised or appointed.18  In her two 
years of working at the municipality, the estate officer for Ngqushwa has 
never dealt with a new housing project – she has only ever tried to unblock 
two existing housing projects.19  The municipality first applied to manage 
these projects (which are still not complete) in 1997.20  The estate officer 
identifies the IDP as the housing strategy and advised that there is no housing 
strategy or plan outside of the IDP.21  There is no reference in the IDP of 
provision for emergency housing or the ECP.  Unlike the Makana IDP, there is 
no reference to timeframes or implementation plans for the R42 million project 
                                                                                                                                            
Despite large protests in its municipal area relating to lack of service delivery and 
mismanagement of housing projects, the Council won a Vuna award.  Atkinson opines that 
the reasons for this paradox could be: (1) that municipalities provided information about 
themselves for the award leading to a bias in the evidence; (2) the methodology of evaluation 
of municipalities is still poorly developed, and that it tends to focus of formal office 
requirements; and (3) municipalities are making serious efforts to improve at head office level, 
but these efforts have not yet been felt at community level.  
13
 Makana interview 17. 
14
 Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme. 
15
 Nqgushwa IDP 2006-2007 93. 
16
 Gcinisa, Mpekweni, Masele, Hamburg and Glenmore. 
17
 Ngqushwa IDP 2006-2007 118 (project number 80). 
18
 Ngqushwa interview 15.  This post was created in 2004 to manage housing, land and town 
planning.  All housing-related matters prior to 2004 were handled through the Municipal 
Manager’s office.  Currently (as at July 2006), one estate officer and one building inspector 
manage housing for the entire municipality (Ngqushwa interview 5).  
19
 Ngqushwa interview 9.  In this regard, she states at 3: ‘We haven’t had any new projects 
that have started while I am here.’  
20
 See para 5.6 for a more detailed discussion of Ngqushwa housing projects.  
21
 Although it should be noted that the estate officer advised (as at July 2006) that they were 
waiting for Amathole District Municipality to assist them in drawing up a housing strategy.  
See Ngqushwa interview 3. 
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listed in Ngqushwa’s IDP, except that it is set out under the heading 
‘2006/7.’22  
 
Neither of the blocked projects mentioned in interviews with the estate officer 
and the project manager for the area are mentioned in Ngqushwa’s IDP, 
despite a total of 816 houses that still need to be built in respect of these 
projects.  
 
6.2.3 Sakhisizwe Local Municipality 
 
In Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, one official manages the Local Economic 
Development process, the Integrated Development Process, Housing, Land 
and Sports and Recreation.  This official is assisted by four housing clerks. 
None of the clerks has engineering, project administration or financial 
experience.23 
 
The IDP of Sakhisizwe Municipality for 2006-201124 identifies housing as third 
on the list of development priorities25 and sets out that ‘a large housing 
backlog … requires urgent attention.’26  Housing projects to address this large 
housing backlog, as specified in the Sakhisizwe IDP, are set out in the table 
below for ease of reference.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 This entry is distinguished from the entries in Makana Local Municipality’s IDP which sets 
out the person responsible, source of funding, and status of a housing project. 
23
 Sakhisizwe interview (2) 3. 
24
 Each page of the Sakhisizwe IDP for 2006-2011 has a marginal note titled ‘Draft 2006/2011 
IDP Document.’  Upon my visit to the Local Municipality in June 2006, this was the only IDP 
document available.  Efforts to ascertain the document’s status in September 2006 were 
unsuccessful.  In addition, the Sakhisizwe IDP could not be accessed via the internet.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the draft available is taken as the official IDP. 
25
 Sakhisizwe Local Municipality IDP 2006/2011 11. 
26
 Sakhisizwe Local Municipality IDP 2006/2011,12. 
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Project 
number 
 
Housing 
Project 
 
Budget 
 
Funder 
 
Timeframe 
Corresp-
ondence  re: 
progress  
(18/10/06)27 
 
1 
Ekuthuleni 
housing project 
and internal 
infrastructure 
14 750 000 
(expected budget 
in 2006/2007) 
No information 
given 
2006/2007 Application 
phase 
 
2 
Old township 
housing 
(construction 
and upgrading) 
24 800 000 
(expected budget 
in 2008/2009) 
DHLGTA28 
(consultant not 
yet appointed) 
No 
information 
given 
Application 
phase 
 
3 
New township 
housing 
(construction 
and upgrading) 
17 500 000 
(expected budget 
2010/2011) 
DHLGTA 
(consultant not 
yet appointed) 
2010/2011 Application 
phase 
 
 
4 
Maxhongo’s 
hoek housing 
and 
infrastructure 
1 500 000 
(expected budget 
in 2006/2007) 
No information 
given 
2006/2007 Planning 
stage 
 
5 
Rural housing 31 680 000 
(expected budget 
in 2008/2009) 
DHLGTA 
(consultant  
appointed) 
2007/2008 No 
information 
given 
 
6 
Sakhisizwe 
housing project 
ext. 13,14,15 
55 000 000 
(budget for 
2005/2006) 
No information 
given 
2005/2006 Blocked 
project 
 
 
7 
Elliot – Phola 
Park 
14 500 000 
(budget for 
2005/2006) 
No information 
given 
2005/2006 Blocked 
project 
Table 6.1 Housing Projects in Sakhisizwe Local Municipality 
 
Two of the envisaged projects29 identified to be completed in the financial year 
2005-2006 in the IDP are, in fact, projects which have been blocked since 
2003.30  One of these projects envisaged the building of 3 415 houses. 
Despite misgivings by the provincial project manager, the housing application 
was approved by the Provincial Department which was then under pressure to 
                                                 
27
 Correspondence from the official responsible for housing, 18 October 2006 (on file with the 
author). Whilst falling outside of the time-frame of the research of this dissertation, it is 
interesting to note the latest developments in the municipality. According to a telephone 
interview with a housing official at Sakhisizwe Local Municipality on 2 October 2007 the 
Provincial Department turned down the municipality’s applications for the housing projects 1, 
2, 4 and 5 as tabulated above. In respect of the new township planning construction and 
upgrading (3), the municipality has yet to apply for the 2010-2011 project. The housing official 
reported that the Premier of the Eastern Cape visited the municipality in September 2007 and 
promised R2 million for the old township housing construction and upgrading. In respect of 
the Sakhisizwe and Phola Park housing project (6 and 7), top-up funding (R96 760 000) has 
been provided by the Provincial Department to complete the project. Work on this project is 
due to commence on 10 October 2007. 
28
 Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs in the Eastern Cape. 
29
 Sakhisizwe Housing Extension 13,14 and 15 and Elliot – Phola Park.  
30
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 19. 
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spend money to avoid yet another year of under-spending.31  However, the 
IDP does not indicate that these projects have been carried over from 2003 
and whether the budget for each project refers to top-up funding or the 
original amount given (presumably) by the Department.  
 
There is no reference to emergency housing or the ECP in the IDP or in any 
other planning document of the municipality.  According to the official 
responsible for housing within the municipality, the only housing plan (apart 
from their IDP) is its housing list which does not include any reference to 
emergency housing.32  According to the project manager for Sakhisizwe Local 
Municipality, no measures have been taken to implement the ECP at local 
level.  This is because ‘that concept [emergency housing] has not yet been 
implemented fully by the Department.  It is at a very tender age.’33  The 
measures taken by the province itself had, as of July 2006, consisted of one 
‘policy session’ with provincial housing project managers – consultants 
employed by the province itself.34   
 
6.3 Application of eviction criteria to case studies 
 
6.3.1 Proactive planning by local government 
 
In response to the Grootboom judgment, it will be recalled that the National 
Department of Housing drafted and adopted the National Housing 
                                                 
31
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 10. 
32
 Sakhisizwe interview 3.  The housing list is a list of beneficiary names that have been 
approved by the Department and who are waiting to be housed.  When asked whether plans 
had been made for emergency housing, the official responded that ‘it ECP] does not affect 
us.’ (handwritten notes with the author). 
33
 This comment was made in 2006, more than two years after the National Department of 
Housing adopted the ECP.  When asked to distinguish between situations where the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 provisions would be applicable (as opposed to situations where 
the ECP would be applicable), the response of the same manager was: ‘Because the policy 
has not been implemented I wouldn’t be able to tell you how and what stage would those two 
things be separated.’  My italics. 
34
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 19.  This statement relies on an interview with one of the 
project managers from the Department.  No local government officials interviewed made any 
reference to assistance by the province for emergency planning other than that provided for in 
terms of the Disaster Management Act.  Furthermore, no reference could be found on the 
Department’s website to the ECP (accessed 23 September 2006 
http://www.ecprov.gov.za/municipality/content.asp?PageID=72&buster=2006%2F09%2F25+0
6%3A39%3A41+PM).  It must therefore be assumed that this statement is correct. 
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Programme: Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances (ECP) in 
2004.  This programme in turn specifies that the municipality must proactively 
plan for these types of situations in their IDP.  
 
Even before the ECP was finalised, the SAHRC commented on the draft, 
noting in its Fifth Report that the allocation of grants to the municipalities in 
the ECP was a way forward towards improving the co-operation and co-
ordination between the different spheres of government.35  However, the 
SAHRC questioned in that same report, whether many municipalities had the 
capacity to institute measures initiated by national government, especially 
regarding the implementation of the ECP.36  The SAHRC based this concern 
on the fact that the ECP does not cover refuse removals, operations, 
maintenance and management of the development.  In addition, the SAHRC 
commented: ‘The temporary nature of the programme presupposed a 
programme that will adequately help the situation at that moment.’37   
 
The context is thus: National government formulates a programme to respond 
to Grootboom.  Assistance comes in the form of grants from provinces to 
municipalities.  If a province actually responds timeously to such application, 
the grant is given.  However, the grant is limited to certain forms of assistance 
for the emergency situation.  The municipality is then faced with providing 
services not covered by the grant to people who cannot pay for them.38  
                                                 
35
 Note that the SAHRC were commenting on a draft version of the ECP as it was only 
finalised in July 2004, after the SAHRC Report was published.  However, the only real 
difference between the draft and the final version was the fact that applications for emergency 
housing funds would be heard at provincial level (as opposed to the draft version which set 
out that a committee within the National Department of Housing would hear all applications). 
36
 Fifth SAHRC Report 12. 
37
 Fifth SAHRC Report 15.  My italics.  
38
 The problem identified here does not only relate to the ECP.  McLean 55-25 notes that the 
national government has been criticised for failing to appreciate fully the financial implications 
for local government of engaging in housing delivery – in general terms.  This is made very 
clear in a 2003 Public Service Commission report (quoted in Urban Sector Network Report 
27-29) which notes: ‘In spite of the evidently high levels of severe poverty in many HSS 
projects local authorities continue to expect payment for rates and services.  Only the larger 
metros have developed indigent policies that allow the poorest household a basic lifeline of 
water and/or energy supply, and also zero rating for rates payments.  Poorly resourced small 
town municipalities face up to 80% to 90% default on rates or services but appear not to have 
the means, or the national or provincial support, to be able to put in place appropriate indigent 
policies.  This affects the social and economic viability not just of the housing projects but also 
of these small municipalities.’  My italics.  
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Whilst the ECP envisages that this scenario is to be remedied by ‘pro-active 
planning’ by municipalities in their IDP planning, this raises serious questions 
as to the sustainability of the programme, particularly with regard to:  
(i) payment for rates and services for those who fall into the category of an 
emergency situation (and payment of those services listed by the 
SAHRC above); and 
(ii) a municipality’s obligations to promote economic development.39  
 
Thus the programme can be criticised as short-sighted in that it fails to realise 
all components of the right to have access to housing which extends beyond 
the immediate ECP grant and emergency situation.  In other words, how will 
the municipality be able to continue to support those in desperate need when 
they only receive a ‘once-off’ payment in terms of the ECP?  
 
Notwithstanding the SAHRC’s hesitance in accepting the reasonableness of 
the ECP and issues raised in case law,40 it is clear that a local municipality 
must have a programme that addresses those in desperate need – whether it 
is a separate, locally-drafted programme (as envisaged by Rudolph I and II) or 
a programme drafted in terms of the ECP (as envisaged by City of 
Johannesburg I and II).41  
                                                 
39
 See City of Johannesburg para 6 where the applicant (the local government for 
Johannesburg) appealed to the Court ‘not to place a “stop sign” on its difficult road to 
upliftment of the inner city.’  See also Property Lodgings 16 where the court emphasised that 
the local government had a duty to take into account the interests of the developers and the 
demands of the 2010 World Cup. 
40
 Subsequent to the drafting of the ECP, two judgments (namely City of Cape Town v Neville 
Rudolph and others II and The City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others) 
have reflected a difference in approach as to whether the ECP requires that local government 
make up for the deficiencies in the ECP by adopting its own plan or simply follow the 
procedures set out in the ECP.  It was common cause in Rudolph II that the ECP is structured 
in such a way that it does not pay ‘due regard to the urgency of the situation it is intended to 
address’.  In City of Johannesburg however, Jajbhay J held that the applicant municipality had 
failed in the pragmatic implementation of the ECP.  Nowhere in the latter judgment did the 
court question the effect of the bureaucratic procedures within the ECP as considered in 
Rudolph.  Unfortunately, the SCA in City of Johannesburg II did not deal with this issue on 
appeal, mainly because the provincial housing department was not joined and the appeal 
mainly dealt with the NBRA.  However, as is apparent from chapter 4, the Court articulated 
quite clearly that it disapproved of the province’s lack of action in the matter. 
41
 It will be recalled that in City of Johannesburg, the court rebuked the local government 
concerned for failing to implement this ECP: ‘The applicant has failed in the pragmatic 
implementation of this programme’ (para 53).  
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If one follows the judgments in the City of Johannesburg matter, this means 
that, in effect, local government must take steps to implement the ECP.42  In 
terms of implementation by local government, the ECP sets out that local 
government must plan ahead for emergency housing situations by making 
provision for: procedures to monitor land use, including illegal land invasion, 
within its area of jurisdiction;43 pro-active procurement measures;44 and liaison 
channels and procedures both within its organisation and with other public 
and private bodies to deal with emergency situations effectively when they 
arise.45  In addition, local government must identify possible emergency 
housing situations by utilising components of its integrated development plan 
(IDP).46  
 
Thus, in addition to the planning in the IDP, it is vital that a municipality should 
be able to access funding from the province at short notice.47  The ECP 
operates on the basis that, in emergency situations, a municipality applies for 
                                                 
42
 City of Johannesburg para 67: ‘The order … requires that the Applicant be interdicted from 
evacuating the Respondents, until such time that the applicant has developed a pragmatic, 
constructive and coherent programme that will deal with the predicament that the 
Respondents presently have to endure, The programme must also provide for alternate 
adequate accommodation for the Respondents.’  
43
 ECP 27. 
44
 Examples of pro-active procurement measures include annual contracts and the 
establishment of panels of suitable contractors and consultants.  A municipality and/or the 
provincial housing department have considerable discretion in the particular contract strategy 
it chooses to use, especially given the nature of the emergency.  However, the programme 
requires that in all instances acquisition procedures must be fair, equitable, transparent and 
cost effective.  See ECP 22 and 27. 
45
 ECP 27. 
46
 In particular, the ECP requires that a municipality’s IDP should include:    
• Identification of communities that do not have access to basic municipal services.  In this 
way, existing and potential emergency situations can be identified, risks assessed, and 
contingency plans made. 
• Setting out existing emergency situations or potential emergency situations as 
development priorities and objectives.   
• Information about existing emergency housing situations where alternative land or 
development projects may be required should be identified and reflected in the spatial 
development framework.  Threatening and potentially threatening situations, disaster-
prone areas, and communities at risk identified in the municipal disaster management 
plan, that may qualify for assistance under the ECP, must also be identified.  
• Land must also be identified that can be utilised for emergency situations.  
See ECP 27.  Jajbhay J in City of Johannesburg at para 53 interpreted these duties as 
‘targeting those who can afford to pay for housing and those who cannot.’  In particular, he 
found that the implementation of the ECP by local government had to be undertaken with a 
measure of urgency; yet in a co-ordinated and coherent fashion. 
47City of Johannesburg para 53. 
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funding via the Department to the Member of the Executive Council (‘the 
MEC’) responsible for housing.  The funding consists of a grant to the 
municipality, rather than subsidies to individuals.48  However, it is clear from 
the Rudolph II, City of Johannesburg II and Property Lodgings decisions that it 
could be months before the province even responds to such an application, 
thus justifying the concern that the SAHRC expressed regarding the 
temporary nature of the ECP.49 
 
Given the duties set out in the ECP and case law, the first aspect of the 
‘eviction criteria’ requires local authorities to (1) proactively plan for 
emergency situations in their IDP and/or separate programme(s) and (2) 
ensure that such planning allows for the immediate relief of the emergency 
situation by securing the necessary funding from provincial government in a 
co-ordinated and coherent fashion.  The question posed in the next section is: 
What have the three Eastern Cape local municipalities under review done to 
comply with this requirement? 
 
As set out above, none of the three municipalities studied includes any 
reference to the ECP in either their IDP or any other planning document.50  In 
fact, only one local government official interviewed (from Makana Local 
Municipality) even knew that the ECP existed.  In Ngqushwa Local 
Municipality, the estate officer advised that there was no planning for an 
emergency-type situation, in terms of the ECP or any other plan in her 
municipality.51  In Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, an official stated that the 
                                                 
48
 ECP 9-10.  
49
 Fifth SAHRC Report 13. 
50
 For example, the Spatial Development Framework, the Local Economic Development Plan 
etc.  It may be argued that the IDP is a five-year planning document and, since the ECP was 
only adopted in 2004, it will obviously not include emergency measures if such IDP was 
adopted prior to 2004.  However, the IDP is subject to an annual review and may in fact be 
amended ‘to the extent that changing circumstances so demand’ (see s34 of the Municipal 
Systems Act 23 of 2000).  It is submitted that the inclusion of proactive measures in terms of 
the ECP should be made at this annual review or in terms of ‘changed circumstances’. 
51
 Ngqushwa interview 2.  This was confirmed by the project manager overseeing Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality who stated: ‘I would know something about it (the ECP) or I would be 
asked to facilitate it … that hasn’t happened.’  My italics.  Ngqushwa Project Consultant 5.  
The Eastern Cape Provincial Report on the assessment of municipal powers and functions 
(prepared by the Municipal Demarcation Board, May 2003) noted at 15 that there was no 
dedicated budget for integrated planning for the District Municipality under which Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality operates (viz Amatole District) or any of the local municipalities which fell 
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municipality’s housing plan (apart from its IDP) was the municipality’s housing 
list52 and that, in any event, the ECP ‘does not affect us’.53  The Makana Local 
Municipality advised that the municipality did make provision for those in 
desperate need, although this was not in terms of the ECP but in terms of its 
own arrangements.54  These arrangements, described above, provide a piece 
of ground with access to water. 
 
From interviews conducted with local government officials and project 
managers, the kind of planning that has taken place in Makana is not evident 
in the other two municipalities studied.  It is clear that all the municipalities 
studied have not taken any steps in terms of the ECP, with only one 
municipality planning pro-actively in some way.55  
 
The description of those persons who benefit from Makana Local 
Municipality’s arrangements certainly fit the Grootboom profile – to the extent 
that such description acknowledges that an emergency does not only consist 
of natural disasters such as floods and fires.56  Thus, while Makana Local 
Municipality has not ‘pro-actively planned’ in its IDP in the manner required by 
the ECP, it has attempted to accommodate those in dire need by allocating a 
plot with access to water where a person can build his or her shack.  
 
When asked to describe the rationale for reserving these erven, the Makana 
official’s reply reminds one of comments made in the judgments of 
Grootboom, City of Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
                                                                                                                                            
under it (including Ngqushwa).  In particular, the report noted that ‘Ngqusha (sic) Municipality, 
while it renders the function [of integrated planning], has some capacity limitations.’  These 
capacity limitations vis-à-vis housing and integrated planning are discussed later on in the 
chapter. 
52
 Sakhisizwe interview 3.  The housing list is a list of beneficiary names that have been 
approved by the Department and who are waiting to be housed. 
53
 Sakhisizwe interview (handwritten notes with the author). 
54
 The official interviewed from Makana Local Municipality stated that whilst ‘there is no 
document for that [provision for those in dire need],’ the municipality had ‘reserved erven for 
this particular type of thing.’  Makana interview 14. 
55
 It should be noted that the ECP sets out at 7 that it will take preference over any existing 
provincial and municipal programmes relating to emergency housing assistance.  Such 
programmes must be brought into conformity with the ECP.  
56
 It will be recalled that the SAHRC commented in its Fifth SAHRC Report at 15 that the 
definition of ‘emergency’ in the ECP might be too narrow to cover the situations envisaged by 
the court in Grootboom. 
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occupiers57 regarding the need of the state to show ‘care and concern’,58 
‘ubuntu’59 and ‘good neighbourliness’60 when dealing with the poor:  
 
‘The problems were that we were telling a person that you cannot 
squat here in Makana.  Yet, the circumstances of this person are 
forcing him to squat. … Because at the end of the day we are human 
beings, now we have to face that … our people cannot just be dumped 
on the street.’61  
 
The provision of land by Makana Local Municipality in this way appears to 
solve the problem raised by Pienaar and Muller as far back as 1999, as well 
as Sachs J in Port Elizabeth v Various Occupiers, namely: there is no 
substitute infrastructural provision for transitional support of evicted persons.62  
Makana Local Municipality has thus responded to the problem raised by 
Pienaar and Muller (and repeated by Sachs J) that ‘there is still a need for 
areas with basic or rudimentary services, areas where squatters can legally 
settle while they wait to get to the front of the housing queue.’63 
 
6.3.2 Co-operation between the provincial and local sphere of 
government 
 
The ECP drafted at national level can only succeed if local government and 
provincial government ‘co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good 
faith by co-ordinating their action and legislation.’64  The Constitutional Court 
stated in Grootboom: 
 
                                                 
57
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
58
 Grootboom para 44. 
59
 City of Johannesburg para 62. 
60
 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 37. 
61
 Makana interview 14.  My italics. 
62
 Van Wyk 49.  See Port Elizabeth Municipality para 28 (footnote 28).  
63
 J Pienaar and A Muller ‘The impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on homelessness and unlawful occupation within the 
present statutory framework’ (1999) 10 Stell LR 370 393. 
64
 Section 41(1)(h)(iv) of the Constitution. 
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‘All levels of government must ensure that the housing programme is 
reasonable and appropriately implemented. … Every step at every 
level of government must be consistent with the constitutional 
obligation to take reasonable measures to provide adequate housing.’65 
 
It will be recalled that the Grootboom judgment also emphasised that ‘[t]he 
State must devise a comprehensive and workable plan to meet its obligations 
[in terms of s26]’66 and ‘[a] reasonable programme must … ensure that the 
appropriate financial and human resources are available.’67 
 
The Housing Act68 draws no distinction between a local council, a 
metropolitan council, a metropolitan local council, a rural council and a district 
council.  The Act therefore imposes the same obligations and duties on all of 
these different types of municipalities.  The underlying assumption of the 
Housing Act is therefore that municipalities are similarly placed in terms of 
resources and infrastructure so as to enable them to perform their duties and 
functions in an equally diligent and capable manner.  This lack of distinction in 
spite of the vast disparities in their resources, capacity and general skills and 
knowledge regarding housing development is only manageable if the 
provincial sphere is able to assist the smaller municipalities both financially 
and in providing human resources in accordance with the principles of co-
operative government.69  
 
The role of local government as regards housing development is also not 
linked with any specific financing provisions in the Housing Act.  Funding for 
housing development is drawn down from the provincial sphere.  This is a 
critical issue in the context of the limit of ‘available resources’ in terms of 
s26(2) of the Constitution and, again, the success of co-operative government 
                                                 
65
 Grootboom para 82.  The co-operation that should take place between the province and 
local government in terms of s26 is spelt out s7(2)(c) and s7(2)(e) of the Housing Act.  
66
 Grootboom para 38. 
67
 Grootboom para 39.  My italics. 
68
 Act 107 of 1997. 
69
 K Pillay ‘Local Government and the Right to Adequate Housing’ (1998) 1 ESR Review 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-Economic-Rights/esr-review/esr-
previous-editions/esr-review-vol-1-no-1-march-1998.pdf/ accessed 5 March 2007. 
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becomes vital.  Any planning by local government would need to be an 
iterative process between provincial and national government giving 
consideration both to national and provincial policy principles.70  One recalls 
the warning in the 1994 Housing White Paper:  
 
‘The absence of legitimate, functional and viable local authority 
structures will jeopardise both the pace and quality of implementation 
of housing programmes.’ 71 
 
Local government’s ability to realise the housing right is therefore severely 
undermined if communication with the province regarding housing policy 
consistency and alignment breaks down.  The SAHRC has stated:  
 
‘It is the responsibility of both the national and provincial governments 
to strengthen the role and responsibilities of local government through 
the exchange of expertise and experience, in line with the principles of 
co-operative governance to locally implement the adopted housing 
programme.’72  
 
In the interviews conducted, local government officials complained in general 
about the lack of communication between local government and provincial 
government, resulting in delay and uncertainty in planning ahead.  A Makana 
official comments that planning at provincial level is haphazard73 and the 
process ‘is not how it should be.’74  Lack of planning at provincial level 
necessarily impacts negatively on the Municipality’s ability to plan (and 
monitor) housing projects ahead in terms of the Municipality’s IDP.75  Despite 
                                                 
70
 This success did not seem apparent in a 2003 survey conducted by the Urban Sector 
Network.  A local government official is reported to have commented: ‘The question is: is the 
provision of housing the core function of local authorities?  If yes, the national policy is not 
very clear.  If housing is the high priority at national level, then all local authorities should align 
their responsibilities and resources to meet this obligation.’  See Urban Sector Network 22. 
71
 White Paper para 5.2.3. 
72
 Fourth SAHRC Report 60. 
73
 Makana interview 15. 
74
 Makana interview 5. 
75
 Makana interview 20: ‘It must not be a lucky lotto stake.  I must know so that I can plan 
accordingly.’  Also see Makana interview 19: ‘The problem … is that if you are dependent on 
the province to give you funding, you can’t determine that [the future].’  Atkinson (2006) 4 
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the obligation of the provincial government to assist and integrate a 
municipality’s IDP,76 the Makana official notes that ‘as far as housing [is 
concerned] I have never received anything from the province.  You never get 
such a thing.’77  
 
The lack of pro-active planning by Ngqushwa and Sakhisizwe Local 
Municipalities set out above cannot be seen in isolation.78  As noted in 
Chapter 3, the Provincial Department of Housing is under a duty to assist 
local government in its housing functions.  Such assistance would cover 
assistance to local government in carrying out its functions in emergency 
housing situations either in terms of the ECP or in terms of a separate 
programme. 
 
The ECP stipulates that Provincial Departments must: 
 
‘guide, assist and collaborate with municipalities in the preparation and 
submission of applications and in the implementation of projects [for 
emergency situations] and also co-ordinate actions with any disaster 
initiatives as well as with the actions of other role players in an 
approved project.’79  
 
The Provincial Department’s duty to assist municipalities goes beyond 
assistance in the actual project application itself (which may be implied in the 
programme excerpt above).  This submission is borne out by the Provincial 
Department’s general constitutional mandate to assist and support local 
                                                                                                                                            
notes that inadequate communication between the provincial and local spheres of 
government ‘is a regular occurrence, with municipalities receiving highly contradictory 
information about budgetary allocations and spending deadlines.’ 
76
 Part 4 of the Housing Act requires that local government include housing responsibilities in 
their IDP process.  As set out in chapter 3, the IDP of each municipality is aimed at the 
integrated development and management of the area of jurisdiction of the municipality 
concerned in terms of its powers and duties. 
77
 Makana interview 20. 
78
 See the Sixth SAHRC Report 28 which confirms this approach: ‘The activities of different 
departments at all levels of government are interlinked and intertwined.  The failure of one 
department contributes to the ultimate failure of other departments.  Likewise, an 
inappropriate decision by one department affects the ability of other departments to 
implement appropriate decisions.’ 
79
 ECP 5. 
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government80 and its very specific mandate in both the Housing Act81 and the 
Municipal Systems Act82 to assist municipalities in their planning for housing. 
 
What then has the Provincial Department done to assist these municipalities 
in planning for emergency situations?  The measures adopted by the 
Provincial Department for the ECP are unclear.  One project manager 
reported that the measures have, to date, consisted of one ‘policy session’83 
with provincial housing project managers (viz. consultants employed by the 
province itself).84  The project manager comments: ‘That concept [ECP] has 
not yet been implemented fully by the Department.  It is at a very tender 
age.’85  This comment was made in 2006, more than two years after the 
National Department of Housing adopted the ECP.  When asked to 
distinguish between situations where the Disaster Management Act86 
provisions would be applicable (as opposed to situations where the ECP 
would be applicable), the response of the same manager was: ‘Because the 
policy has not been implemented I wouldn’t be able to tell you how and what 
                                                 
80
 Section 155(b) of the Constitution states that ‘each provincial government must provide for 
the … support of local government in the province; and must promote the development of 
local government capacity.’  In giving content to the concept of support, it is instructive to refer 
to how the Constitutional Court interpreted the meaning of support in s155(6) of the 
Constitution.  In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:  in re Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC), the Court held at para 371 that the term ‘support’ derived much of its significance 
from s154(1) where national and provincial government are compelled to ‘support and 
strengthen the capacity of the municipalities’.  The Court held that this power of ‘support’ can 
be employed by provincial governments to strengthen existing local government structures, 
powers and functions and to prevent a decline or degeneration in such powers, structures and 
functions.  See also Mettler 222. 
81
 Section 7(2)(c) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 requires that the province (through its MEC) 
must take all reasonable and necessary steps to support and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities to effectively exercise their powers and perform their duties in respect of 
housing development.  See also s7(2)(e) of the Housing Act.  
82
 Section 31 of the Municipal Systems Act 23 of 2000 requires that the MEC for local 
government in the province must, inter alia, assist a municipality with the planning, drafting, 
adoption and review of its integrated development plan.  
83
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 19. 
84
 This statement relies on an interview with one of the project managers from the Provincial 
Department.  No local government officials interviewed made any reference to assistance by 
the province for emergency planning other than that provided for in terms of the Disaster 
Management Act.  Furthermore, no reference could be found on the Provincial Department’s 
website to the ECP (accessed 23 September 2006 
http://www.ecprov.gov.za/municipality/content.asp?PageID=72&buster=2006%2F09%2F25+0
6%3A39%3A41+PM).  It must therefore be assumed that this statement is correct. 
85
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 20. 
86
 Act 57 of 2002. 
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stage would those two things be separated.’87  Given that these project 
managers are often the sole advisors and contacts the municipality has with 
the province, it is clear that if the project managers cannot articulate the 
details of the programme, it is hardly likely that meaningful assistance is being 
provided to municipalities in respect of planning for emergency situations 
under the ECP or otherwise.88  
 
Both project managers and all local government officials interviewed 
commented that they had not prepared or been assisted in any preparation of 
a separate programme to deal with emergency situations.  The acting senior 
manager of policy and research for the Provincial Department disputed this 
conclusion when interviewed, setting out the fact that the province had trained 
municipal officials and had, in fact, set aside R32 million for emergency 
programmes for 2006/7.89 
 
If we accept the version of the local government officials interviewed, it is 
highly likely that, notwithstanding the setting aside of money, the province 
itself has not planned the operation of the ECP and that many local 
municipalities in the Eastern Cape are not in a position, in the words of 
Jajbhay J, to ‘[s]ecure the necessary resources and assistance from … 
provincial government to deal with the current crisis situation.’90  It also follows 
that, should a local municipality apply to the province for funding, such 
application would not be ‘attended to with a measure of urgency; however in a 
co-ordinated and coherent fashion’ as required by City of Johannesburg I and 
II.91  This conclusion is articulated by a project manager:  
                                                 
87
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 20.  My italics. 
88
 Given that these project managers are each responsible for twenty to twenty-five projects in 
several different municipalities (Pillay Commission, Perks 130), it is fair to conclude that 
ignorance of the ECP extends beyond the three municipalities studied. 
89
 Provincial interview 5.  However, setting aside an amount of money does not equate with 
adequate planning – especially when the Provincial Department has a history of under- 
spending.  In any event, the setting aside of money is a statutory obligation.  For example, 
see Government Gazette 24834, GN 616, 30 April 2003 published in accordance with s24 of 
the Division of Revenue Act 7 of 2003.  In terms of Annexure A of this Gazette, Provincial 
Governments have to set aside 0.5-0.75 per cent per year to finance emergency housing 
needs.  According to the Annexure, the setting aside of funding ‘will provide for the people 
who have been affected by disasters; and need to be assisted as a matter of urgency.’ 
90
 City of Johannesburg para 61. 
91
 City of Johannesburg para 53 and City of Johannesburg II para 77. 
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‘I have not been involved in that [planning for emergency situations] 
which then clearly says that in municipalities in which I have been 
involved in, that [planning under the ECP] hasn’t happened.’92 
 
The lack of communication between officials in the three case studies 
reviewed and the province appears to be a general problem within the 
Eastern Cape by (1) the provincial government’s own admission and (2) 
reports by the media.   
In May 2003 the MEC for Housing in the Province noted that there was a 
‘volatile’ and ‘unstable’ environment within local government which led him to 
conclude that ‘[n]ot all of us understand the significance of Chapter 3 … one 
of the things we need to practise is co-operative government.’  The MEC said 
further that ‘difficulties in executing principles of co-operative government 
were due to the spheres of government not talking to one another.’93    
In the same month, the Director of the Provincial Department of Housing , 
Local Government and Traditional Affairs admitted that one of the reasons for 
its under-spending on housing was that municipalities lacked housing units 
(i.e. adequate human resources) and the political will ‘to do the right thing’ at 
local level.  In response to this statement, the mayor of Buffalo City at the 
time, Sindisile McLean, stated that ‘the Department says municipalities have 
no capacity.  We say the Department fails the municipalities.’94  Over the 
same period, the strategic plan of the Provincial Department for 2004-2007 
noted that the provincial housing programme suffered from ‘poor 
communication internally and externally.’95    
                                                 
92
 Ngqushwa Project Consultant 5.  The project manager interviewed is responsible for 
Ngqushwa, Nxuba, Great Kei, Amahlathi and Mnquma Local Municipalities.  It is therefore 
safe to conclude that in all these municipalities, no planning has been undertaken in respect 
of the ECP or any other programme.  A general overview of the relationship, co-operation and 
assistance between the province and municipality (i.e. not only for emergency situations) 
paints the same picture.  
93
 ‘Nkwinti calls for better co-operation’ Daily Dispatch 9 May 2003. 
94
 ‘Dept vows to spend R1.1 billion on new houses’ Grocott’s Mail  23 May 2003. 
95
 Provincial Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs Strategic Plan 
(2004-2007) 15.  Research conducted in 2002 by De Visser in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal 
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The lack of co-operative government within the Eastern Cape however, has 
been taken up politically in the last two years.  In her State of the Province 
address in February 2005, the Premier of the Eastern Cape stated that 
relations between municipalities and Provincial Government needed to be 
strengthened in order to accelerate service delivery.96  This theme was 
reiterated in a policy speech a month later by the MEC for Housing, Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs stating that there needed to be ‘role 
clarification between provincial government and municipalities.’97  As a result 
of widespread protests in the Port Elizabeth area in May 2005 relating to lack 
of service delivery and alleged mismanagement of housing projects, the 
national Minister of Housing met with the Mayor of Port Elizabeth, the Housing 
MEC and the Premier.  At that meeting, the national Minister maintained that 
inadequate communication between the three spheres of government and the 
affected communities had been the cause of problems relating to service 
delivery and housing.98  A year later, the Premier continued to focus on lack of 
co-operative government, resulting in poor capacity at municipal level: 
 
‘Local government is what gives life to the concept of wall-to-wall 
government.  Extensive work has been undertaken to review the 
functionality of this sphere of government, out of which two problems 
underlying the performance of municipalities have been distilled.  The first 
                                                                                                                                            
also revealed a break down in co-operative government between provincial and local 
government.  Having interviewed both municipal and provincial officials, he found: ‘An issue 
that constantly came up [in interviews] was the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
municipalities about provincial plans, budgets and priorities that were supposed to influence 
IDPs. … From the interviews it appeared that some provincial departments are blissfully 
unaware of municipal IDPs and the communication and sharing of information during 
municipal IDP processes is sorely lacking.  Numerous respondents complained about the lack 
of understanding and interest of departments in IDPs; they show little interest in municipal 
IDPs, thereby stifling its integrative potential.’  Research carried out by the National 
Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Local Government and a Ministerial Advisory Committee 
on Local Government confirmed this finding.  See Portfolio Committee on Provincial and 
Local Government (2003) 19 and Ministerial Advisory Committee (2001) 61-62 quoted in De 
Visser 225. 
96
 State of the Province Address, Premier Nosimo Balindlela 18 February 2005 
(http://www.ecprov.gov.za/images/pdfFiles/05state_province_address.pdf accessed on 3 
August 2006). 
97
 Policy Speech of Neo-Moerane, MEC for Housing, Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs 2005/2006 17 March (2005) 11 and 21. 
98
 Local Government Briefing, June (2005) 32. 
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is poor capacity within municipalities to discharge their functions, 
compounded by inadequate and inappropriately structured capability 
within the state in general to support municipalities.  Secondly, the 
existence of poor and inadequate accountability mechanisms straddles 
both the administrative and political domains of our municipalities.  It is for 
this reason that the next term of local government must be characterised 
by a decisive shift towards building municipal capacity and sustainability 
that should lead to an improvement in the performance of the whole of 
government.’99   
 
6.3.3 Adequate financial and human resource allocation 
 
The right to have access to adequate housing is subject to the limitation that 
the state must take reasonable measures to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right within its available resources.100  Although the courts 
have been hesitant in the past to consider the spending patterns or to impose 
specific planning directives regarding socio-economic rights,101 they have 
accepted that the provision of constitutional remedies inevitably impacts on 
budgets and planning.102  Where the courts have accepted as much, they 
have also been quick to point out that these possible budgetary 
consequences on the state are a direct consequence of its duty to enforce 
                                                 
99
 My italics.  See State of the Province Address, Premier Nosimo Balindlela 10 February 
2006 (http://www.ecprov.gov.za/Uploads/pdfFiles/premier%20sopa%202006%20v7.doc 
accessed on 3 August 2006). 
100
 Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
101
 In Soobramoney para 29  the Constitutional Court stated: ‘A court will be slow to interfere 
with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities 
whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.’  In Minister of Health and others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and others 2002 (5) 721 (CC), 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 
37 the Constitutional Court again refrained from examining policies that influence the overall 
resource availability by stating: ‘It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters 
the courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political 
enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards called for by the first 
and second amici should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should be most effectively 
spent.’ 
102
 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 para 77 and 78.  In other words, while the 
courts are unlikely to be receptive to a direct challenge to the state’s micro-economic 
budgetary decision-making processes, the courts are not likely to defer to the government’s 
set budget priorities where such priorities run counter to the Constitution.  Roux (quoted in 
Wilson (2004) 440) makes this point very well: ‘The Constitution does not say that South 
Africa’s macro-economic strategy is the supreme law of the Republic, and everything that 
government does must necessarily fall into line with this strategy.’ 
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progressive realisation of soci-economic rights.103  This is clear from both the 
Khosa and others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and 
another v Minister of Social Development and others104 and also the eviction 
cases105 where the courts have shown that they will not accept 
unsubstantiated allegations regarding resource shortages. 
It follows then that the reasonableness review could lead to an enquiry into 
the fiscal policy which supports a particular socio-economic right such as 
housing.  Thus, while the court is not able to ‘judge’ the choice of a particular 
operating system, it could assess the reasonableness of such housing budget 
spending in achieving what is required by the Constitution.  This is what the 
Constitutional Court in fact did in both Grootboom and Khosa in varying 
degrees.106  
Without considering the actual budgetary allocation at national, provincial and 
local level, the courts have indirectly expected the proper management of 
financial resources.  The SAHRC has continually reported that the Eastern 
Cape Provincial Department has attributed its under-spending of the housing 
budget on a lack of capacity at local level.  However, if the management of 
these resources – both in terms of financial and human resources – is 
                                                 
103
 For example, in Grootboom, the court would not specify the amount to be spent on those 
‘in dire need’ but rather required proof that there was sufficient allocation and use of budget 
for the specified group. 
104
 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  In Khosa (discussed in chapter 4), the likely budgetary impact 
of the order to include permanent residents as beneficiaries of certain social grants amounted 
to an estimated R243 million to R672 million per year.  While the Court found that the 
necessary increase of the budget as a result of the order was ‘a small portion of the total cost’ 
of social grants (at the time valued at R26,2 billion per year) (para 62), the order did show the 
Court’s willingness to make orders affecting budgets. 
105
 See especially South African Rail Commuter Corporation v Unlawful Occupants of the 
Western Cape Commuter Area between Nolungile and Nonkqubela Stations, Khayelitsha 
Khayelitsha  (unreported case no 2452/03 CPD) and the unreported return of the structural 
interdict in City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph and Others (Rudolph II). 
106
 In Grootboom the Court indicated that the state had to show proof to the court that there 
was a sufficient and reasonable part of the national housing budget set aside for those in 
desperate need, although the precise allocation of budget was for national government to 
decide.  The state could not show this and therefore, it was in breach of its s26 obligation.  In 
Khosa, the Constitutional Court actually considered the state’s figures in deciding whether the 
exclusion of foreign permanent residents to the state’s scheme for social welfare assistance 
was reasonable.  The Court found that given the small cost of including such members of 
society, the scheme was not reasonable and thus it insisted that the state increase its budget 
to accommodate permanent residents.  The purpose of the court’s analysis was therefore not 
to engage in policy-making or actual budgeting, but to enquire whether any restrictions of the 
right (based on resource constraints or any other reason) were reasonably required in 
achieving the constitutional goal. 
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unreasonable and affects the implementation of the housing programme, it is 
submitted that such mismanagement would constitute a breach of s26. 
 
Local government must apply to provincial government for funding for housing 
projects and for funding in terms of the ECP.  Given provincial government’s 
responsibilities in both the Housing Act and in the ECP for funding 
programmes, the expenditure of the budget of the provincial housing 
department must also be considered.107  This section is therefore divided into 
two sections: a discussion of the issue of human resource allocation at local 
level followed by a discussion of both budgetary and human resource 
allocation at provincial level. 
 
6.3.3.1 Human resource allocation at local government level  
 
In almost all the SAHRC reports to date,108 the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Department has attributed its under-spending to a lack of capacity at 
municipal level.  This lack of capacity is certainly apparent in two of the three 
municipalities studied, namely Ngqushwa and Sakhisizwe.  
 
In Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, one official manages the Local Economic 
Development Process, the Integrated Development Process, Housing, Land 
and Sports and Recreation.  This official is assisted by four housing clerks 
who do not have any engineering, project administration or financial 
                                                 
107
 The focus of this application must necessarily be devoted to the role of the province in 
transferring and monitoring funds for housing projects to municipalities.  The majority of 
funding that comes from the national Department of Housing is in the form of conditional 
grants.  These comprise predominantly grants for housing subsidies.  Funds appropriated as 
conditional grants may not be used for any other purpose.  In order to support sectoral 
legislation and policy on spending, the Division of Revenue Act (DORA) regulates the 
spending of conditional grants, together with additional reporting responsibilities imposed by 
Treasury.  Transfers from a Provincial Department are, in turn, regulated by the Treasury 
Regulations.  See chapter 3, para 3.6. 
108
 For example, in the Fourth SAHRC Report the SAHRC reported: ‘The Eastern Cape 
attributed its under-spending to insufficient capacity at municipal level’ and later on in the 
report: ‘Eastern Cape and Limpopo cited lack of capacity at local level.’ (no page numbers 
cited).  In the Fifth SAHRC Report the SAHRC reported at 36-37: ‘The under-expenditure [by 
the Eastern Cape Department of Housing] is attributed to capacity constraints at municipal 
level.’  In the Sixth SAHRC Report (a report that is considerably less comprehensive than 
previous SAHRC reports), there is no mention made of the particular responses of provinces. 
However, the Report does make a general recommendation at 28: ‘The national and 
Provincial Department of Housing and local government officials should be capacitated … to 
be more effective in ensuring access to adequate housing.’ 
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experience.109  In Ngqushwa Local Municipality, the position of ‘estate officer’ 
was created in 2004 to manage Housing, Land and Town Planning.  All 
housing related matters prior to 2004 were handled through the municipal 
manager’s office.  As at July 2006, one estate officer and one building 
inspector manage housing for the entire municipality.110  In her two years of 
working at the municipality,111 the estate officer for Ngqushwa has never dealt 
with a new housing project – she has only ever tried to unblock existing 
projects.112 
 
Ngqushwa and Sakhisizwe Local Municipalities are by no means exceptions 
to the rule as is clear from the comment of a consultant hired by the Provincial 
Department: 
 
‘I have five municipalities which I am looking after.  Only two 
municipalities out of these five have housing managers, so-called 
housing managers who do not even have a secretary or an assistant. 
But they manage housing, they manage everything.  And each 
municipality does not have one project; they have more than one 
project within its municipality. … They cannot expect a housing official, 
or a housing municipal manager who does not have anything in terms 
of support underneath him, any support whatsoever, to run four 
projects.’113 
                                                 
109
 Sakhisizwe interview (2) 3. 
110
 ‘I am the only one doing housing.’  Ngqushwa interview 5. 
111
 The lack of municipal experience appears to be a general phenomenon.  Atkinson (2006) 
8 notes that a 2004 survey conducted by the Municipal Demarcation Board showed that many 
municipal managers have fewer than five years municipal experience.  This accounts for 48% 
of the managers in the North-West Province; 57% of managers in Limpopo; 48% of Free 
State managers; 34% of Eastern Cape managers, and 33% of Guateng managers. 
112
 Ngqushwa interview 9.  In this regard, the Ngqushwa official states at 3: ‘We haven’t had 
any new projects that have started while I am here.’  Quite simply, this official suggested (at 
23) that the Department should ‘just take the function [of housing] over.’  In Sakhisizwe, the 
official responsible for housing offered two solutions (Sakhisizwe interview (1) at 16): ‘Build 
capacity within the municipality because it [delivery of housing] is going to go faster’ and ‘Do 
away with consultants to make money.’  At 14, the official comments: ‘The thing is, as long as 
it [the housing function] is in Bhisho, then there is a problem.  If they can capacitate the 
municipalities … then this thing will run smoothly.  If we rely on Bhisho then we have a 
problem.’ 
113
 Ngqushwa Project Consultant 31.  The project consultant 22 comments on the lack of 
support or capacity in the following terms: ‘Great Kei – they don’t even have anybody to do 
housing; they grab anybody to do something which is housing or land.  But they do have 
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Given the issues at local government level, the focus now turns to the 
provincial government’s role in human resource and financial allocation for the 
purposes of meeting the obligations created by the housing right. 
 
6.3.3.2 Human and financial resource allocation at provincial 
government level 
 
In terms of s7(2)(e) of the Housing Act, a provincial government is obliged to:  
 
‘take all reasonable and effective steps to support and strengthen the 
capacity of the municipalities to effectively exercise their powers and 
perform their duties in respect of housing development.’  
 
The question posed in this section is, how has the provincial government 
sought to address capacity issues at municipal level?  This question is 
especially important given that the province has used ‘lack of capacity at 
municipal level’ since 2000 to explain to the SAHRC why it has failed to spend 
its budget and thus delay the progressive realisation of the housing right.  
 
As noted in chapter 3, the Provincial Department of Housing is under a duty to 
assist local government in its housing functions.  This duty would cover 
assistance to local government in carrying out its functions in emergency 
housing situations either in terms of the ECP or in terms of a separate 
programme.  
 
6.3.3.2.1 Management of financial resources 
 
Given provincial government’s responsibilities in both the Housing Act and in 
the ECP for funding programmes, it is necessary to consider the expenditure 
                                                                                                                                            
building inspectors.  As far as finances are concerned, their project is heading towards 
blockage because they don’t know how to reclaim VAT.  I don’t know how, but they just 
cannot know how to reclaim VAT.  So they will not be able to put in proper reconciliation 
statements.’ 
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of the budget of the provincial housing department and consider whether such 
expenditure is reasonable.  
 
Funding is technically provided by a Provincial Housing Development Board 
(PHDB), a public entity set up in terms of the Housing Act.114  In practice, 
however, the PHDB in the Eastern Cape has no employees or offices and all 
administrative functions are performed by the Provincial Department.115 
 
Statistics provided by the Provincial Department itself display a bleak picture 
of management of resources.  Between 2000/2001 and 2003/2004, the 
Provincial Housing Department underspent by a total of R928 million (29%) 
allocated to its housing programme, despite the Provincial Department’s 
complaint to the SAHRC that its budget ‘was not enough’.116  The actual 
amount that the Department failed to spend during this time (2000-2004) was  
approximately R1.24 billion, as the Provincial Department made advance 
payments of  R314 million  to municipalities in the 2003/2004 financial year, 
between January and March 2004 (the last quarter of the financial year) for 
house construction.  These advance payments went entirely unspent and 
were found by the Auditor-General to be made without due regard to 
efficiency.117  
 
The amount of R1.24 billion identified as unspent is corroborated by a project 
manager contracted by the Provincial Department during 2004: 
 
‘There was a tender at the time [around July 2004] in the paper where 
the department embarked on a turnaround strategy of R1.1 billion that 
                                                 
114
 The Housing Arrangements Act 155 of 1993 made provision for what was termed Housing 
Boards at the time.  Provincial Housing Boards were then established from that in terms of the 
Housing Act. 
115
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 46. 
116
 For the particular year in which the Eastern Cape Provincial Department alleged that its 
budget was not enough (2002/2003), the Provincial Housing Department nevertheless 
reported to the SAHRC that it had under-spent its budget vote of R1 221 072 000 by R376 
471 000.  See Fifth SAHRC Report 36. 
117
 Overy 39.  See also the Report of the Auditor-General which noted that these advance 
payments represented a breach of treasury regulations which requires the Department to 
make payments no earlier than is necessary with due regard to efficiency.  See Reports of the 
Auditor-General to the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature on the Financial Statements of 
Vote 8 – DHLGTA Annual Report 2003/2004, 61. 
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they had to spend.  … [i]t was money which was unspent in previous 
years in the allocation for that particular year.’118 
 
In addition, the Department underspent a cumulative total of R172 million 
(18%) which it allocated to its programme on ‘Developmental Local 
Government’ for the year 2003/2004.119  This programme aimed, inter alia, to 
monitor, promote and facilitate the administration of human resources at 
municipal level, monitor and audit transferred funds and municipal finance 
systems, render support to municipal developmental planning, surveying and 
valuations, monitor and evaluate municipal performance and standards, and 
monitor legislative compliance.  
 
At the end of the 2004/2005 financial year, the situation did not appear to 
have improved in any way.  This is evidenced by the fact that the Provincial 
Housing Department received its third audit disclaimer120 in a row.  The 
Auditor-General indicated that he could not be sure how much of the R570 
million spent on housing should be considered fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure because of the lack of monitoring on the part of the Department. 
In addition, the Department froze all new housing developments in September 
2005 until the 2007/2008 financial year. 
 
Where the Provincial Department has managed to spend part of its budget, it 
is obliged by the Housing Act to ensure that housing development is 
‘economically, fiscally, socially and financially affordable and sustainable,’121 
and is ‘administered in a transparent accountable and equitable manner, and 
                                                 
118
 Ngqushwa Project Consultant 1. 
119
 Overy 40.  
120
 An audit disclaimer results where the Auditor-General, having audited the accounts of the 
public entity, cannot confirm whether the auditee’s resources were procured economically and 
utilised efficiently and effectively (s 20(3) of the Public Audit Act 25 of 2004).  In addition, an 
audit disclaimer will usually follow where the Auditor-General answers any of the three 
subsections of s20(2) of Public Audit Act in the negative.  Section 20(2) requires the Auditor-
General’s report to reflect an opinion or conclusion on: (a) whether the annual financial 
statements of the auditee fairly present, in all material respects, the financial position at a 
specific date and results of its operations and cash flow for the period which ended on that 
date in accordance with the applicable financial framework and legislation; (b) the auditee’s 
compliance with any applicable legislation relating to financial matters, financial management 
and other related matters; and (c) the reported information relating to the performance of the 
auditee against predetermined objectives.  
121
 Section 1(c)(ii) of the Housing Act.  
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upholds the practice of good government.’122  These sections basically require 
that the Department spends its money reasonably and therefore assists an 
enquiry based on the Grootboom reasonableness standard.  The question is 
thus: why has the Department failed to spend its ‘available resources’ (using 
the terminology of s26(2) of the Constitution) reasonably and in so doing, 
risked progressive realisation of the housing right?  
 
A major problem, identified by the Auditor-General, appears to be the lack of 
adequate monitoring and reporting by the Provincial Department in relation to 
financial resources.  In addition, despite detailed legislation, regulations and 
guidelines; a forensic investigation of the Provincial Department’s in-year 
monitoring reports (IYMs)123 from April 2002 to March 2004 indicated that the 
Provincial Department: 
 
• failed to set out expenditure per programme in its IYM reports;124 and 
• allocated expenditure to suspense accounts instead of  specific programmes 
within the Department unnecessarily and without adequately managing and 
clearing the suspense accounts timeously.125 
 
By failing to set out expenditure per programme and allocating expenditure to 
suspense accounts, the IYM report is not an accurate reflection of the current 
financial status of the Department.  This has a knock-on effect:  With 
unreliable information contained in the IYM, it is highly unlikely that the budget 
can be properly managed throughout the year.  Without proper in-year 
management of the budget, under- or over-expenditure within the Provincial 
Housing Department is inevitable.  At the end of the line, underspending can 
                                                 
122
 Section 1(c)(iv) of the Housing Act. 
123
 See chapter 3 above for a description of this type of report. 
124
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 41. 
125
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 17.  This is obviously a reference to regulation 17 of the 
Treasury Regulations (as amended) which gives effect to s40(1)(a) of the PFMA.  Regulation 
17 provides that revenue and expenditure transactions can be allocated to a clearing or 
suspense account in exceptional cases.  This can occur where the classification of such 
revenue has not been resolved.  However, the regulations require that, in respect of these 
suspense accounts, the accounting officer must ensure that the amounts included in clearing 
or suspense accounts are cleared and correctly allocated to the relevant cost centres on a 
monthly basis and that monthly reconciliations are performed to confirm the balance of each 
account. 
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be nothing less than a failure to make use of, or manage available resources 
to progressively realise s26. 
 
Since the Department primarily spends its money on the funding of housing 
projects, one could reasonably expect that the Provincial Department monitor 
and account for the transfer of housing subsidies to local government to 
ensure the efficient and effective use of its resources.126  This, as mentioned 
above, is regulated by the DORA framework which sets out strict reporting 
requirements for all transfer payments.127  In terms of DORA, the Provincial 
Department assumes certain responsibilities for monitoring resources set aside 
for housing subsidies.  The local authorities also assume certain responsibilities 
for monitoring and accounting for housing subsidy resources.  However, the 
same forensic investigation (mentioned above) indicates that the Provincial 
Department had, at times, incorrectly classified housing resources as 
‘specialist goods and services’ instead of ‘transfer payments’ in their IYM 
report.128  By classifying the transfers as specialist goods and services, the 
Department did not have to comply with same strict regulatory requirements 
as required for transfer payments.  Thus payments to municipalities were not 
monitored carefully enough, resulting in ineffective use of resources.  
 
This view is confirmed by the Auditor-General129 who noted that the problems 
at municipal level could be attributed to some extent to the actions (or 
inactions130) of the Department.  In particular, the Auditor-General noted that 
the monitoring and control of transfer payments to municipalities were 
‘ineffective.’131  This comment was followed up in the recent Commission of 
                                                 
126
 This could be seen as part of the reasonableness test as it looks at the actual success of 
implementation. 
127
 See also s30(1)(i) of the PFMA read with regulation 8.4.1 of the Treasury Regulations (as 
amended) and Treasury Instructions K5.1 and 5.4. 
128
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 112. 
129
 Report of the Auditor-General to the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature on the Financial 
Statements of Vote 7 – DHLGTA Annual Report 2003/2004 60-61. 
130
 For example, the R172 million allocated to promoting and monitoring municipal 
performance which went unspent.  See above. 
131
 This assertion by the Auditor-General casts doubt on the comment by a project manager: 
‘One thing I know about the [Provincial] Department of Housing is that they are very good in 
monitoring whatever transactions or funds between themselves and the municipalities’ 
Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 9. 
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Inquiry into the Finances of the Eastern Cape.132  Here, evidence was led that 
the Department failed to adequately monitor transfers effectively in at least 
three projects and a further suspected 27 more housing projects in 
2003/2004.133  A senior manager commented that the Department’s biggest 
challenge was its over-reliance on municipalities without effectively monitoring 
them.134  He notes: ‘We were providing funds to a municipality without seeing 
if they’ve got the ability.’135 
 
In addition, the Auditor-General noted that the Provincial Department had not 
sought business plans from municipalities before funds were transferred for 
housing projects.  In relation to the use of approximately R642 million 
budgeted for top structures, the Auditor-General found that site visits to 
projects by departmental officials were ‘infrequent’ and site inspection reports 
were inconsistent, lacked specific comment on the quality of houses and were 
not submitted to the Provincial Department on time.136 
 
While many of the problems with blocked housing projects could be attributed 
to lack of proper monitoring of conditional grants (we have seen that both 
Sakhisizwe and Ngqushwa Local Municipality have had to apply for top-up 
funding for blocked projects in their jurisdiction137), it would not be fair to 
blame the Provincial Department in all projects for the inefficient and 
ineffective use of resources.  This is borne out by the problems raised by local 
officials such as labour disputes and litigation with contractors138 which 
inevitably delay and increase costs.  However, by not managing resources 
effectively, the Provincial Department cannot effectively assist and support  
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 Established in terms of Provincial Gazette, Proclamation No 1440, GN 4, 7 October 2005. 
133
 Pillay Commission, Papadakis 55 and 87.  This evidence related specifically to three 
forensic investigations into housing projects situated in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Council, namely, Jacksonville R22 million, Bloemendal Block 23 South R31 million and 
Motherwell Tjoks R28 million.  From a review of media reports over the last few years, 
Atkinson (2006) 3 records that angry residents took to the streets in May 2004 and again in 
March 2005 (just before the local government elections) to protest against corrupt councillors 
and housing officials, alleged to have mismanaged various projects in the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality.  
134
 Province Interview 24. 
135
 Province Interview 26. 
136
 Report of the Auditor-General to the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature on the Financial 
Statements of Vote 7 – DHLGTA Annual Report 2003/2004 60-61. 
137
 See Ngqushwa Project Consultant 26-27 and Ngqushwa interview 21. 
138
 Ngqushwa Project Consultant 7 and Sakhisizwe interview (1) 7. 
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local government and therefore cannot realise the housing right, leaving the 
most needy without proper shelter. 
 
6.3.3.2.2 Management of human resources 
 
The way in which the Department has sought to deal with the lack of capacity 
at municipal level is ambiguous and is best dealt with in two parts, namely (1) 
training of municipal officials; and (2) centralising the housing function. 
 
In accordance with its mandate in both the Constitution and the Housing Act 
to assist and support local government, the Department has provided training 
courses on housing for municipal officials.139  However, it appears that some 
of this training was not properly organised and participants were informed at 
the last minute.140  
 
The Department’s 2003/2004 annual report records that it trained 77 
municipal officials in total under its developmental local government sub-
programme.141  In addition, the annual report noted that 17 mentors were 
appointed in 14 municipalities under its development finance sub-programme. 
The purpose of this mentorship programme was to produce ‘competent’ 
municipal managers.  Only one mentee was reported as having completed the 
mentoring task.  In the same sub-programme, the Department recorded that it 
intended training municipal staff in nine different municipalities, but only 
managed to do so in two.142  Despite the limited numbers of officials trained, 
the Department spent all but five percent of their training budget.143 
 
Since 2004, the Department has attempted to centralise the housing function 
by appointing consultants as regional project managers to oversee housing 
                                                 
139
 The Department’s Annual Report 2003/2004 at 20 records that it managed to train 90 
housing practitioners. 
140
 Ngqushwa interview 18. 
141
 Department’s Annual Report 2003/2004 30.  
142
 Department’s Annual Report 2003/2004 36-37. 
143
 Department’s Annual Report 2003/2004 90. 
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projects in a particular municipal area.144  Approximately nine project 
managers were appointed in 2004 for a two year period.145  Presently, 21 
project managers are contracted to the Department to oversee eight so-called 
‘management areas’.146  These project managers’ duties are to assist in the 
management of housing projects falling within their particular management 
area and service the municipalities falling within that area.  According to a 
provincial official, the ideal ratio of project manager to housing project is 
1:5.147  Given that there are currently approximately 460 housing projects 
within the province, each project manager is required to manage between 22 
and 25 housing projects on average.148  
 
It can be argued that the Provincial Department is assisting municipalities in 
their housing function by the appointment of these project managers and 
indeed, most local government officials have found such assistance to be 
invaluable.149  Nevertheless, by doing so, the province is not actually 
addressing the capacity issues of the municipality in the long term.  Instead of 
seeking to create viable housing units within municipalities, the Provincial 
Department appears to be centralising the housing function.  While it is clear 
from the interviews that the project managers have assisted local government 
officials enormously in managing housing projects, the risk is that these 
managers effectively take over the local government function allowing officials 
at the local level to shrug off all responsibility for housing.  In one instance, a 
local government official suggested that the Department should ‘just take the 
function over.’150  The practical result of relying on these provincial project 
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 An official from Sakhisizwe (1) comments at 9: ‘They [the project managers] are supporting 
us local municipalities in terms of engineering and all those things.’  An official from 
Ngqushwa comments at 11: ‘He [the project manager] has been assisting me a lot.’ 
145
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 2. 
146
 Pillay Commission, Gerber 174. 
147
 Pillay Commission, Perks 130. 
148
 Pillay Commission, Perks 130.  However it is noted that the Sakhisizwe project consultant 
commented that he was responsible for 52 housing projects within his management area (at 
2).  The Ngqushwa project consultant stated that he was responsible for the housing projects 
in 5 municipalities without specifying the actual number of projects (at 30). 
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 See, for example, Ngqushwa interview 11: ‘We have been assisted by the department with 
a project manager from the dept to do all the applications for funding, to go and sign the bill of 
quantities.’   
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 Ngqushwa interview 23. 
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managers is evidenced in the scenario reported by a project manager as 
follows: 
  
‘[The estate officer] was busy doing something else and then I had a 
TET151 which was going on in the following week or so.  She couldn’t 
be able to do what was required.  So I did everything and then I 
emailed it to her so she can just put it on the municipality’s letterhead. 
You know.  And then it is fine.  In that instance, I was not advising her; I 
was doing what was supposed to be done by the municipality.’152  
 
This method of centralising the obligations of local government regarding 
housing goes against the objectives of strong, developmental local 
government (as articulated in the White Paper on Local Government and 
subsequent legislation).  These objectives make it clear that ‘the shackles of 
centralising, dourness and control-mindedness must be broken.’153  
 
Why then take this centralising route?  A provincial official, who admitted that 
the Department has not capacitated local government, justified this approach 
by blaming it on a scarcity of technical capacity throughout South Africa.154 
From other interviews undertaken, it appears that the Provincial Department 
was (and is) under pressure from the provincial portfolio committee on 
housing to spend the budget and deliver housing.155  In addition, centralising 
is simply seen as the easier and cheaper option for the housing department:  
 
‘At the end of the day because it is going to cost quite a lot to be able 
to address the capacity issues at municipalities than the department 
having capacitating themselves (sic) within the provincial level 
overseeing these housing projects, … They [the Provincial Department] 
                                                 
151
 Technical Evaluation Team.  This team, located at provincial level, assesses the 
applications for housing projects by municipalities.  See Ngqushwa Project Consultant 7. 
152
 Ngqushwa Project Consultant 19.  My italics. 
153
 Heymans 148. 
154
 Province interview 7. 
155
 Province interview 26: ‘That is why the department has taken the decision [to appoint 
project managers]. … We cannot continue any longer to be answering questions [from the 
portfolio committee] about why people are not doing their jobs so let’s [get] project managers 
attached to these municipalities.’ 
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will be able to put proper planning because we got engineers, we got 
town planners, we got electrical engineers, we got plumbers, we got a 
whole lot of range of people.  Within that level we can create a 
technical section where the problem is being dealt with at a technical 
level more appropriately than at the level of the municipalities where 
sometimes they have to go and source a third party in assuming 
responsibility.’156  
 
While the province blames lack of capacity at municipal level, it does not 
acknowledge to the SAHRC how its own lack of capacity has affected under- 
spending and hence effective implementation of the s26 right. 
 
In 2003/2004, the Department’s annual report noted that there were 1086 
posts within the Provincial Department, of which 587 were vacant (46%).  The 
report also noted that the Provincial Department employed 460 staff (42% of 
its total staff complement) who were additional to the establishment figure (so-
called ‘supernumeraries’).157  In terms of critical posts,158 the Annual Report 
noted that only 34 of 103 critical posts were filled (33%).  As a result of the 
lack of suitably-qualified staff (and no staff at all), the Department’s 
Management Report commented that the shortage of personnel, especially at 
management level, ‘has impacted service delivery negatively since there are 
no managers to manage, drive or monitor critical projects.’159 
 
It is fair to assume that with an overall vacancy rate of 46% and a critical staff 
complement of 33% the Provincial Department is seriously constrained and 
                                                 
156
 Province interview 21-22. 
157
 DHLGTA Annual Report, 2003/2004 201.  The term ‘supernumeraries’ refers to those not 
placed in defined posts within departments.  These 460 persons were employed in 2003/2004 
despite the Auditor-General warning as early as 2000/2001 that the payment of wages of staff 
additional to the establishment was fruitless expenditure because ‘the Department did not 
receive any economic benefit.’  See the Report of the Auditor-General to the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Legislature on the Financial Statements of Vote 7 – the Department for the year 
ended March 2001, DHLGTA Report, 2000/2001, s2.1.1.1(b)(i)(b) 106.  In an effort to address 
the problem of additional staff, a Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council Resolution 
7 of 2002 came into effect on 6 March 2002. Section 5 required government departments to 
redeploy, retrain or find alternative employment for excess employees.  In terms of s3 of the 
resolution, the resolution was to be implemented within a maximum of 15 months. 
158
 These posts are described by the department as professionals and technicians. 
159
 DHLGTA Annual Report 2003/2004 56 and 58. 
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therefore, must be very careful in conceiving and implementing a programme 
which is capable of meeting the obligations set out in s26 of the Constitution. 
The programme must at least have reasonable measures to deal with 
capacity constraints or at least take them into account when drafting its plans. 
Linked with the under expenditure of the Department cited above, it is clear 
that the Department has failed to deal with human resource issues 
reasonably, using the Grootboom standard.  This has a knock-on effect.  If the 
Department is incapable of handling its own human resource issues, it is 
reasonable to conclude that it cannot assist in capacitating or managing 
another institution’s human resource issues (viz. local government), and for 
that matter, it cannot effectively manage implementing s26.  Three human 
resource issues illustrate this point: 
 
• The failure of the Provincial Department to actually implement its stated 
intentions  
The failure of the Provincial Department to actually implement its stated 
intention can be gleaned by a comparison of two financial years.160  In the 
Provincial Department’s Annual Report 2002/2003, the Department 
recorded its intention161 to make all 1656 of its staff members sign 
performance agreements, attend quarterly performance reviews and have 
valid workplace plans.  However, during 2002/2003 no staff members 
attended performance reviews, no workplace plans were validated and 
only 9 performance agreements were actually signed.  The following year, 
the Department reported in its Annual Report 2003/2004162 that only six 
performance agreements had been signed, 205 performance reviews 
completed and no staff had had their work plans validated. 
 
• 20 million spent on supernumeraries in 2001 
Whilst the Department generally under-spent its budget in respect of 
housing subsidies, the budget for personnel within the Department was 
over spent by R20 million in 2001, despite huge vacancy rates.  The cause 
                                                 
160
 This comparison was initially made by Overy of the PSAM in a 2005 report Housing in the 
Eastern Cape 2001-2004:  A Crisis of Accountability and Service Delivery.  
161
 DHLGTA Annual Report 2002-2003 64. 
162
 DHLGTA Annual Report 2003-2004 51. 
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of such over expenditure was attributed to the payment of 
supernumeraries employed by the Department.163  Five years later, the 
Department is still over-spending and is still blaming such over-spending 
on supernumeraries. 
 
• Failure to implement disciplinary hearings 
In October/November 2005, the Auditor-General reported that 
approximately 1100 people applied for and had obtained housing 
subsidies despite not fulfilling the criteria for a housing subsidy; most 
notably, the criterion that the beneficiary cannot earn more than R3 500 
per annum.164  Of these 1100 people, 583 are employees of the Province 
and approximately 283 are employees working in the Department itself.  
Eleven months later, none of the employees implicated has been subject 
to any disciplinary action and they continue to work at the Department.165 
 
Given the debilitating levels of staff shortages and adequately trained staff at 
provincial level, it is not surprising that the Department has made extensive 
use of consultants.166  While the actual amount expended by the Department 
for consultants is not clear, this amount is considerable.  In the Department’s 
2003/2004 Annual Report, it was reported that the Department spent R51 
million on consultants in the housing sphere.167  The amount cited is at odds 
with the Eastern Cape Provincial Government Budget Statement which 
reported that R90 million was spent on consultants in the housing sphere over 
                                                 
163
 The existence of these supernumeraries is usually blamed on the revision of apartheid 
organisational structures which result in employees being ‘additional’ to the new amalgamated 
institution under a new organogram.  One can certainly understand how this problem could 
arise, especially given that the Department represents an amalgamation of housing 
employees from the previous Ciskei, Transkei, Cape Provincial Administration and the 
Eastern Cape Housing Board.  However, this amalgamation took place from 1994 to 1997, 
years previously.  In addition, the Chief Financial Officer for the Department (Putu) could not 
explain adequately how these supernumeraries suddenly arrived on the scene in 2001 when it 
did not appear that they were employed by the Department in 1999.  See the Pillay 
Commission’s evidence leader’s question (Pammenter) at 213 and Putu’s response at 214. 
164
 Gerber indicates (at 183 of the Pillay Commission) that some employees who were 
awarded housing subsidies were earning +- R42 000 per month.  
165
 Pillay Commission, Putu 235.  
166
 See also the discussion above regarding the use of 9 consultants employed as project 
managers. 
167
 DHLGTA Annual Report 2003/2004, Notes to the Annual Financial Statements, 9, 82. 
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the same period.168  While the use of consultants can be a useful endeavour 
to facilitate better service delivery, a media report169 describes the problem 
that emerges from relying on consultants.  It does so by comparing the 
spending on consultants to the spending on the training of the province’s 
employees: 
 
‘Sometimes an organisation needs to call on some outside expertise 
and this comes at a price.  But what happens when calling on outside 
expertise gets a little out of hand, as it has in the Eastern Cape?  
There, the provincial government blew no less than R3.43-billion on 
such services between 2002 and 2004.  A study by the Public Service 
Accountability Monitor showed that this was 15 times more than the 
R219-million it spent on training its own employees in the same period. 
Perhaps Premier Nosimo Balindlela should outsource the whole 
government to the highest bidder.’170 
 
This general problem is replicated within the Department itself.  In the same 
period that the Department spent R51 million or R90 million (depending on the 
source) on consultants, the Department spend a paltry R698 000 on the 
training of its own employees.171 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a summative and evaluative account of 
the current housing provision in three case studies as supported by provincial 
government.  
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 Eastern Cape Provincial Government Budget Statement PR NR: 26/2005 406. 
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‘And so the government was quietly privatised’ Sunday Times, 30 October 2005 
(http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1741221 accessed 11 October 
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 This report surfaced in 2005 despite the Municipal Demarcation Board’s 2003 stated 
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in relation to the integrated municipal planning process.  See Municipal Demarcation Board 
Report 16-17. 
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 Eastern Cape Provincial Government Budget Statement, PR NR: 26/2005, 428. 
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The conclusion in chapter 5 was that the parlous state of affairs in local 
government (in terms of inappropriate jurisdictions and structures) up to the 
early 1990s has contributed to the particular capacity and socio-economic 
problems faced by individual municipalities. 
 
What effect has this had on housing provision in the case studies under 
discussion?  First, it is evident that the particular historical (hence social and 
economic) context of each municipality has affected housing provision in 
terms of capacity.  While Makana Local Municipality has many housing 
projects that are stalled, it is in a far better position than either Sakhisizwe or 
Ngqushwa Local Municipality to carry out housing provision.  However, none 
of the municipalities has the ECP pro-active planning in place.  Despite 
Makana Local Municipality’s advantage in terms of capacity, neither Makana 
Local Municipality nor any of the other municipalities under discussion have 
pro-actively planned in terms of the ECP. The relative inexperience of the 
officials running housing in Sakhisizwe and Ngqushwa Local Municipality, the 
absence of support staff, and the appalling social and economic indicators, 
make the task of providing housing by the local government that much more 
challenging.  Second, it is not clear from a survey of planning documents from 
each case study area whether comprehensive provision has been made for 
those living in desperate need – as required by the Grootboom judgment – 
even in the form of acknowledging that the ECP exists or the need for 
temporary measures.   
 
These two issues have a direct impact on the point made by the Court in 
Grootboom, namely, that reasonableness should be assessed not only with 
regard to legislation and policy, but also with regard to the implementation of 
the policy.172 This requirement sets out that any programme adopted by the 
state to realise socio-economic rights must go beyond ‘hollow statements of 
good intentions.’173  Both the Housing Act and the ECP recognise that the 
                                                 
172
 Grootboom para 42. 
173
 Creamer 226. 
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central planning mechanism in local municipalities is the IDP.174  However, in 
2002 Atkinson warned that IDPs must not become ‘dust covered tomes that 
grace municipalities’ bookshelves’.175  In 2006, the SAHRC reported that, in 
relation to housing, ‘[m]ost IDPs have been reduced to a councillor’s wish list 
instead of being a strategic document that ensures the realisation of a 
developmental local government.’176  Examples of this ‘wish list’ mentality are 
littered throughout the IDPs of Ngqushwa and Sakhisizwe Local 
Municipalities.  
 
The IDP of Ngqushwa can be used as a specific example.  The IDP sets out 
its intention to ‘lobby with the Department of Housing and Local Government 
to embark on the People Housing Process, CIMP,177 Rapid Release 
Programme etc’178 and sets out an ambitious project for the construction of 
3000 housing units in five villages179 to the amount of R49 million.180  These 
two intentions are set out in the IDP despite the facts that: 
 
• The municipality has been incapable of completing the only two projects 
(the Peddie 500 and Peddie 710 project) that it has applied for since 1997. 
Neither project is mentioned in their IDP despite a total of 766 houses that 
still need to be built in respect of these projects.  The severe delays in the 
completion of these projects181 have arisen through political issues and a 
‘lack of value for money’ from contractors.182  In respect of the latter 
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 Van Wyk confirms this view when she states at 55: ‘From a local government perspective 
– where the responsibility normally rests – the heart of the solution is the Integrated 
Development Plan.  Both housing and disaster management are inextricably part of integrated 
development planning.’  My italics.  But see further in this chapter that planning in the IDP is 
not enough – proper co-operation with the provincial government and resource allocation is 
needed. 
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 Atkinson (2002) 4. 
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 Sixth SAHRC Report 29. 
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 Gcinisa, Mpekweni, Masele, Hamburg and Glenmore. 
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 Ngqushwa IDP 2006-2007 118 (project number 80). 
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 As at July 2006, no houses have yet been completed in the Peddie 710 project.  In the 
Peddie 500 project, 106 houses are outstanding. 
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 Ngqushwa interview 4 and 6. 
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reason, a forensic audit was undertaken in 2003 in respect of the Peddie 
710 project.183  Apparently, the matter is currently before the courts.184 
• The human resource capacity of Ngqushwa Local Municipality is totally 
inadequate for the task; there is currently one estate officer who is 
responsible for housing, land and town planning.  
• There is no reference to timeframes, implementation plans or responsible 
staff members for the R42 million project listed in Ngqushwa’s IDP, except 
that it is set out under the heading ‘2006/7.’  
• There is no integration between the IDP and the Province’s plans in 
respect of housing.185  The housing project envisaged for 2006/2007 is set 
out in the IDP despite the stated intention of the Provincial Department in 
2005 that no funds will be made available for new projects until 
2007/2008.186 
 
The ‘wish list’ scenario is repeated in the IDP of Sakhisizwe Municipality 
which, as stated previously, identifies housing as third on the list of 
development priorities187 and states that ‘a large housing backlog … requires 
urgent attention.’188  However, the attention which is to be given to the large 
housing backlog is unclear from the IDP and from interviews conducted with 
two local government officials.  Of seven housing projects listed in the IDP, 
only three projects have an identified source of funding.  Two of the envisaged 
projects189 identified to be completed in the financial year ‘2005-2006’ in the 
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 In respect of the Peddie 500 housing project, the project manager advised that additional 
funding was approved on 20 February 2006 in order to complete the project (correspondence 
with project manager 4 October 2006).  Despite this approval, the municipality has not yet 
appointed a service provider or a contractor as at 29 September 2006 (date of interview with 
project manager) – some 7 months after funding was approved.  The project manager 
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envisaged that the MEC assesses a particular IDP to check, inter alia, whether the IDP is 
aligned with the strategies of other municipalities, the provincial government or national 
government.  Should the IDP conflict with any of these strategies, the Act provides that the 
MEC can request that the municipality change its IDP in accordance with his/her proposals. 
186
 In terms of Provincial Circular 1 of 2005. 
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 Sakhisizwe Housing Extension 13,14 and 15 and Elliot – Phola Park.  
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IDP are, in fact, projects which have been blocked since 2003.190  One of 
these projects envisaged the building of 3415 houses.  Despite misgivings by 
the project consultant for the area regarding the size of the project in relation 
to the capacity of the local government, the housing application was approved 
by the Department which was then under pressure to spend money to avoid 
yet another year of under-spending.191  The reasons given for the delay and 
problems with the project are many and varied192 and fall outside the scope of 
this research.  However, the references to these projects in the IDP do not 
reflect the current status of the projects.  A physical site audit of these projects 
was completed in 2005 and whilst the audit document is unclear in terms of 
the categories it uses,193 it sets out that, at best, approximately 650 houses 
contemplated in both projects have been completed.  As of July 2006, no 
further work had been completed on these projects.  A local municipal official 
advised that the contractor responsible for the projects had threatened ‘to take 
us to court … because they say that we owe them.  And we say that they owe 
us.’194  In the light of these facts, the IDP entries relating to these projects are 
nothing more than hollow statements of good intentions.  As with Ngqushwa 
Local Municipality, there is no reference to the moratorium placed on all 
municipalities by the Department in 2005.  This means that the housing 
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 These reasons include a dispute regarding the rates of payment of the contractor to local 
labourers and lack of local infrastructure (see Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 18).  The 
Sakhisizwe Project Consultant interviewed also mentioned the possibility of graft in the 
particular contract but could not produce any evidence to support this claim.  However, he 
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means, given the grammar.  It is assumed that these 62 units are completed. 
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 Sakhisizwe interview (1) 8. 
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projects scheduled for 2006/2007 will, at best, be delayed and at worst, be 
white elephants. 195 
 
In comparison, the IDP of Makana Local Municipality sets out its housing 
projects in more detail than the Ngqushwa IDP and Sakhisizwe IDP.  Despite 
this detail, the IDP also remains a wish list for a different reason, namely, 
because of the moratorium declared by the Provincial Department on all 
housing projects until 2007/2008.  Despite Makana applying to the province 
for several housing projects in line with their housing obligations, all such 
projects will lie dormant until 2007/2008.  Of nineteen housing projects 
recorded in an IDP Implementation Report submitted to Makana Municipal 
Portfolio Committee on Land, Housing and Infrastructural Development on 18 
July 2006, seven housing projects had the status: ‘Housing Application is on 
hold until 2007/2008.’196 
 
The frustration of the Makana housing manager in relation to these projects 
‘on hold’ is clear:  
 
‘The province comes and slaps us with this circular and then when we 
want to understand the relevance of this circular to us as Makana 
Municipality, the province is saying the municipalities across the board 
are not delivering.’197 
 
This may, in fact, be the case in the Sakhisizwe and Ngqushwa Local 
Municipalities where not one house has been built since 2003, but it is 
certainly not true of Makana where several projects have been successfully 
completed to date.  In this regard, the Makana housing manager commented: 
‘They are truly holding the purse for us here, you see, we can’t do anything. 
So, it [the moratorium] plays a big role.’198 
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 Officials would have known about the Provincial Circular before drafting either the 
reviewed IDP documents for 2006/2007 (see Ngqushwa) or the 5-year IDP document (see 
Sakhisizwe). 
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 Makana IDP Implementation Report, 18 July 2006 (no page numbers). 
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 Makana interview 6. 
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The circular issued by the Provincial Department declaring this moratorium in 
2005 gives no reason for taking such a drastic measure.  When asked for the 
rationale behind the circular, a provincial project consultant reflected:  ‘What 
would be the point of having 472 projects within the Province not move – then 
approving new ones?’199  Clearly, the Provincial Department intended to 
unblock existing projects before considering new applications200 despite the 
fact that some municipalities who are, in fact, capable of completing projects 
will suffer delay in the process.201  
 
It is clear that housing provision in each case study area is not only hampered 
by a lack of proactive planning by local government, but also by a lack of co-
operation and assistance between the local and provincial sphere of 
government.  This situation is exacerbated by the absence of capacity in 
number and skills at both levels of government.  In addition, it is clear that 
housing provision within each case study is largely dependant on the 
adequacy (or not) of resource allocation – financial and human – from the 
provincial sphere.  These three factors in turn impact on the failure of local 
government to implement the housing policy and make a real difference to the 
lives of the poorest of the poor. 
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 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 25. 
200
 Sakhisizwe Project Consultant 26; Ngqushwa Project Consultant 12 and Province 
interview 11. 
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 This was conceded by the Sakhisizwe project manager who stated at 25 that ‘[t]hose that 
have effective systems in place to complete their projects, they are being affected now.’ 
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Chapter 7: 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
In the third Bram Fischer lecture, Chaskalson remarked that dignity informs 
the content of all the concrete rights of our Constitution.1  Nowhere has this 
been more apparent than in the application of socio-economic rights,2 and the 
housing right in particular.3  For how can there be dignity in a life lived in a 
shack made of cardboard or zinc, in a backyard, under stairs, precariously 
close to railway lines, and under highway bridges? As was stated by the 
Constitutional Court in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Scholtz:4 ‘Relative 
to homelessness, to have a home to call one’s own, even under the most 
basic circumstances, can be a most empowering and dignifying human 
experience.’5  
 
Thus, in the last chapter of this dissertation, the value of dignity must, of 
necessity, inform the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters regarding 
the historical and international context of housing; the interpretation of the 
housing right by the courts; and, finally, the reality of implementation at a local 
level.  This is appropriate given the comments of Sachs J in the Port Elizabeth 
Municipality case that, ‘[a]s with all determination about the reach of 
constitutionally protected rights, the starting and ending point of the analysis 
must be to affirm the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.’6 
 
This dissertation has shown that there is still much to be done by the state in 
order to meet its s26 obligations and, by so doing, affirm the dignity of those 
most vulnerable in our society. Importantly the court decisions and case 
                                                 
1
 A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a foundational value of our Constitutional order’ (2000) 16 
SAJHR 173 at 204.  See, in particular, the remarks of Chaskalson P (at para 144) and 
O’Regan J (at para 328) regarding dignity in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 
(6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
2
 See Liebenberg (2005) generally. 
3
 Grootboom paras 38 and 41.  See also Jaftha para 21 where O’Regan J confirmed that any 
claim based on socio-economic rights must necessarily engage the right to dignity. 
4
 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC). 
5
 Jaftha para 39. My italics. 
6
 Port Elizabeth Municipality  para 15. 
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studies indicate that these obligations require effective implementation of a 
reasonable housing plan which takes into account short-, medium- and long-
term issues. Short-term planning (or ‘emergency’ planning) is of particular 
importance as it deals with those who live in desperate and intolerable 
conditions.7   
 
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that, since 1994, law and policy makers have 
genuinely attempted to address the issues of racial segregation, inequality 
and systematic human rights violations. In the sphere of housing, these 
attempts have resulted in a number of housing and land initiatives designed to 
secure an adequate standard of living for all. Over 2.4 million houses have 
been built under the National Housing Subsidy Scheme and many policies 
have been developed at provincial and municipal level.8 However, in 
considering the actual housing provision in case study areas against the 
courts’ jurisprudence, it is clear that, despite Joe Slovo’s promise in 1994 to 
give millions of South Africans ‘the dignity that comes from having a solid roof 
over your head,’9 millions of people still live in desperate and intolerable 
conditions. 
 
This research demonstrates that it is not simply due to the lack of ‘available 
resources’ which keeps many people in these conditions, but rather, the lack 
of coherent and reasonable state policy and practice – especially for use at a 
local level. When used in the context of this research ‘reasonableness’ means 
responding in the affirmative to the three criteria developed by the courts and 
emphasised in chapter 4 in the form of questions, namely: 
 
4. Has the local government institution pro-actively planned for emergency 
situations in their IDP or any other programme which allows for immediate 
relief for those in emergency situations?    
                                                 
7
 Significantly, the amici in the appeal to the Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
road and another v City of Johannesburg and others note in their heads of argument (albeit in 
another context) at para 25 that: ‘The protection of section 26(1) is not aimed at those who 
live in comfortable homes in leafy suburbs: it is designed for those who are vulnerable to 
homelessness.’ The outcome of this appeal is awaited. 
8
 Special Rapporteur Report 2. 
9
 Quoted by Cohen 134 and mentioned in chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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5. Does the programme place adequate emphasis on co-operative 
governance and the need for open, accountable and responsive 
governance by local government? 
6. Is the programme capable of securing the necessary financial and human 
resources and assistance from national and provincial government to deal 
with crisis situations on an urgent basis? 
 
The largely negative responses to these criteria in the case studies, as set out 
in chapter 6, remind us that addressing the challenge of housing not only 
requires recognition of the housing right on paper and in the courts, but it also 
requires effective governance and enhanced capacity within the state.10 This 
requires that the state implement and deliver against plans which will respond 
to the housing right in a truly progressive manner.  
 
This research has demonstrated that effective governance and enhanced 
capacity is one of the greatest challenges in the Eastern Cape. This is due, in 
part, to the failure to recognise historical capacity issues at local government 
level11 and partly the failure of the Provincial Government to assist and 
support local government.  During the course of this research it was found: 
 
1. The municipalities under discussion have not pro-actively planned / made 
provision for those in dire need.  
2. There is a lack of co-operative governance between local and provincial 
government. 
3. The management of human resources by both local and provincial 
government is inadequate. In particular, the management of financial 
resources by provincial government is inadequate, given factors such as 
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 In a similar vein, Albertyn (at viii) comments that policy needs to respond to the lived 
realities of the poor in order to secure their lives and livelihoods, rather than rendering 
themselves even more precarious. 
11
 Fast (then a researcher at the Surplus Peoples Project) foresaw this problem as far back as 
1998 when she commented (at 308): ‘Most district and primary councils in the rural areas in 
South Africa are in dire straits. … Very few have the capacity to deliver services, and a 
significant number are unable to draw up business plans and manage their financial 
resources.  Very little revenue is generated locally, and many councils are either not 
functioning or depend heavily on outside transfers to continue operations.’ 
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under-spending, mismanagement and transferring of housing funds to 
municipalities without adequate controls. 
 
Significantly, these findings have been corroborated (in general terms) by the 
recently-released Summary Report on Rapid Assessment of Service Delivery 
and Socio-Economic Survey (Abridged version).12 The purpose of this survey 
was to create ‘an accurate picture of the state of service delivery in the 
Eastern Cape.’13  Unfortunately, as at August 2007, the Office of the Premier 
has yet to release the unabridged survey which contains statistics for each 
municipal area.14 Once released, it would be apposite to compare some of the 
findings in each case study with the particular area results of the survey.  
 
Nonetheless, some of the recommendations made in the abridged Rapid 
Assessment Survey validate the conclusions made in this dissertation and 
relate directly to the challenges faced in the individual case studies. 
Noteworthy in these recommendations is the acknowledgement (in the 
context of realising the housing right within available resources) that under-
expenditure is ‘the biggest problem’15 and that ‘[t]he dumping of unused funds 
to municipalities at the end of each financial year’16 is a real concern. 
 
The survey further acknowledges that the need for local government to plan 
pro-actively ‘is a serious administrative and political challenge for local 
authorities in the Eastern Cape where capacities are lacking.’17 Although it is 
                                                 
12
 This survey was commissioned by the Premier of the Eastern Cape Government in 2005 
and was undertaken over the period 1 November 2005 until 30 June 2006. The survey was 
prepared by the Fort Hare Institute of Social and Economic Research in partnership with 
Development Africa and Take Note Trading Consortium (see Rapid Assessment Survey 1). It 
is referred to as the ‘Rapid Assessment Survey’ in this chapter. 
13
 Rapid Assessment Survey 1. 
14
 Both the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and The Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) have requested copies of the full survey report. In response, 
the Office of the Premier has, to date, not furnished these organisations with a copy of the full 
survey on the basis that it is ‘an internal planning document’ (e-mail communication from the 
Office of the Premier of the Eastern Cape to the SAHRC dated 16 March 2007). The Office of 
the Premier stated in a further e-mail communication (dated 17 July 2007) that ‘the full 
doc[ument] will possibly be released in early 2008.’ Notwithstanding, the PSAM has, as at 
August 2007, sought access to the full report via the provisions of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000. A response is awaited. 
15
 Rapid Assessment Survey 15. 
16
 Rapid Assessment Survey 15. 
17
 Rapid Assessment Survey 13.  
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not expressly stated in the survey, it is implied that some municipalities do not 
have housing strategies at all. This conclusion is drawn from the survey’s 
recommendation: ‘Municipalities need to have housing strategies in place.  
This could be incorporated into their IDPs.’18  
 
The survey also addresses the issue of capacity. It notes: ‘Few municipalities 
are geared towards housing delivery, some have no staff members assigned 
to do these jobs or have people with no capacity to perform.’19 This leads one 
to conclude that the serious capacity issues evident in two of the three case 
studies20 are by no means the exception to the rule.  
 
The concerns expressed in this dissertation about the state’s lack of co-
operative governance and lack of management of resources – both financial 
and human21 are identified in the Rapid Assessment Survey as serious 
impediments to the s26 right. It identified that a ‘lack of coherent strategic 
direction, conducive policy environment and good governance affects housing 
delivery processes.’22  
                                                 
18
 Rapid Assessment Survey 15. This comment should be seen alongside the finding in the 
survey (at 2) that only 10% of the municipalities in the Eastern Cape are ‘able to shoulder the 
burden’ of delivery of basic services. The survey does not indicate which municipalities fall 
within that 10%. 
19
 Rapid Assessment Survey 15. My italics.  
20
 See a discussion of capacity issues in Ngqushwa Local Municipality and Sakhisizwe Local 
Municipality in chapter 6. 
21
 More particularly, see conclusions 2 and 3 in this chapter. The prevalence of corruption 
within the municipalities and the Provincial Department around housing funds could not be 
properly canvassed in this dissertation, although some passing comments were made on this 
issue in chapter 6 when the Pillay Commission heard evidence that 583 employees of the 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government had received housing subsidies irregularly (with 
approximately 283 employees actually working in the Housing Department itself).  Eleven 
months later, none of the employees implicated had been subject to any disciplinary action. 
See Pillay Commission, Putu 235. It is submitted that the issue of corruption directly relates to 
the proper management, planning and monitoring of human and financial resources directed 
at realising socio-economic rights.  Significantly, the Rapid Assessment Survey highlights 
corruption as a major problem in the housing sector at both local and provincial level. The 
survey states (at 15): ‘Corruption in the Provincial Department must end and measures put in 
place to monitor processes’ and ‘Systems should be put in place to monitor [housing] delivery 
as corruption is rife in municipalities.’ My italics.  The survey was severely critical about local 
government generally stating (at 3) that it found that ‘local government is more about 
shielding corruption and incompetence than providing the constitutional space for local 
leaders and communities to make informed choices about policy and service options.’  
22
 Rapid Assessment Survey 15.  It is a pity that no research is available to the general public 
to determine how the authors of the survey came to this statement. It will be recalled that only 
an abridged version of the report is available which focuses on ‘recommendations’ and ‘key 
messages in housing’ without providing very much in the way of empirical data.  
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In another recently-released report, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
adequate housing also identified similar concerns about the housing policy 
environment when he visited South Africa on 12 April – 24 April 2007.23 In 
particular, he stated that ‘the progressive realisation of access to adequate 
housing in South Africa is compromised by the fragmented governmental 
approach to the implementation of housing law and policy.’24 He also 
questioned whether any level of government had actually sought to ensure 
that the policies put in place were effectively implemented, controlled and 
evaluated.25 As a result of his preliminary observations, he recommended that 
there needed to be ‘improved co-ordination amongst all government 
departments’ and that ‘a clear implementation strategy’ was needed.26 
 
The judgments of the courts (as discussed in chapter 4) speak directly to the 
concerns raised in the case studies, and the latest reports of the Rapid 
Assessment Survey and the UN Special Rapporteur. Rather than speaking 
about the content-specific nature of the housing right, the Constitutional Court, 
through the use of the reasonableness test, has emphasised the need for 
good governance, a conducive policy environment and strategic direction to 
deliver housing to the poor. Thus our Constitution recognises that housing 
policies and programmes must address the needs of the poor effectively. If 
this requires decisions that have extensive policy and budgetary implications, 
then that is what the Constitution requires.27  
 
The problems that have surfaced in this dissertation reflect a lack of careful 
planning by the Eastern Cape Housing Provincial Department and the local 
government case studies to manage and monitor scarce resources.  For 
example, the Provincial Department has stated many times that its under-
                                                 
23
 See Preliminary observations as of 24 April 2007 by the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on adequate housing, Mr Miloon Kothari in light of his mission to South Africa (12 April – 24 
April 2007), referred to as ‘UN Special Rapporteur’. 
24
 UN Special Rapporteur 2. 
25
 UN Special Rapporteur 2. 
26
 UN Special Rapporteur 10. 
27
 See, for example, the Court’s comment in Grootboom at para 94: ‘The Constitution obliges 
the state to give effect to [socio-economic rights]. This is an obligation that courts can, and in 
appropriate circumstances, must enforce.’ 
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expenditure is attributed to capacity constraints at municipal level.  However, 
the reasons given for such under-expenditure are questionable.  If it is a 
question of capacity at municipal level, it is reasonable to conclude that most 
of the 18% reported as being under-spent in the developmental local 
government programme28 should have been spent on capacity building, 
project management and capacitating staff at municipal level.  In addition, the 
29% reported as under-spent in the housing programme cannot be simply 
explained away because of ‘lack of capacity’ at municipal level when the 
Provincial Department under-spent in its developmental local government 
programme.   
 
Ultimately, this research has shown that recognition of the housing right in the 
Constitution and by the courts does not necessarily translate into effective 
recognition and implementation by the state. The message is not totally 
negative though – for two reasons.  First, it is hoped that the kind of research 
undertaken in this study will provide the state (be it national, provincial or 
local) and other stakeholders (be it civil society organisations or the 
communities themselves) with greater insight into the environment in which 
s26 and its supporting legislation must operate. Ideally, serious reflection on 
this research will lead to better planning and implementation of services that 
are aimed at realising socio-economic rights, and hence better living 
conditions for those must vulnerable in our society. The Rapid Assessment 
Survey and the UN Special Rapporteur both reiterate this message by 
suggesting that rigorous monitoring and evaluation requirements are needed 
to inform government planning.29 Whilst this kind of research should be the 
primary concern of the relevant state organs, it should also be undertaken by 
Chapter 9 institutions, civil society organisations and other concerned 
organisations. 
 
Second, while the purpose of this dissertation was largely exploratory (in 
seeking to establish how the housing right for those most vulnerable is being 
implemented in the Eastern Cape), the findings here suggest some exciting 
                                                 
28
 As discussed in chapter 6. 
29
 See Rapid Assessment Survey 1 and UN Special Rapporteur 10. 
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possibilities for litigation in the Eastern Cape in proceedings where a violation 
of s26 is alleged.  Here, a new research agenda is required, one in which 
more emphasis is placed on scrutinising the management of financial and 
human resources of the state in the context of the policy, planning and 
implementation environment.30  
 
Given the findings in this dissertation, an appropriate applicant in one of the 
case study areas could place evidence before the court that the state has, in 
some instances, not allocated its available resources at all – correctly or 
incorrectly. In addition, the applicant could show that, in allocating these 
resources, there is inefficient control over the effective utilisation of these 
available resources.31 Lack of planning, ineffective implementation and 
unspent housing budgets over an extended period of time surely falls foul of 
the reasonableness test, since such test covers both the conception (the 
legislation and policies drafted to effect s26) and the implementation of 
policies (the actual spending of the budget allocated to s26).32   
 
The Constitutional Court has confirmed that a court must take into account the 
availability of human and financial resources in determining whether the state 
has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness.33 In addition, 
the Constitutional Court has indicated that, albeit in another context, a court 
may go further: where the state pleads ‘lack of available resources’ or ‘lack of 
capacity’,34 a court will interrogate the precise character of those resource 
                                                 
30
 Should this research be undertaken, it would answer the supposed ‘hard question’ raised in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg II. In this matter, Harms ADP 
commented that there was no evidence to suggest that the state had allocated its available 
resources incorrectly and that there was no evidence to suggest how the state might have 
allocated its resources differently. See City of Johannesburg II para 45. 
31
 The Auditor-General Reports for the Eastern Cape Department of Housing, Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs are a rich source of information concerning effective 
spending. Significantly, the Auditor-General issued a disclaimer in respect of the Provincial 
Department for three years running. Recently (ie. for the 2006/2007 year), the Provincial 
Department received its fourth disclaimer. 
32
 It needs to be emphasised that what is required from the courts in this type of situation 
does not clash with the separation of powers, legitimacy and competence arguments raised in 
chapter 2. This is so because, as reiterated by the Constitutional Court, the determination of 
reasonableness may have budgetary implications, but this determination is not, in itself, 
directed at rearranging budgets. See TAC para 38. 
33
 Khosa para 44. 
34
 See chapter 4. The Constitutional Court has already said, albeit in another context, that it 
will not find an organ of state to have reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis of a 
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constraints to determine reasonableness.35 However, a court’s power is only 
as effective as the information placed in front of it. Evidence of unspent 
budgets, insufficient planning and mismanagement of resources will assist the 
courts in focusing on the implementation aspect of s26 thus ensuring that the 
housing right may yet have a meaningful impact on the lives of millions of 
those people who are most vulnerable in society. 
 
Finally, given reports by the UN Special Rapporteur and the SAHRC 
discussed in this dissertation, the research agenda suggested here should 
extend beyond the borders of the Eastern Cape Province. It appears that the 
mismanagement of housing budgets is not confined to the Eastern Cape and 
extends to other provinces.  After a careful examination of the SAHRC reports 
in 2003, Newman remarked:  
 
‘It was fortunate for the government that the damning words of 
constitutional violation for falling budgets and inappropriate 
management of existing budgets came thirteen months after the 
Grootboom decision was handed down rather than promptly enough to 
precede the decision.  In Grootboom,  the judges essentially operated 
from a premise that the government had a reasonable housing policy 
as a whole and that it was unreasonable basically only in that it failed 
to contemplate temporary shelter for those most in need.  Who knows 
how they might have reacted to the government’s argument of a 
reasonable housing policy in the wake of such realisations by 
constitutional rights-monitoring institutions?’36 
 
This lack of careful planning, it is submitted, runs contrary to the obligations 
imposed by the Constitution and supporting legislation.  This lack of planning 
                                                                                                                                            
bald assertion of resource constraints. See Rail Commuters Action Group and others v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and others 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC); 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC) para 88 
(Metrorail). 
35
 Metrorail para 88. 
36
 Newman 204. 
 216 
also fails to value the human dignity of the poor.37  As such, we are 
dangerously close to reliving the past.38  With a research agenda that focuses 
on peoples’ actual lived realities, we step further away from an undignified 
past and closer to a state which values human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.39 
 
                                                 
37
 Liebenberg (2005) 31.  See the UN Special Rapporteur’s comment (at 4) that he was ‘very 
disturbed to see large numbers of people living in situations of desperation and crisis and 
without basic human dignity.’ 
38
 The poet and philosopher George Santayana is reputed to have said: ‘Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’ A recent example suffices.  In Tswelopele 
Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality [2007] SCA 70 (RSA), 
officials from three governmental agencies in a joint operation, unlawfully expelled about one 
hundred persons from the rudimentary shelters they had erected and, in so doing, destroyed 
many of the persons’ belongings.  This arbitrary eviction took place despite the state’s 
constitutional obligations in terms of s26(3) and the criteria laid down by the courts in the 
jurisprudence discussed in Chapter 4.  In considering the remedy for such an unlawful act, 
Cameron JA stated at para 16: ‘It is impossible not to endorse appellant’s counsel’s 
submission that in its lack of respect for the poor and the vulnerable, and in the official hubris 
displayed, what happened displays a repetition of the worst of the pre-constitutional past.’  My 
italics. It was Cameron JA again who, in the context of the Eastern Cape government’s failure 
to provide social security grants to people in the Eastern Cape, described the conduct of the 
Eastern Cape government as ‘contradictory, cynical, expedient and obstructionist … as 
though it were at war with its own citizens, the more shamefully because those it was 
combatting were in terms of secular hierarchies and affluence and power the least in its 
sphere.’ (See Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, EC v Ngxuza 2001 (4) SA 1184 
(SCA); 2001 (10) BCLR 1039 (SCA) para 15).   
39
 Section 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Annexure A 
Interview Questionnaire 
 
General conceptual questions 
 
1. What do you understand by the term ‘adequate housing’ in section 26 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996? 
2. What do you understand by the term ‘emergency housing’? 
3. What sphere of government is responsible for ‘adequate housing’ and 
‘emergency housing’? (viz. national, provincial, local?) 
4. How does local government contribute to the fulfilment of the right to have 
access to adequate housing in the context of  
a. the Constitution and  
b. any other statutory obligations of local government? 
5. Do you consider the provision of housing to be a core function of local 
government?  
6. Is/are there programme(s) and/or structures designed to implement the 
housing right at national, provincial and local level? What are these 
programmes / structures? 
 
Specific questions  
 
7. Does the municipality have a programme to address housing needs within 
its area?  
a. If yes, what is it and when was it implemented? 
b. If no, why not? (specify any impediments, constraints etc.) 
(The next questions assume the existence of a programme:) 
8.  Does the programme address long, medium and short term needs? In 
particular, does the programme identify and have measures to deal with  
a. possible emergency housing needs; 
b. the bucket system (if operational in the municipality); and 
c. informal settlement upgrading? 
9. How does the programme interact with  
a. the municipality’s spatial development plan; and 
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b. district, national and provincial plans in your area (if any)?  
10.  Are performance monitoring mechanisms in place to monitor the success 
of the programme. If yes, please describe (eg data collection techniques, 
needs based surveys etc)? 
11. How is the housing programme financed? 
12. Does the programme cater for marginalized groups - for example, women, 
HIV, child-headed households and the poor? 
13. How does a person apply for housing? What are the procedures? 
14. How easy or difficult is it for the municipality to apply for and obtain finance 
for housing developments from the provincial Department of Housing – 
what are the procedures? 
15. What are the time lines from application to grant?  
16. Is a feasibility/needs survey conducted prior to the implementation of a 
housing project in the municipality’s area? 
17. How does the municipality  
a. communicate their needs to the provincial government and 
national government; 
b. align their housing programme with national and provincial 
housing programmes. 
18. Are provincial and national government responsive to requests by the 
municipality for assistance in drafting programmes, applying for grants 
etc.? In what ways do provincial and national government assist the 
municipality?  
19. What are the conditions attached, if any, to a grant given for a housing 
development? 
20. Have you experienced ‘fiscal dumping’ at end of year in respect of housing 
projects? 
21. Does the municipality educate/advertise housing lists (where and how?) / 
take surveys / provide assistance (where and how?). 
22. Has the municipality sought to evict people? If yes, 
a. what were the reasons for evicting a particular group? 
b. was the group consulted about the impending eviction? 
c. was alternative land and services made available? 
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d. If yes to (c), was previous location and livelihood strategies (e.g. 
informal employment in the area, family ties etc.) of the people 
taken into account when making the alternative land available? 
25.  Does the municipality have a separate programme or section of a 
programme making provision for people in desperate need of housing? If 
yes, 
a. how is financing for this kind of housing obtained? 
b. what interaction (if any) takes place between the municipality and 
provincial and/or national government regarding this kind of 
housing? 
26. Does the municipality’s housing programme deal with contingencies and 
necessary changes in direction? (e.g. is the programme flexible?) How is it 
flexible? 
 
Opinion Questions 
 
27. Do you believe that your municipality has fulfilled (and continues to fulfil) 
its obligations regarding provision of housing?  
a. If yes, why?  
b. If no, why (viz. what do you believe to be the main impediments 
to housing delivery?) 
28. Are you satisfied that  
a. there is a clear outline of the duties of local government in housing 
legislation and policies; 
b. the municipality is financially able to undertake its housing 
obligations; 
c. the municipality has adequate human resources to undertake its 
housing obligations; and 
d. there are clear lines of communication between the municipality and 
provincial and national housing departments?  
29. What would you suggest to improve the policy, legislation and regulatory 
environment in order to improve the municipality’s ability to meet its 
obligations in respect of the right to housing? 
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30. How do you think these obligations fit with the municipality’s obligation to 
promote economic development (viz. the developmental mandate of local 
government as set out in the Constitution)? 
Specific Questions  
 
31. Do all persons within the area of the municipality possess a degree of 
tenure which protects them against forced evictions and harassment either 
by statute or private actors? (Tenure may be in the form of rental 
accommodation (whether private or public), co-operative housing, lease, 
emergency housing, informal settlements, including occupation of land or 
property) 
32. Do all persons have recourse to a minimum set of services? In other 
words, do all persons in the area have sustainable access to  
a. safe drinking water,  
b. energy for cooking,   
c. heating and lighting,  
d. sanitation and washing facilities,  
e. means of food storage, refuse disposal,  
f. site drainage and emergency services?  
33. Does the municipality ensure that money spent on the provision of basic 
services and minimum standards (for example, those basic services set 
out above) is not to the detriment of other housing rights (such as housing 
acquired by means of subsidies, rental accommodation etc.)? 
34. Are all persons in the municipality protected from cold, heat, damp, rain, 
wind, or other threats to health and other structural hazards (e.g. bad 
roads, polluted areas etc.)? 
35. Is a person’s social status taken into account when providing him or her 
access to housing? For example: 
a. Relatives of officials and councillors; 
b. Identified race groups;  
c. Vulnerable groups (see question 12 above) 
36. Is the land allocated for housing  
 221 
a. Suitable in terms of employment options, health care services, 
schools, child care and other social facilities; 
b. far from polluted sites; and 
c. suitable in a way that allows different cultural formations to 
express themselves in their different cultures? 
37. Are communities affected (including the homeless and the inadequately 
housed) consulted before adopting a housing strategy? 
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Annexure B
Subsidy quantum for 30m2 houses in the 2006/2007 financial year (see 
http://www.housing.gov.za/content/Subsidy%20Information/Subsidies%20Home.htm
accessed 15 January 2007). 
Income category Previous 
subsidy 
New subsidy 
 
Contribution 
 
Product price 
Individual, Project linked and Relocation Assistance subsidies 
R0 to R1 500 R31 929,00 R36 528,00 None R36 528,00 
R1 501 to R3 500 R29 450,00 R34 049,00 R2 479,00 R36 528,00 
Aged, disabled or 
health stricken R1 
501 to R3 500  
R31 929,00 R36 528,00 None R36 528,00 
Institutional subsidies 
R0 to R3 500 R29 450,00 R34 049,00 Institution must 
add capital 
At least  
R36 528,00 
Consolidation Subsidies 
R0 to R1 500 R18 792,00 R21 499,00 None R21 499,00 
R1 501 to R3 500 R16 313,00 R19 020,00 R2 479,00 R21 499,00 
Consolidation 
Subsidy: Aged, 
disabled or health 
stricken R1 501 to 
R3 500 
R18 792,00 R21,499.00 None R21,499.00 
Rural subsidies  
R0 to R3 500 R29 450,00 R34 049,00 None R34 049,00 
People’s Housing Process  
R0 to R3 500 R31 929,00 R36 528,00 None R36 528,00 
Emergency Programme 
Temporary 
assistance* 
R26 874,00 R31 952,00 None R31 952,00 
Repair to existing 
stock: 
    
  
  
   Services R13 137,82 R15,029.00 None R15,029.00 
   Houses R18 792,00 R21,499.00 None R21,499.00 
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